THE SAṂDHINIRMOCANA SŪTRA: A LIBERATING HERMENEUTIC

A Dissertation

Submitted to

the Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by

Chen-Kuo Lin

March 1991

FORM IV

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE BOARD

Title of Dissertation:

Author:

Read and Approved by: ....

....

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Date submitted to Graduate Board: 4-2-91

Accepted by the Graduate Board of Temple University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy**.

Date 4/17/91 .... (Dean of Graduate School)

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Acknowledgements

In preparing this thesis, I have so many debts to those who gave me instructions and support that I am unable to acknowledge all of them. My thanks especially go to: the China Times Cultural Foundation for the 1989 award of a dissertation scholarship; Dr. Sandra Wawrytko, who was kind enough to read two chapters of this thesis with many stylistic suggestions; Dr. Alan Fox and Dr. Dan Lusthaus, who, while sharing with me years of friendship and academic growth, painstakingly reviewed the whole draft and allowed me to benefit from their valuable comments; Professor Thomas Dean, the reader of this thesis, who introduced me to modern Western thought; Professor Bibhuti Yadav, to whom I am indebted so much for his intellectual inspiration and spiritual encouragement. A special thanks is due Professor Charles Wei-hsun Fu, my advisor, who uncompromisingly guided me during my study at Temple University. Finally, I would like to mention my wife and children, Hsiao-Hsuan, Tiffany and Andrew, who shared with me every joyful or difficult moment during these years of graduate study.

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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 The significance of the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*

The present thesis is a textual, historical, and hermeneutical study of the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra* (henceforth, *SNS*), one of the most important Mahāyāna texts. As a founding scripture of the Yogācāra school, the *SNS* laid down the basic doctrinal framework which shaped the development of Yogācāra Buddhism. Under the influence of the *SNS*, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, two prominent Yogācāra thinkers of the fourth and fifth centuries, then successfully systemized Yogācāra philosophy. They either cited or completely incorporated the *SNS* into their works.1 It is through this process of canonization that the scriptural authority of the *SNS* was fully recognized and established.2

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1 The entire text of the *SNS* is incorporated into the *Bodhisattvabhūmi-viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. See T.30.713.c-736.c. The verses of *SNS* V appears in the beginning of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. See T.30.579.a. They are also seen in Paramārtha's translation, *Chüeh-ting tsang lun*, T.3o.1018.c. The *SNS* is also quoted in Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*. See T.31.33.a; 138,b.

2 According to the Tibetan account, Yogācāra was further subdivided into two lines of development: the scripture-follower (*āgama-anusārin*) and the logic-follower (*yukti-anusārin*). The former refers to those who follow Asanga's *Yogacarabhumi* in which the entire *SNS* is included. The latter refers to those who follow Dharmakirti's treatises of logic. See Alex Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians" (1979), p. 73. Strictly speaking, only

In the Chinese Yogācāra (Fa-hsiang) school, among the "six sūtras and eleven śāstras", K'uei-chi (632-682 C.E.) considered the SNS as the "fundamental residence" of Yogācāra Buddhism.3 The SNS was the subject of at least five commentaries after it was translated into Chinese four times starting from the first half of the fifth century. In Tibet, it was used by many eminent scholars as a key interpretative device for shaping their conception of Buddhist history. As seen in Bu-ston's (1290-1364) History of Buddhism, all Buddhist exoteric texts are cataloged in accordance with the model of "Three Turnings of the Dharma-Wheel", a basic framework originated in SNS VII.4 The SNS was also taken by Tsong Kha-pa (1357-1419) as a textual source for clarifying the distinction between "non-definitive" (neyārtha) and "definitive" (nītārtha), a central issue for East Asian

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pre-Dignāga or pre-Dharmakirti Yogacara can be characterized to be scripture-oriented.

3 See K'uei-chi, Ch'eng wei-shih lun shu-chi, T. 43.229.c-230.a. The six scriptures are: (1) Avataṃsaka Sūtra, (2) Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, (3) Ju-lai ch'u-hsien kung-te chuang-yen ching, (4) Mahāyāna-abhidharma Sūtra, (5) Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, and (6) Hou-yen ching (Ghanavyūha Sūtra ?). The eleven treatises are (1) Yogācārabhūmi, (2) Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun (Vikhyāpana?), (3) Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra, (4) Pramāṇasamuccaya, (5) Mahāyānasaṃgraha, (6) Daśabhūmikasūtra-śāstra, (7) Alambanaparīkṣa, (8) Abhidharmasamuccaya, (9) Viṃśatikā, (10) Madhyāntavibhāga, and (11) Yogavibhāṅgaśāstra.

4 The catalogue is not included in E. Obermiller's translation of History of Buddhism by Bu-ston (1931). I consult a Chinese translation by Kuo Ho-ch'ing, Fo-chiao shih ta pao-tsang lun (1986), pp. 208, 216, 219, 245.

Buddhism.5

The significance of the SNS has, of course, attracted the attention of modern scholars. In 1935, Etienne Lamotte published a Tibetan text of the SNS along with his French translation, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, L'Explication des Mystères, a magnum opus which remains a pioneering classic. His scholarship continues to be an indispensable source for any student who wants to study Yogācāra Buddhism.

Although they are less accessible to the Western academic circle, Japanese scholars' contributions to the same subject are also significant. We can at least mention Nozawa Josho and Nagasawa Jitsuto, who in 1957 separately published their studies and Japanese translations of chapter VIII of the SNS ("Maitreya Chapter") and its Tibetan commentaries.

In the English-speaking academic circle, recent scholars seem to pay more attention to Yogācāra than to Madhyamika. Many books on Yogācāra have been published, although there is still no monograph or translation of the SNS in English available.6 Among those scholarly discourses,

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5 See Robert A. F. Thurman, Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence (1984).

6 In addition to D. T. Suzuki's study and translation of The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (1930, 1932), Alex Wayman's analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi (1961) greatly contributes to the recent interest in Yogācāra studies. Here are mentioned some recent publications on Yogācāra: Janice D. Willis's On Knowing Reality (1979), Thomas A. Kochumuttom's A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience (1982), Stefan Anacker's Seven Works of Vasubandhu (1984), Diana Y.

this thesis particularly concerns the new trend of refusing to label Yogācāra Buddhism as "idealism".

1.2 Dispute Regarding the Label of "Idealism"

For those scholars involved in the dispute, what is at stake is to determine the ontological nature of external objects as conceived by Yogācāra. They began to question some taken-for-granted interpretations of Yogācāra concepts, such as, vijñapti-mātra or citta-mātra,[7] to see whether in fact the mind (citta) or consciousness (vijñāna) is the only reality such that external existents are nothing but representations (vijñapti) of the mind.[8]

In a review article of 1965, Alex Wayman argued that in Yogācāra Buddhism the object ceasing to be the object occurs only in the state of meditation. In that experience it is

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Paul's Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China (1984), Lambert Schmithausen's Ālayavijñāna (1987), Paul Griffiths, et al. (trans.), The Realm of Awakening (1989), Thomas E. Wood's Mind Only (1991), and Gadjin M. Nagao's Mādhyamika and Yogācāra (1991). French translations of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam by Poussin and Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa by Lamotte have been translated into English by Leo M. Pruden. For details, see "Bibliography".

7 Generally vijñaptimātra is translated by "consciousness only", "ideation only", or "representation only", etc., and cittamātra is translated by "mind only". Since these translations involve the very dispute which will be clarified in this thesis, the original terms are better left untranslated in this introductory chapter.

8 The rendition of vijñapti as "representation" is not accepted in the present thesis. It is used here simply to be faithful to the position which disagrees with the labelling of Yogācāra philosophy as "idealism".

not external objects whose existence is denied.[9] With reference to a passage found in SNS VIII.7, where the term vijñaptimātra is believed to appear for the first time, Wayman says:

> This passage does not constitute an idealist denial of an external object, but rather a disinterest in externals; because the yogin has retreated from manifold sense objects and dwells only on the meditative object in his mind.[10]

His observation is not only applied to the SNS, but is extended to the works of Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.[11]

In 1972, Walpola Rahula presented a sharp criticism. To those scholars who maintained that in the Yogācāra system the mind or consciousness is the only reality, Rahula contended that their interpretation is "wrong, a serious mistake, and that it is against all fundamental Buddhist teaching, whether Theravāda or Mahāyāna."[12] He argued that

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9 Alex Wayman, "The Yogācāra Idealism" (review article), Philosophy East and West 15.1 (1965), p. 69.

10 Alex Wayman, "The Mirror as a Pan-Buddhist Metaphor-Simile", in Buddhist Insight, p. 134.

11 See A. Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians", in JIABS 2.1 (1979), p. 70. His argument here is more subtly refined. According to his argument, even in the everyday state the nature of the external object is "misreported" or "fabricated". "Hence, the point is not to deny an external object, but rather to affirm the representation of it as a group fabrication; and so the common denial of an external object means in these terms that there is no object of which the representation is a faithful copy." (p. 67)

12 Walopa Rahula, "Vijñaptimātratā Philosophy in the Yogācāra system--Some Wrong Notions", Middle Way XLVII, 3, 1972, p. 118; also, Zen and the Taming of the Bull (1978), p. 79.

cittamātra or *vijñaptimātra* can be better translated as "only a thought", "only an idea", or "just a thought", "just an idea", meaning that all of the five aggregates, including mind (*citta*) or store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), are only a thought in the sense of absence of self (*nairātmya*).13

Within this trend of questioning the label of "idealism" for Yogācāra Buddhism, another perspective was raised by Lambert Schmithausen. In a 1976 article he declared that in most parts of the *Yogācārabhūmi* there is a "realistic ontology" which does not deny "the reality of insubstantial entities (*dharma*), mental as well as material ones", whereas, on the other hand, in the case of the *SNS* a "universal idealism" is clearly expressed.14

Like Wayman, Schmithausen was aware that the notion of *vijñaptimātra*15 results from the practice of meditation, but he further observed that a universal idealism was proclaimed by the *SNS* when it "simply extends this fact to ordinary objects, without justifying this procedure by any rational

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13 Rahula, *Zen and the Taming of the Bull*, pp. 84-85. His position is consistent with his other criticism about, for instance, "wrong notions of *dhammatā* (*dharmatā*)", a fundamental Buddhist idea which should not be conceived as something metaphysically "behind" the happening of events/things. See another paper, "Wrong Notions of *Dhammatā* (*Dharmatā*)", in *Zen and the Taming the Bull*, pp. 88f.

14 Lambert Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism", in *German Scholars on India*, II, (1976), pp. 238-240.

15 Schmithausen's rendition: "nothing but cognition", *ibid.* p. 240.

argument". "Yogācāra idealism", he concluded, "primarily resulted from a generalization of a fact observed in the case of meditation-objects, i.e., in the context of spiritual practice."16

This view is still maintained by Schmithausen. In a recent study, he expresses his disagreement with "the--mainly American--fashion of altogether denying idealism...even in texts like Saṃdh VIII.7-8 or Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā."17 Apparently this "American fashion" refers to the position represented by Alex Wayman.

The polemic on this issue has not yet ended; both sides are still attracting their own supporters. As far as the SNS VIII.7-8 is concerned, Paul J. Griffiths tends to side with Schmithausen when he argues that in the SNS:

> these increasingly explicit statements of the idea that the cosmos is simply a mental phenomenon are in no sense philosophically systematic, largely because of the genre of the material in which they appear. Texts of this kind do not provide analytical philosophical discussion since they are intended to present the word of the Buddha to his faithful hearers.18

His argument clearly suggests that the "idealist" statements in the SNS are simply dogmatic without any philosophical base. When the dogmatic character of the SNS is considered

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16 Ibid, p. 241. Also cf. the sixth chapter of the present thesis.

17 L. Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, Vol. II, (1987), pp. 298-299.

18 Paul J. Griffiths, On Being Mindless (1986), p. 77.

by Griffiths to be the result of the authority of the Buddha, he does not depart too far from Schmithausen's argument, that is, that the idea of _vijñaptimātra_ is nothing but the result of "generalization simply extended" from meditation experience.19

Despite their apparent disagreement, most modern scholars share the view that this problem can be explained in terms of meditation experience. Precisely based on this common view, one side argues that the object being denied is not the external object, but the image-object in the state of concentration, while another side contends that the early Yogācārins failed to justify philosophically the extension of _vijñaptimātra_ to external objects in everyday experience.

1.3 Natural World and Life-World

What really concerns both parties in this dispute is how Yogācāra understands the nature of the external world. Does an object exist outside of consciousness? Or, is an object grounded in consciousness? A good example of this dispute can be seen in various interpretations of the notion

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19 In this sense, Thomas A. Kochumuttom's bold attack against those who labeled Yogācāra philosophy "idealism" should not be overlooked. In his _A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience_ (1982), Kochumuttom rather argues that Yogācāra philosophy is better understood in terms of "realistic pluralism". By realistic pluralism he means " a theory that recognizes a plurality of beings which really exist and operate independently of each other". (p.1). This definition sounds more like the Sarvāstivādin than the Yogācārin position. Since Kochumuttom concentrates on Vasubandhu's system only, his argument is not discussed here.

of "three realms" (traidhātuka) in the statement of "the three realms are vijñaptimātra" (traidhātukam vijñaptimātram) or "the three realms are cittamātra" (cittamātram traidhātukam). As Rahula contends, the three realms, which include all existents both external and internal, physical and mental, are not grounded in "self".20 Schmithausen also holds that this statement does not deny "the existence of real objects", but rather denies "the existence of a Substantial Self (ātman)".21 Alex Wayman even more explicitly concludes that "the three worlds are the natural realm".22

Efforts to save the existence of external objects for Yogācāra philosophy, however, should not be taken to mean that the problem of the existence of the external object is the main concern of Yogācāra Buddhism. Instead, as this thesis argues, early Yogācāra Buddhists were never simply concerned with the existence of consciousness or external objects. What really concerned them is how to disclose the context of the life-world in which the interaction of

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20 W. Rahula, "Vijñaptimātratā Philosophy in the Yogācāra System--Some Wrong Notions", in Zen and the Taming of the Bull, p. 83.

21 See Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism", p. 245.

22 Alex Wayman, "Vasubandhu-Teacher Extraordinary", in Studia Missionalia 37 (1988), p. 261.

consciousness and object emerges.23 For Yogācāra, it is absolutely misleading to ask whether consciousness is grounded in the external object or the external object is grounded in consciousness because this question is based on an untenable assumption that there are "consciousness in itself" and "object in itself". Precisely this dualistic presupposition is subject to Yogacara criticism.

Like Buddhism in general, Yogācāra aims at liberation which transcends duality. The task of Yogācāra Buddhism is to explain what this duality is and how it arises in the everyday world. Without questioning the arising of duality within the context of the life-world, the problem of the external object, as raised in the modern debate, would be irrelevant. To Yogācāra, a hermeneutic of the life-world must precede epistemology, even though the latter is considered by Yogācāra as an indispensible analytical tool.

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23 The concept of life-world is adapted from Husserl's late work, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology (1970), in Part III.A of which the life-world concept was elaborated in full scale for the first time. Briefly, this notion is conceived in contrast to the notion of scientific world. In the following chapters, we will see that the relationship between the scientific world and the life-world is in parallel with, but different from, that between the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristic (parikalpita-lakṣaṇa) and the other-dependent characteristic (paratantra-lakṣaṇa). To Buddhism the samsaric life-world is "anonymous" in a way reminiscent of Husserl's statement: "It is a realm of something subjective which is completely closed off within itself, existing in its own way, functioning in all experiencing, all thinking, all life,thus everywhere inseparably involved; yet it has never been held in view, never been grasped and understood." (underlines mine) (Crisis, p. 112)

The Yogācāra hermeneutic is designed to disclose the construction of the samsaric life-world. It has a twofold function: interpretation and liberation. Interpretation leads to liberation, while liberation can be attained only through right interpretation and understanding. In the SNS, the doctrines of appropriating-consciousness (ādāna-vijñāna) and three natures (trisvabhāva) are taken as hermeneutic devices to interpret how the samsaric life-world is constructed and ceaselessly cycles. As to the path of liberation, SNS VIII ("Maitreya Chapter") presents methods of meditation-praxis through which the samsaric life-world can be transformed into the liberated life-world. These problems will be discussed in Part Two of this thesis.

1.4 Methodological Considerations and an Overview of Contents

The situation which Anthony Giddens called a "double hermeneutic" arises when this thesis attempts to interpret the SNS, a text which is basically characterizable as a liberating hermeneutic.24 This "double hermeneutic" consists of the hermeneutic contexts of both the SNS and the present thesis. While the former is thematically shaped in light of

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24 Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (1976), p. 158. According to Giddens, the social sciences are not only constituted within their traditions--the objects and events they study are also constituted within their own traditions. That is, the studying subject and the studied object are each confined by their own hermeneutic context.

the latter, viz., the modern conceptual horizon, this does not mean that the latter must methodologically control the former. On the contrary, the present thesis seeks to minimize methodological control so that the subject matter can speak out without much distortion. In order to facilitate the infusion of the horizons of the SNS and this study, both textual-historical methods and hermeneutical reflection are utilized to shape the methodological tone of this thesis.25

The present thesis is divided into three parts. Part One attempts to reconstruct the formation of the early Mahāyāna Yogācāra school. Part Two provides a hermeneutical analysis of the major doctrines of the SNS. Part Three is a selected translation of the SNS from Chinese sources. The contents of this thesis are briefly sketched below.

Part One, "The SNS and the Formation of the Early Yogācāra School", consists of three chapters.

Chapter Two: After Chinese and Tibetan sources are introduced, the redactional process of the SNS is reconstructed. Different layers of the text are examined in order to trace the specific schools by which they were influenced. Based upon these materials this chapter concludes by computing the dates of composition.

Chapter Three is devoted to clarifying the extremely

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25 For the notion of "fusion of horizons", see Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Second revised edition, 1989), p. 306.

obscure process of mahayanization which occurred in the Northern Abhidharma during the third and fourth centries. This chapter demonstrates that the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra resulted from the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra's encounter with the Prajñāpāramitā movement. This chapter also investigates the activities of the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra and the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika communities and their relationships to the Sarvāstivāda.

Chapter Four gives a survey of the three major phases of the development of Buddhist thought in India, viz. Abhidharma, Prajñāpāramitā, and the early Mahāyāna-Yogācāra, particularly in light of the early Yogācāra hermeneutical consciousness as shown in the well known passage, "Three Turnings of the Dharma-Wheel," in the SNS.

Part Two, "Yogācāra Hermeneutic of the Life-World", consists of Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

Chapter Five carefully treats the early doctrine of dependent origination in the *Nikāyas* and *Āgamas* and its subsequent development in the Sarvāstivāda and the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra. This chapter then analyzes the Yogācāra doctrine of appropriating-consciousness.

Chapter Six analyzes the doctrine of three natures.

Chapter Seven focuses on the Yogācāra conceptions of "text" and "reading" with reference to the method of meditation which leads to ultimate liberation.

Part Three, "A Selected Translation of the SNS," is

based on Hsüan-tsang's text, though the other three Chinese translations are consulted. In my translation I have checked Yüan-t'se's commentary and Lamotte's restored Sanskrit terms which are very helpful in penetrating some difficult passages.

Part One

The *SNS* and the Formation of the Early Yogācāra School

Chapter Two

The Making of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra

2.1 Chinese Primary Sources

In 435 A.D., Guṇabhadra (349-468), a Mahāyāna monk from Central India, arrived at Canton in South China. About ten years later, he translated a sūtra into Chinese, called Hsian-hsü chieh-tou ching, in two scrolls.1 In the Taishō edition, these two scrolls are edited as two separate sūtras: Hsiang-hsü chieh-tou ti p'o-lo-mi liao-i ching (Saṃdhinirmocana-bhūmipāramitānītārtha-sūtra) and Hsiang-hsü chieh-tou ju-lai so-tso sui-shun liao-i ching (Saṃdhinirmocana-tathāgata-kṛtyānuṣṭhānanītārthasūtra). They are the oldest Chinese translations of the last two chapters of the SNS.

Another work translated by Guṇabhadra was Ti-i i wu-hsiang lüeh.2 This work has been lost. Yet since some fragments were preserved in Chi-tsang's (549-623) Fa-hua hsüan-lun, the Ti-i i wu-hsiang lüeh is now identified as the first four chapters of the SNS.

In 514, the SNS was translated by Bodhiruci, a Buddhist

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1 See Seng-yu (445-513), Ch'u san-tsang chi-chi, scrolls II, XIV, (T.55.12,105). The biography of Guṇabhadra was edited by Seng-yu for the first time. See T.55.105.b-106.b.

2 Also see Ch'u san-tsang chi-chi, scroll II. (T.55.12.c).

monk from North India.3 This complete translation, entitled _Shen-mi chieh-tou ching_, was divided into ten chapters plus a Prologue.4 Bodhiruci came to North China through Central Asia. He was invited by Emperor Hsuan Wu to be the leader of a translation group, consisting of seven hundred Indian and Central Asian monk-translators.5 According to Li-k'uo's _Chung ching lu_, Bodhiruci collected ten thousand fascicles of Sanskrit texts in his private library. The drafts of Chinese translations filled the whole room.6 Thirty-nine Buddhist texts, comprising one hundred and twenty seven scrolls, were translated. Compared to the previous translations, the quality of Bodhiruci's works was a great improvement, partly because these works were regulated by rigorous rules and procedures.7

Half a century after Bodhiruci's translation, that is, about 557-569, the _SNS_ was translated into Chinese for the

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3 _Li-tai san-pao chi_, T.49.45,85. Compiled in 579, this work is one of the oldest catalogues of Chinese Buddhist literature.

4 The same chapter division is seen in the Tibetan translation. See Etienne Lamotte, _Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, L'Explication des Mystères_ (1935), pp.8-10.

5 See biography of Bodhiruci in _Hsü kao-seng chuan_, T.50.428.a.

6 _Hsü kao-seng chuan_, T.50.428.c.

7 As recorded in T'an-ning's translation preface to the _Shen-mi chieh-tou ching_, an oral translation was first presented by Bodhiruci and then discussed by the translation group before it was written down. See T.16.665.a.

third time by Paramārtha (499-569),[8] a well-known Buddhist scholar from Ujjaini in Western India.[9] His translation, with the title Fo-shuo chieh-chieh ching, contains the first four chapters only.

Like Paramārtha's translations of other Yogācāra texts, the contents of Fo-shuo chieh-chieh ching suggest that the original text might be different from the one used by the other translators. First, its Prologue is totally different from those seen in Bodhiruci's and Hsüan-tsang's versions.[10] Second, in Li-tai san-pao chi under the entry of "Chieh-chieh ching, one scroll" there is a note: "Originally the Scripture had eighteen chapters. Now this scroll is the fourth chapter only. Paramārtha selected it as the scriptural support."[11] This suggests that the original text of Paramārtha's translation, if existed, might be much larger than Bodhiruci's and Hsüan-tsang's versions.

Some textual materials also seem to support the

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8 Regarding the date of translation, two possibilities were recorded in Yüan-t'se's commentary. It was said that Paramārtha translated the SNS either in the years of Yung-ting (557-559) or in the second year of T'ien-chia (561). See Yuan-t'se's Shu, 2.1.a-2.b.

9 Hsü kao-seng chuan, T.50.429.c. See also, Diana Y. Paul, Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China (1984), pp. 11f.

10 Hsüan-tsang's version, see discussion below.

11 T.49.87.c. H. Ui rather suggests that this note is probably misprinted. The original note was prabably written as follows: "Now this scroll is the first one which is divided into four chapters." See H. Ui, Shōdaijōron kenkyū (1935), p. 59.

existence of a large version of the SNS. For instance, the verses of the SNS quoted in the Fo-hsing lun and the Hsien-shih lun, both translated by Paramārtha, are not seen in the extant SNS12. This might suggest that the translator of Fo-hsing lun and Hsien-shih lun knew an original SNS different from the versions used in Bodhiruci's and Hsüan-tsang's translations. Moreover, Yüan-t'se (613-697) in his Chieh shen-mi ching shu (hereafter, Shu) pointed out:

> This Scripture [SNS] as one set is of two versions. One is the larger version which contains one hundred thousand verses, the other one is the smaller version which contains one thousand and five hundred verses. Nevertheless, there was only one Sanskrit original for the brief version, which was translated into four Chinese texts by different translators.13

However, the existence of the large version of the SNS remains hypothetical and speculative unless more substantial evidence is found.

Paramārtha composed a commentary on the SNS, the Chieh-chieh ching shu, in four scrolls, which is listed in Li-tai

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12 In the Hsien-shih lun (T.31.878.c), it says: "The Buddha composed a verse in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra: The store-consciousness gives rise to discrimination. Discrimination gives rise to perfuming. Perfuming givies rise to the store-consciousness. Therefore, the cycle of life-and-death continues." This verse is not seen in the extant versions of the SNS. The other verses of the SNS quoted in Fo-hsing lun are all excluded in the translations of the SNS. See Fo-hsing lun, T.31.806.c, 812.a. Also cf. Jikido Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra) (1966), p. 295. The issue of whether or not Fo-hsing lun is an apocryphal text does not concern us. A passage of the SNS was also quoted in Shih-pa kung lun, T.31.846.b.

13 Shu, 2.1.a.

san-pao chi.14 But this commentary was not extant, and only some fragments are preserved in Yüan-t'se's commentary, Chieh shen-mi ching shu.15

The last complete Chinese translation was made by Hsüan-tsang (602-664) in 647, two years after his return from India. It has become a standard text because of its precise rendition. It should be noted that except for the Prologue the entire text of the SNS was incorporated in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī section of the Yogācārabhūmi (hereafter, Yobh).16 The latter was also translated into Chinese by Hsüan-tsang in 648 A.D.

There were several Chinese commentaries on the SNS. Five commentaries are recorded in the Tung-yü ch'uan-teng mu-lu17:

1. Chieh shen-mi ching shu, ten scrolls, by Hsüan-fan.
2. Chieh shen-mi ching shu, ten scrolls, by Yüan-t'se (Korean: Wonch'uk).
3. Chieh shen-mi ching shu, eleven scrolls, by Ling-yin.
4. Chieh shen-mi ching shu, ? scrolls, by Ching-hsing.
5. Chieh shen-mi shu, three scrolls, by Yüan-hsiao

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14 T.49.87.c.

15 Ou-Yang Ching-wu (1871-1943) collected those fragments into one volume called Chieh-chieh ching chen-ti shu. Unfortunately this work is not available to me.

16 T.30.713.c-736.c.

17 T.55.1153.a. Also cf., Fa-hsiang tzung chang-shu, T.55.1138.c.

(Korean: Wonhyo).

Of the above five commentaries, only Yüan-t'se's commentary is extant. Though its tenth chapter is no longer extant in Chinese, fortunately, his commentary was completely translated into Tibetan by Chos-grub (Fa-ch'eng) in ca. 842-846 A.D..18 The tenth chapter has been translated back into Chinese by Shoju Inaba from the Tibetan translation.19 Another restoration was also accomplished by Kuan-k'ung independently.20

Yüan-t'se's Shu is an eminent work. Its encyclopedic sources and insightful comments are indispensable for any research on the SNS. It is also important for our understanding of Yüan-t'se's intellectual career, a great Buddhist philosopher-scholar. Since he was disgraced as heterodox by Kuei-chi's disciples, Yüan-t'se has been almost forgotten for thirteen centuries. Even in modern Buddhist studies, he receives no proper recognition he deserves.21

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18 Shoju Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation of the chieh-shen-mi-ching-shu", in Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization (1977), p. 106.

19 Shoju Inaba, Enjiki gejimmikkyō-so no sanitsububun no kenkyū. Kyoto: Hozokan, 1949; also, Ōtani Daigaku Kenkyū Nempō, No.24, 1971, pp.1-132.

20 Kuan-K'ung's restoration which I have seen is a reprinted edition (Taipei, 1986). The data of original publication is not given.

21 Only a few modern Chinese, Japanese and Korean studies on Yüan-t'se are available. Such as, Pai-yi Yang, "Yüan-t'se chih yen-chiu", in Yang Pai-yi hsuan-chi, pp.252-303; Shotaro Iida, "A Mu Kung-hwa in Ch'ang-an--A Study of Life and Works of Wonch'uk (613-696), with Special Interest

Another commentary is available in Yü-ch'ieh shih ti lun chi, a commentary on the Yobh by Korean monk Tao-lun (Tun-lun. ca. 650-730), who belonged to the lineage of Kuei-chi. The first scroll was composed in 705 A.D.22 Tao-lun's commentary on the SNS can be easily sorted out from his voluminous commentary on the Yobh which contains the entire SNS.23 That work is also a valuable source because it preserves many contemporary and earlier commentaries of the Fa-hsiang school.

2.2 Tibetan Primary Sources

The official translation system in Tibet was established after 779 A.D.. The period from that point up to the establishment of the new translation system skad gsar bcad in 814 A.D. is called the "period of old translation". The period after 814 A.D. is called the "period of new translation". The extant Tibetan translations of the SNS belong to the latter. That is, they were translated after

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in the Korean Contributions to the Development of Chinese and Tibetan Buddhism," Proceedings of the International Symposium Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of Korean Liberation, Republic of Korea: National Academy of Sciences, August 11-12, 1975, pp. 225-251.

22 Pai-yi Yang, "Tao-lun yü-ch'ieh shih ti lun chih yen-chiu", in Hwakang Buddhist Journal, No. 7, 1984.

23 In 1917, Tao-lun's commentary on part of the SNS was edited and published by Chin-ling-ko-ching-ch'u in Nanjing (Taipei, reprint, 1985). The title was renamed as Chieh shen-mi ching chu, four scrolls.

814 A.D..24

However, according to Noriaki Hakamaya's research on the fragments of the old translation of the *SNS* which are preserved in the Tun-huang manuscripts, the *SNS* was already translated into Tibetan before 814 A.D.25 Moreover, Jñānagarbha (ca. 700-760) is said to have arrived at Tibet in ca. 740.26 The text of the *SNS* upon which he wrote a commentary could be a Tibetan translation. Therefore, we can assume that by the middle of the eighth century the *SNS* had already been translated into Tibetan.

For decades modern scholars have been interested in the Tibetan sources of the *SNS*. In 1935 Etienne Lamotte published a Tibetan text of the *SNS* with a French translation, in which the sources of the Tibetan translation are well surveyed.27 He also translated parts of Asaṅga's

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24 Noriaki Hakamaya, "The Old and New Tibetan Translations of the *Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*: Some Notes on the History of Early Tibetan Translation" (1984), pp. 192-176.

25 *Ibid*.

26 See Jutsudo Nagasawa, *Yugagyō Shisō to Mikkyō no Kenkyū* (1978), p. 16.

27 See E. Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra: L'explication des Mystères, Texte Tibetain, Edite et Traduit* (1935), pp.8-12. The Tibetan sources are listed as follows:

1. *Ḥphags pa dgoṅs pa ṅes par ḥgrel pa theg pa chen poḥi mdo* (= *Āryasaṃdhinirmocanamahāyānasūtra*)
2. *Ḥphags pa dgoṅs pa ṅes par ḥgrel paḥi rnam par bsad pa* (= *Āryasaṃdhinirmocanabhāṣya* by Asaṅga)
3. *Ḥphags pa dgoṅs pa zab mo ṅes par ḥgrel paḥi mdohi rgya cher ḥgrel pa* (= *Āryagambhīrasaṃdhinirmocanasūtraṭika* by Yūan-t'se)
4. *Ḥphags pa dgoṅs pa ṅes par ḥgrel paḥi mdoḥi rnam par bsad pa* (= *Āryasaṃdhinirmocanasūtrasya vyākhyānam*,

Bhasya.28 Later, between 1939-1941, Nishio Kyoo published a thorough study and complete Japanese translation ot Asanga's Bhasya.29

In addition to Asanga's commentary, there are two other existing Tibetan commentaries: (1) Jnanagarbha's Samdhinirmocanasutre Aryamaitreya-kevala-parivarta-bhasya (Tohoku Catalogue, No. 4033) and (2) Byan-chub rdsu-hphrul's Samdhinirmocana-sutra-vyakhyana (Tohoku Catalogue, No. 4358).30 While Jnanagrabha's commentary deals only with the "Maitreya Chapter" (SNS VIII), Byan-chub rdsu-hphrul's commentary covers the entire text. Jnanagarbha's commentary with its corresponding Byan-chub sub-commentary was studied and translated into Japanese by Josho Nozawa in 1957. The Tibetan text of Jnanagarbha's commentary was also edited by

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author unknown)

5. Ḥphags pa dgoṅs pa ṅes par ḥgrel paḥi mdo las ḥphags pa byams paḥi leḥu ni tsheḥi bsad pa (= Āryasaṃdhinirmocanasūtre āryamaitreyakevalaparivartabhāṣyam, by Jñānagarbha).

28 Ibid, pp. 182-183, 187, 191.

29 Nishio Kyōo, "Mujaku zo gejimmikkyō-sho ni tsuite", Ōtani Gakuhō, 20.1, 1939. Buchikyōron no Kenkyū (Nagoya, 1940), pp.36-42. "Mujaku zo gejimmikkyō-sho" (II) & (III), Ōtani Gakuhō, 22.1, 3, 1941.

30 Recently, according to E. Steinkeller, Byan-chub rdzu-'phrul has been identified as the king Khri-sroṅ lde-btsan, or more plausibly, Klu'i rgyal-mtshan. See Steinkeller, "Who is Byaṅ chub rdzu 'phrul? Tibetan and non-Tibetan Commentaries on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra--A survey of the literature." See Lambert Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, Part II, (1987), p. 577.

Nozawa in the same study.31 Similar research was conducted independently by Jitsudo Nagasawa at almost the same time (1957-1960). He translated the "Maitreya Chapter" with Jñānagarbha's commentary.32

The SNS played an important role in the history of Tibetan Buddhism. In addition to the above-mentioned commentaries, the SNS was also highly exalted and well expounded in two of Tsong kha-pa's works. The first one is his magnum opus, the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (Lam rim chen mo), particularly the section on calming and discerning (śamatha-vipaśyanā).33 The other is The Great Essence of True Eloquence, which focuses on the hermeneutical distinction of definitive teaching and non-definitive teaching as found in the SNS and the

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31 Josho Nozawa, Daijō Bukkyō Yugagyō no Kenkyū. Kyoto: Hozokan, 1957.

32 Jitsudo Nagasawa, Yugagyō Shisō to Mikkyō no Kenkyū (1978), pp. 372-399. To my knowledge, Nagasawa (1910-1968) was the first to do thorough research on Jñānagarbha. Now, the importance of Jñānagarbha's thought seems to attract the attention of English-speaking scholars. See Malcolm David Eckel, Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths (1987). However, a Japanese translation and study of the same text by Jnanagarbha, done by Nagasawa and published in 1960, was not yet consulted by Eckel.

33 This section was translated into English by Alex Wayman. See Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (1978). The whole text of Lam rim shen mo was translated into Chinese by Fa-tsun in 1935. See P'u-t'i tao tz'u-ti kuang-lun (reprint, 1987).

Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra.34 Both works are valuable for our study of the SNS.

2.3 The Structure of the SNS

Like many other Mahāyāna sūtras, the SNS was not originally composed as a single text by a single author. The modern concept of text, i.e., one text by one author, does not apply to the Mahāyāna tradition. On the contrary, the SNS as a Mahāyāna text was made possible through a long process of compilation and canonization.

Before we start to uncover the structure of the SNS, we have to know its present chapter division first. In the Bodhiruci and Tibetan versions, the SNS is divided into ten chapters plus a Prologue. Each chapter is named after a bodhisattva who plays the role of interlocutor in that chapter. In the Hsüan-tsang's version, the SNS is divided into eight chapters in which the Prologue is counted as the first chapter and the second chapter ("The Characteristics of the Ultimate Truths") contains the first four chapters in the other versions. Every chapter is named after its theme, not after a bodhisattva. In Guṇabhadra's translation, the chapter division is identical with that of Hsüan-tsang's version. In Paramārtha's translation, the four chapters (I

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34 Robert Thurman, tr. Tsong-khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence (1984). A complete Chinese translation was done by Fa-tsun in 1936. See Pien liao pu-liao i shan-shuo tsang lun (1979, reprint).

to IV) are also titled in terms of theme.[35]

To be compatible with Lamotte's Tibetan text and French translation, in this thesis the *SNS* is divided into ten chapters plus a Prologue:

Prologue

Chapter I: The Characteristics of the Ultimate Truth (I)

Chapter II: The Characteristics of the Ultimate Truth (II)

Chapter III: The Characteristics of the Ultimate Truth (III)

Chapter IV: The Characteristics of the Ultimate Truth (IV)

Chapter V: The Characteristics of Mind-Mentation-Consciousness

Chapter VI: The Characteristics of All Dharmas

Chapter VII: The Characteristics of Non-Self-Natures

Chapter VIII: The Exposition of Yoga-Practice

Chapter IX: The Stages of Perfection

Chapter X: The Accomplishments of the *Tathāgata*

The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Chapters each ends with an epilogue. Such epilogues usually indicate the completion of a *sūtra*.[36] The existence of epilogues may suggest that, as H. Ui assumes, the *SNS* was compiled from the different sources in following order: (1) the ur-text:

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35 Cf. Lamotte, *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, pp. 8-12.

36 In Paramārtha's translation, an epilogue is found at the end of the fourth chapter, which was obviously taken from the end of the ninth chapter in order to complete the *sūtra* form. See T.16.714.c.

chapters I-VII; (2) the second layer: chapter VIII; (3) the third layer: chapter IX and X; (4) the Prologue was added at the last stage of compilation.37 In the following, we will try to trace the origins of each layer in the hope that the historical context of the *SNS* can be better clarified.

(1) The ur-text

The first layer, i.e., the ur-text, starts from chapters I-IV on the characteristics of the ultimate truths.38 Those characteristics are also stated in the *SNS*. VII in the form of an aphorism: "All dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent, nirvanic by nature." This description of the ultimate truth appears first in the Prajñāpāramitā literature that is totally in opposition to the Abhidharma position.39 For example, the Prajñāpāramitā idea of "non-self-nature" differs from the Abhidharmic idea of "self-nature". By the same token, the Prajñāpāramitā realization of "non-arising" is in contrast with the Abhidharma notion

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37 H. Ui, *Indo Tetsugakushi* (1965), p.323.

38 Five characteristics are (1) non-duality (*advaya*), (2) inexpressibility (*anabhilāpya*), (3) transcending reasoning, (4) transcending identity-and-difference, and (5) one-flavor (*ekarasa*).

39 In the *Small Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, it is said: "The wisdom of perfection comes into existence for the sake of the big event. The wisdom of perfection comes into existence for events which are unthinkable, inexpressible, unmeasurable, and innumerable." (T.8.559.c; 450.c; 492.b; 632.b) See Nishio Kyōo, "Gejimmikkyō seiritsu kōzō no kenkyū (II)", *Ōtani Gakuhō*, 24.3, 1943, p. 15.

of "arising" as one of the universal characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) of dharmas.[40] Since it is difficult for the Abhidharmists to understand and accept the Prajñāpāramitā realization of the ultimate truth, the mahayanized Yogācārins of the SNS attempted to make this Prajñāpāramitā "hidden meaning" explicit to the non-Mahāyānists. As a result, the doctrines of the appropriating-consciousness and the three natures in SNS V, VI and VII are formulated as a hermeneutical device to disclose the "hidden meaning" of the Prajñāpāramitā realization. We will return to this problem in chapter three of the present thesis.

SNS V focuses on the doctrine of appropriating-consciousness or store-consciousness. In chapter VI, the doctrine of the three natures is employed as a hermeneutic model to interpret and transform the samsaric life-world into the liberated life-world. Chapter VII sheds new light on the meaning of emptiness through the doctrine of the three non-natures.

It is implausible to find the origins of those chapters in the early Mahāyāna scriptures or, as Sasaki Geshu argued,

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40 In the Abhidharma tradition, the ultimate truth is understood as the "universal characteristics" of dharmas, which are later classified into the "sixteen aspects" (ākāra) of dharmas in terms of four noble truths. For the details, cf. chapter 3 of the present thesis.

the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* in particular.41 Instead, we have to pay attention to the Abhidharma schools of the time. As pointed out in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-śāstra*, many Abhidharma schools had already developed the ideas preceding the Yogācāra notions of appropriating-consciousness and store-consciousness.42 This complicated issue will be discussed in the next chapter.43

Regarding the origins of the doctrines of the three natures and the three non-natures, some scholars have

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41 For Sasaki Geshu's argument that these chapters can be traced back to the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, see Nishio Kyōo, "Gejimmikkyō seiritsu kōzō no kenkyū", *Ōtani Gakuhō*, 24.1 (1943), p. 10. The reasons to support Sasaki Geshu's observation are: (1) the bodhisattvas as the interlocutors in those chapters were already active in the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*; (2) the doctrine of store-consciousness was found in a Chinese translation of the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*. However, since the same paragraph was not found in any earlier translations of the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, it is believed to have been inserted into the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* at a later date. At any rate, from both doctrinal and textual perspectives it is unlikely that the origins of those chapters of the *SNS* can be attributed to the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*.

42 T.31.134.a. Also see Lamotte, p.26f.

43 Jikido Takasaki contends that the doctrine of *ālaya-vijñāna* was developed from the Sarvāstivāda school. See J. Takasaki, "Kegon shisō no tenkai", in *Koza Daijō Bukkyō*, Vol. 3, *Kegon Shisō*, p. 33. Whereas, Lamotte argues that "the discoverers of the *ālayavijñāna* belonged to the Sautrāntikas; the Vijñānavādins borrowed this theory by adapting it to the doctrine of mind-only." See *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa: The treatise on Action by Vasubandhu*, English translation by Leo M. Pruden (1988), p.38. However, as shown by all textual evidence, the concept of *ālayavijñāna* did not appear in early Savāstivāda literature, such as *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra*. Cf. Naoya Hunahashi, *Shoki Yuishiki Shisō no Kenkyū* (1976), pp. 29-52. A thorough investigation on the issue of how and when the notion of *ālayavijñāna* originated was recently done by L. Schmithausen. See L. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna* (1987).

noticed their probable relation to the Prajñāpāramitā literature when a similar doctrine was found in the *Byams ṣus kyi leḥu* (*BSL*) ("The chapter Preached at the Request of Maitreya"), the 72nd chapter of the Tibetan version of the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra* (*PVSP*).44

The *BSL* was not found in Hsüan-tsang's translation and other Chinese translations of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, but it was quoted by Asvabhāva (ca. 450-530) and Bhāvaviveka (ca. 490-570).45 In Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and Vasubandhu's *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*, the *BSL* version of the

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44 E. Obermiller was the first to notice this connection in *The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreya* (1932). His remark is worth quoting here: "In connexion with the teaching about the three aspects of existence as one of the main tenets of the Yogācāra Vijñānavāda school, it will be of interest to mention a peculiar feature of the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra*. We here have a chapter containing the questions of Maitreya, in which a differentiation is made between the imputed elements (*kalpita*), the elements as representations of constructive consciousness (*vikalpita*), and of the elements in the aspect of the Absolute (*dharmatā*). As this differentiation appears to be identical with the teaching of the three aspects of existence, as we have it in the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, the Yogācāras consider the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā* to be a text, the main standpoint of which is quite the same as that of the said Sūtra, i.e. a Yogācāra work." (pp.97-98)

In addition to the *PVSP*, the same material also exists in the 83rd chapter of the *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*. English translation, see Edward Conze, *The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom* (1975), pp. 644-652. The Sanskrit text is edited by E. Conze and Iida Shotaro in "'Maitreya Questions' in the Prajñāpāramitā", in *Melanges D'Indianisme: A La Memorie de Louis Renou*, 1968.

45 Asvabhāva quoted it twice in his commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*. See T.31.382.c; 399.b-c. Bhāvaviveka's quotation is seen in his *Tarkajvālā*. Cf., Noriaki Hakamaya, "A Consideration on the *Byams ṣus kyi leḥu* from the Historical Point of View", in *IBK* 24-1 (1975).

doctrine of the three natures was also discussed.46 Later, Dignāga (480-540) stated clearly that the doctrine of the three natures is based on the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*.47 These textual materials suggest that the *BSL* must have existed before Asaṅga and were accepted as a part of the Prajñāpāramitā literature by both Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. However, since the *BSL* was the last section interpolated into the *PVSP*,48 the origin of the *BSL* remains undetermined. Based on the above observations, this thesis suggests that the Yogācāra doctrine of the three natures resulted from the encounter of the Prajñāpāramitā literature and the Abhidharma literature.

(2) The second layer

Chapter VIII ("The Maitreya Chapter") on meditation was added to the ur-text as the second chapter. The subject matter of this chapter is more closely related to the *Yobh*, an encyclopedic manual of the Yogācāra school, than any other *SNS* chapters. According to Hsüan-tsang's account, the *Yobh* was recited by Buddha-to-be Maitreya at the request of Asaṅga.49 But according to a Tibetan source, the authorship

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46 See N. Hakamaya, *ibid*., pp. 24-27.

47 Dignāga, *Prajñāpāramitā-piṇḍārtha-saṃgraha*, T.25.913.b. This is pointed out by Yang Pai-yi, "Shih-ch'in san-hsing lun chih yen-chiu", in *Yang Pai-yi hsüan-chi*, p. 391.

48 This was suggested by Bu-ston in his *History of Buddhism*, II, p. 50. See E. Obermiller, *ibid*, p. 98, n. 1.

49 "Postscript of Translation" by Hsu Ching-chung, T.30.284.a.

of the *Yobh* was attributed to Asaṅga; this was confirmed by the Sanskrit manuscript of *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* discovered in 1938.[50] However, this issue still reamins controversial. Both Akira Mukai and Alex Wayman agree that Asaṅga is the author of the *Yobh*; they also assume that the *Yobh* came after the *SNS*. But there is a growing number of scholars who rather contend that the *Yobh* was produced collectively for generations, and during this long period the *SNS* was composed before the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* and after the *Saptadaśabhūmika*, two major sections of the *Yobh*.[51]

This textual problem can not be easily resolved without a thorough comparison of the *SNS* and the *Yobh*. Nevertheless, it is certain that, as the present author argues, both texts belonged to the same trend of mahayanization that occurred in the Yogācārin communities in Northwest India. It is reasonable to accept that the *Yobh* was completed and edited

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50 See N. Dutt, "Introduction" to *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (1966), p.3.

51 See Alex Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript* (1961); Akira Mukai, "Asanga niokeru daijo-shiso no keisei to kugan", *Shūkyō Kenkyū* 227 (1976), pp. 23-44, and "Yugaron no seiritsu to asanga no nendai", *IBK*, 29-1 (1981), pp. 680-686. For those who consider the *Yobh* to be a collective work, see Shinjo Suguro, "Yugaron no seiritsu ni kansuru shikan", *Ōsaki Gakuhō*, No. 129 (1976), pp. 1-50; Koitsu Yokoyama, "Goshisō yorimita miruku no chosaku", *Shūkyō Kenkyū*, No. 208 (1971), pp. 27-52; Jikido Takasaki, "Yugagyō-ha no keisei", *Koza Daijōbukkyō*, Vol. 8 (1982), pp. 1-42; Noriaki Hakamaya, "Yugagyō-ha no bunken", in *Koza Daijōbukkyō*, Vol. 8 (1982), pp. 43-76; Lambert Schmithausen, "Zur Literaturgeschichete der alteren Yogācāra-Schule", *ZDMG*, Supplementband 1, 1969; Akira Hirakawa, *Indo Bukkyōshi*, Vol II (1979), pp. 92-119.

by Asaṅga sometime after the SNS had already been existent as the earliest Mahāyāna-Yogācāra text.

To study the origin of the SNS VIII, we should examine its relationship with the Śrāvakabhūmi, an important section of the Yobh. Both texts were regarded as manuals for meditation. J. Takasaki contends that the Śrāvakabhūmi presents the method of meditation practiced in the Sarvāstivāda school, while Alex Wayman considers the Śrāvakabhūmi to belong to the Mahiśāsaka.52 Based upon the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra tradition as presented in the Śrāvakabhūmi, the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra composed SNS VIII as a meditation guide for their own communities. Here we see the continuity of doctrine and practice between the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra and the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra.

(3) The third layer

The last two chapters of the SNS were related to a rather different source, the Avataṃsaka Sūtra. According to Nishio Kyōo, chapter IX on the stages of perfection (bhūmipāramitā) was taken from the Daśabhūmika chapter of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, while chapter X was inherited from the of Tathāgatotpattisambhava chapter of the same Sūtra.53

The Mahāyāna doctrine of Ten Stages and buddhology,

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52 J. Takasaki, "Yugagyōha no keisei", Koza Daijōbukkyō, Vol. 8, p. 20; Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript, p.45.

53 See Nishio Kyoo, "Gejimmikkyō seiritsu kōzō no kenkyū", (III), pp. 23-38.

especially that in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, was accepted by the Yogācārin communities. This doctrine was also inherited in the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*. Again, this indicates that the tendency towards mahayanization did occur in the Yogācārin communities.

It is interesting to note that chapters VII and VIII of the *SNS* share the same type of epilogue in which hundreds and thousands of sentient beings, śrāvakas, and bodhisattvas are reported to have attended the assembly and to have gained spiritual blessings. Whereas, chapters IX and X of the *SNS* share another type of epilogue in which only the bodhisattvas are said to attend the assembly and gain spiritual benefits. This indicates that the process of mahayanization had been completed by the time the last two chapters were interpolated into the *SNS* as the third layer. It also shows that the influence of the *Avataṃsaka Sūtra* could be very significant at this redactional stage.

(4) The last layer

The last layer is the Prologue. As mentioned, there are two versions: Paramārtha's and Bodhiruci/Hsüan-tsang's. It is claimed in Paramārtha's version that the *SNS* was delivered at Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa of Rājagriha for monks and nuns.54 Another opinion was also held by Paramārtha that the

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54 *SNS*, T.16.711.b-c.

SNS was preached at Ghost King Hall in Vaiśālī.55 Although Paramārtha's account is somewhat confused, it does indicate that the Prologue of the SNS had not been completely standardized before Paramārtha arrived in China in 546.

The standardized Prologue (i.e., Bodhiruci/Hsüan-tsang's version) is also found in the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra56, the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa of Bandhuprabha57, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha of Asaṅga58, and the Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya of Vasubandhu59. As remarked in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, this prologue was common to most sūtras in the Bodhisattva Basket. In the Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya translated by Paramārtha, those sūtras were identified either as the Pure Land Sūtra or the Avataṃsaka Sūtra.60 The latter is confirmed by Nishio Kyōo as the original source of the

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55 Paramārtha, Chieh-chieh ching shu. This was quoted by Yüan-t'se in his Shu, 3.1.b.

56 Fo-shuo fo-ti ching, T.16.720.b-c.

57 Fo-ti ching lun, T.26.261.b-301-a. For English translation, see J. Keenan, "A Study of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa: The Doctrinal Development of the Notion of Wisdom in Yogācāra Thought", Part II (1980).

58 Shê ta-sheng lun, T.31.131.c;151.a; Lamotte, La Somme Du Grand Vehicule D'Asaṅga (Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Tome II (1973), p. 317. For English translation, see Paul J. Griffiths, et al., The Realm of Awakening (1989), pp. 55-56.

59 Shê ta-sheng lun shih, T.31.263.a;376.c-377.b.

60 T.31.263.a. This must be Paramārtha's own commentary, because it is not seen in Hsüan-tsang's new translation.

Prologue of the _SNS_.61 Again, this means that in the final stage of compilation the _SNS_ might be under the dominant influence of the _Avataṃsaka Sutra_.

2.4 Dates of Composition/Compilation

Based on the above study, we are sure that the _SNS_ was composed and compiled over generations. However, like any other Mahāyāna _sutras_, the dates of the _SNS_ can be located hypothetically by the following considerations:

(1) Guṇabhadra (394-468), the first translator of the _SNS_ into Chinese, was forty-one years old when he arrived at China in 435 A.D.62 Accordingly, the _SNS_ must have existed before his life-time.

(2) The _SNS_ was never mentioned by Nāgārjuna (ca.150-250) in his works.63 It must, therefore, have come into existence after him.

(3) The _SNS_ must also have existed before Asaṅga's time, because it was quoted in the _Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī_ of the _Yobh_ and Asanga's _Mahāyānasaṃgraha_.

As for Asaṅga's own date, there is much dispute amongst scholars, and their hypotheses are often mutually

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61 Nishio Kyōo, "Gejimmikkyō seiritsu kōzō no kenkyū", pp.15-37.

62 See _Kao-sêng chuan_, T.50.344-345.

63 Cf. Yin-shun, _Ch'u-chi ta-sheng fo-chiao chih ch'i-yüan yü kai-chan_ (hereafter, _Ch'u-chi_), pp. 23-37.

exclusive.[64] Any attempt to completely solve this issue would go beyond the limited scope of this chapter, nonetheless we must propose acceptable dates for Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

Among those attempts to fix the dates of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, Frauwallner's answer in his theory of two Vasubandhus is most striking and controversial. According to his theory, Vasubandhu the younger, the author of *Abhidharmakośa*, lived between 400-480 A.D. Vasubandhu the elder, a half-brother of Asanga and co-founder of the Yogācāra school, lived around 320-380 A.D.[65] This conclusion was called into question and refuted immediately by several scholars.[66] For example, Alex Wayman claimed that he cannot agree with the theory of two Vasubandhus after having read

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64 The following is a list of selected answers:

Maitreya	Asanga	Vasubandhu	
	275-345		N. Dutt (1966)
270-350	310-390	320-400	H. Ui (1924)
ca. 300	315-390	320-380 Old Vasubandhu	Frauwallner
		400-480 Young Vasubandhu	(1951)
		316-396	S. Anacker (1984)
	336-405	360-440	Yin-shun
	350-415	360-440	K. Schukla (1973)
	375-430		Alex Wayman (1961)
	375-450	390-470	U. Wogihara (1930)
			Akira Mukai (1981)
350-430	395-470	400-480	Ryushu Hikata (1954)
			Akira Hirakawa (1973)
	410-500	420-500	J. Takakusu (1905)

65 E. Frauwallner, *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu* (1951).

66 One example is P. S. Jaini, "On the Theory of Two Vasubandhus", in *BSOAS*, XXI, 1958.

Frauwallner's books "several times in the past few years".67 He proposes different dates for Asaṅga, circa 375-430.68

Except for L. Schmithausen, nowadays most scholars do not accept Frauwallner's theory of two Vasubandhus, but they have reached a different concensus, that is, the activities of Vasubandhu must have occurred in the fifth century. Since Asaṅga is the elder brother of Vasubandhu, his dates must be earlier. Consistent with this theory, Akira Mukai proposes the dates of 375-450 for Asaṅga and 390-470 for Vasubandhu; his observation also confirms the conclusion presented by U. Wogihara in 1930.69 The dates accepted by most Japanese scholars are those proposed by Ryushu Hikata and Akira Hirakawa, i.e., 395-470 for Asaṅga and 400-480 for Vasubandhu.70

Biographical materials on Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are preserved in both Chinese and Tibetan texts. It should be noted that Tibetan sources offer a narrative version much later than that of the Chinese sources.71 Among Chinese

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67 Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript, 1961, p. 19.

68 Ibid, p. 23.

69 Akira Mukai, "Yugaron no seiritsu to asanga no nendai", in IBK 29-2, 1981, pp. 680-204.

70 Akira Hirakawa, "Introduction" to Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (1973), pp. ii-x; Indo Bukkyōshi, Vol. II, (1979), pp. 92-119.

71 The Tibetan accounts of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are seen in Bu-ston's The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet, tr. by E. Obermiller (1932), pp. 136-147 and

sources, The Life of Vasubandhu translated by Paramārtha is the oldest material.72 The other important source is Hsüan-tsang's account in Hsi-yü chi.

According to Paramārtha's account, Vasubandhu received patronage from the Gupta rulers Vikramāditya and Bālāditya. The former was identified by Frauwallner with Skandagupta (ca. 455-467) and the latter with Narasiṃhaguta (ca. 467-473).73 However, other theories as to the identities of those two rulers have been proposed.74 For example, Vikramāditya is identified with Candragupta II (375-415) by both K. Shukla and S. Anacker. This seems more plausible than Frauwallner's judgment.

Whether or not Bālāditya in Paramārtha's biography of Vasubandhu can be identified with any Gupta ruler, his activity, contemporaneous with Vasubandhu's, should thereby occur after 415 A.D. Therefore, it is impossible to assign the hypothetical date 320-400 A.D. to Vasubandhu (H. Ui) or 320-380 A.D. to "Vasubandhu the older" (Frauwallner).

Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, tr. by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya (1980), pp. 154-175. The former was written by Bu-ston in 1322, while the latter was written by Tāranātha in 1608.

72 T.50.188-191. English translation by J. Takakusu was published in T'oung Pao, Serie II, Vol. V, 1904, pp. 269-296.

73 Frauwallner, ibid, p. 26. This identification is accepted by Akira Hirakawa in his "Introduction" to Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Part One, p. iii.

74 See K. Shukla, "Introduction", pp. lxxxiii.

Based on the aforementioned identification of Vikramāditya with Candragupta II, K. Shukla proposes the dates of ca. 360-440 A.D. for Vasubandhu. This conclusion is surprisingly confirmed by Yin-shun through totally independent research.75 If Asaṅga is assumed to be ten years older than Vasubandhu, then it is reasonable for Shukla to propose the dates of ca. 350-415 A.D. for Asaṅga.

(4) It is certain that the SNS precedes Asaṅga. However, it waits further investigation to determine the number of years by which the SNS precedes Asaṅga. Traditionally, the lineage of the early Yogācāra school follows the sequence of Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Whether Maitreya is a historical personage or a divine being needs not bother us. As indicated in some records, Maitreya was always encountered by people who practiced a special form of meditation.76 Or, as indicated by the title of SNS VIII, Maitreya was regarded as the one who propagated a special form of meditation which was common to the Yogācārin community. For this reason we will take the name "Maitreya" to mean a pre-Asaṅga Yogacara tradition.

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75 Yin-shun, "Shih-ch'in te nien-tai", in Fo-chiao shih-ti k'ao-lun (1985, 5th print), pp. 329-341.

76 As stated in The Life of Vasubandhu, after becoming dissatisfied with the doctrine of Hīnayānist meditation on emptiness (hsiao-sheng k'ung-kuan), Asaṅga ascended to the Tuṣita heaven by supernatural power and enquired of Bodhisattva Maitreya, who expounded for Asaṅga the doctrine of Mahāyānistic meditation on emptiness (ta-sheng k'ung-kuan). See T.50.188.c. and The Life of Vasubandhu, in T'oung Pao, p. 273.

The works attributed to Maitreya in Chinese and Tibetan accounts should also be considered as belonging to the pre-Asaṅga Yogācāra tradition,77 even though some of those works are attributed to Asaṅga.78 Among those works, the Madhyāntavibhāga, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and the Dharmadharmatāvibhānga belong, as demonstrated by Yokoyama, to a group of works with common concepts and terminologies. These three works are different from the Yobh and thus are attributed to "Maitreya".79

Yet we must consider the formation of the Yobh separately. As mentioned before, the Yobh was produced

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77 The so-called "Five Works of Maitreya" in the Chinese account are as follows (See Tun-lun, Yü-ch'ieh lun chi, T.42.311.b):
(1) Yogācārabhūmi,
(2) Yoga-vibhāga-śāstra,
(3) Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra,
(4) Madhyānta-vibhāga,
(5) Vajracchedikā-pāramitā-śāstra.
According to the Tibetan account, "Five Works of Maitreya" (Byams-pa'i-chos-lnga) are as follows:
(1) Abhisamayālaṃkāra,
(2) Dharmadharmatāvibhānga,
(3) Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,
(4) Madhyāntavibhāga,
(5) Uttaratantra.
Cf. H. Ui, "Maitreya as an Historical Personage", in Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman (1929), pp. 95-101; E. Obermiller, The Sublime of Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation, in Acta Orientalia II.III (1931), pp. 6f.; Noriaki Hakamaya, "Yugagyō-ha no bunken", in Koza Daijōbukkyō, Vol. VIII, 1982.

78 The term "Maitreya Asaṅga complex" is coined by L. Schmithausen to designate those works which were confusedly attributed to Maitreya or Asaṅga. See Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, pp. 187-188.

79 K. Yokoyama, "Go-shisō yorimita miroku no chosaku", in Shūkyō Kenkyū, No. 208, 1971.

collectively through generations. Like the SNS, the Yobh also consists of several layers.80 Among them the Saptadaśabhūmika (Ch. pen-ti-fen) is the oldest section. It is prabable that the SNS was preceded by the Saptadaśabhūmika and followed by the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī.

According to the above survey, the date of composition of the SNS must be put before "Maitreya" who was at least one generation earlier than Asaṅga.81 We thus assume that the works of "Maitreya" appeared between 350-375 A.D. Since the SNS was composed before the works of "Maitreya", it probably appeared before 350 A.D. By taking the whole process of composition and compilation into consideration, we reach a tentative conclusion that the SNS appeared in the first half of the fourth century (i.e., 300-350 A.D.).

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80 L. Schmithausen divides the YoBh into three layers in terms of the concept ālayavijñāna. See his Ālayavijñāna, p. 14.

81 The same conclusion has been reached by Lambert Schmithausen: "The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is obviously earlier than the Yogācāra treatises ascribed to 'Maitreya-(nātha)' and Asaṅga. It must have been compiled even before the completion or final redaction of the Yogācārabhūmi. But it contains many materials which clearly represent a later stage of development than most parts of the Yogācārabhūmi, esp. than tha Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Śrāvakabhūmi." See L. Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism", in German Scholars on India, Vol. II, p. 240.

Chapter Three

The Formation of the Early Yogācāra School

In this chapter we attempt to reconstruct the historical context of the _SNS_ within the formative stages of the Yogācāra School. The question is simple: Why and how did the _SNS_ appear in the first half of the fourth century? Out of what intellectual and religious milieu did the _SNS_ arise? This chapter will focus on the process of mahayanization that occurred in the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra community. Some lines of development will be highlighted: (1) a new Buddhist movement, i.e., the Prajñāpāramitā movement, from South India, and its encounter with the Northern Abhidharma schools; (2) diversification of the Abhidharma tradition, particularly the Sarvāstivāda, in which the deviations of the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika and the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra will be especially investigated; (3) Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's cases of mahayanization.

As suggested by the title of the _Mahāyānābhidharma Sūtra_, early Yogācāra Buddhism arose from the confrontation and interaction between the Abhidharma and the Mahāyāna.1 The same is true of the _SNS_, a Mahāyāna scripture composed

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1 The _Mahāyānābhidharma Sūtra_ did not survive in Sanskrit or its translation except for some fragments quoted by Asaṅga in the _Mahāyānasaṃgraha_. The former is the mother text of the latter. For the fragments of _Mahāyānābhidharma Sūtra_, see T.31.133.b-135; E. Lamotte, _La Somme_, II., pp. 12, 46-47.

in an Abhidharmic style. Hence, a brief reflection on the early development of the Mahāyāna movement before the fourth century is a necessary step to reconstruct the historical-intellectual context of the SNS.

3.1 Anonymity of the Mahāyāna Literature

Like most Mahāyāna scriptures, the authors of the SNS hid their identity and attributed the authorship of the SNS to the Buddha. But, who are those unknown authors? We should investigate the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism which were closely related to the Mahāsaṃghikas.2 As most modern scholars assume, the Mahāsaṃghikas were progressive and lay-oriented, whereas the Sthaviras are considered more conservative and monk-oriented. Based on a relatively less restrained ideology and philosophical imagination, the Mahāsaṃghikas eventually developed into an entirely new form of Buddhism later called "Mahāyāna".

Although some scholars questioned the attribution of the origin of Mahāyāna movement to the Mahāsaṃghikas, most of them agree that the Mahāyāna was affiliated with the Abhidharma schools which include the Mahāsaṃghika. Some of them also suggest that the arising of the Mahāyāna cannot be explained without reference to the stūpa workship which was

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2 See Edward Conze, Buddhist thought in India (1962/1967), p. 195. The relation between the Mahāyāna and the Mahāsaṇghikas can be seen in the fact that both of them were active in the Southern India.

totally lay-oriented.[3]

Challenging the above current interpretation, Yoshifumi Ueda rather stresses the radical discontinuity between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna:

> In the history of Indian Buddhism, the evolution from the preceding Buddhism to Mahāyāna Buddhism was not a successive and linear development, but a leap of radical change. This does not necessarily reflect, as is often asserted, a shift in sociological background of Mahāyāna from the order of Hīnayāna monks and its community of supporters to a social group of lay believers....The non-successional shift from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna arose not because of differences in the social background of supporting groups; rather, it arose because, in the depths of enlightenment, the Hīnayāna had been transcended.[4] (underlines mine)

He concludes that "the entire history of Mahāyāna, then, is a tradition not of people believing in Buddha, but of people becoming Buddha".[5] While the Śrāvakas practiced Buddhism in a way literally faithful to the Buddha's teaching, the Mahāyāna was more encouraged to deepen and speak out their own realization and understanding. The Mahāyāna sutras were composed precisely by those who have attained the experience of enlightenment as the Buddha did.

Such a phenomenon was reported in some early Mahāyāna literature:

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3 As observed by Akira Hirakawa, Mahāyāna arose due to the efforts of the upholders of the stūpa (the lay Buddhist center). See Hirakawa Akira, A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna (1990), pp. 274f.

4 Y. Ueda, "On the Emergence of Mahāyāna Buddhism", in The Pacific World, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 7-8.

5 Ibid, p. 9.

> It is due to the Buddha's power (*anubhāva*) that those disciples of the Buddha are able to preach [their teachings]. Why? By following Buddha's teaching those followers are able to realize the *dharmatā*. After this is realized, what they speak out is in accord with the *dharmatā*. This is due to the power of *dharmatā*.6

> [In the Treatise,] "because it is established" (*siddha*) means that if a person other [than Śākyamuni] realizes perfect enlightenment (*abhisambuddhaya*) and teaches it, and that [teaching] is established to be the Buddha's teaching (*buddha-vacanatva*), the person who has attained perfect enlightenment and teaches in accord with [his enlightenment] is none other than Buddha.7

This shows that the Mahāyāna Buddhists were not only capable of attaining Buddhahood, but also in many cases did attain the enlightenment experience. The term "power of Buddha" means enlightenment experienced by those authors of the Mahāyāna texts.8

The claim that immediate experience of enlightenment would be the result of the perfection of wisdom (*pāramitās*)

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6 *Hsiao-p'in po-juo po-lo-mi ching*, tr. by Kumarajiva, T.8.537.b; Conze tr., *The Perfection of Wisdom in 8000 Lines & Its Verse Summary* (1973), p. 83.

7 *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, 1.4; Ui Hakuju, *Daijō Shōgonkyōron Kenkyū*, p. 46. This paragraph is pointed out by Ueda. See Ueda, *ibid*, p.6.

8 In fact, this case was also reported in the Abhidharma literature. For example, traditionally the *Jñānaprasthāna* is attributed to Kātyāyanīputra, but it was also considered by the Sarvāstivādins as the word of the Buddha. In the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, the authorship seems to be not so important as the realization of *dharmatā*: "The Abhidharma was originally the word of the Buddha; it is also a compilation of the Aryan Kātyāyanīputra. Whether the Buddha spoke [the Abhidharma], or whether the disciple spoke it does not contradict *Dharmatā*, for all the Buddhas want the bhiksus to uphold the Abhidharma." Quoted from Poussin's "Introduction" to *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, Vol. I, English translation by Leo M. Pruden (1988), p. 20.

and that its literature was a result of that experience, gave the Prajñāpāramitā movement credibility. The Prajñāpāramitā movement earned support from both laymen and monk-scholars not merely because of its astonishing philosophy, but also because of its claim of enlightenment experience.9 That is the reason why the Prajñāpāramitā movement spread with great popularity from the South to the West and then the North.10

About 50 B.C. the ur-text of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra began to appear in the South. A century later (ca. 50 A.D.), it expanded into a voluminous collection in the North where Prajñāpāramitā thought encountered Abhidharma systems.11 As a result, the latter was incorporated into the

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9 As Edward Conze points out, some scholars treat "the views of the Mādhyamikas as if they were the result of philosophical reasoning, when in fact they derive from meditative experience...Emptiness is essentially an object of rapt contemplation, and no amount of inconclusive chatter about it being, or not being, 'nothingness', and so on, will be of any avail." Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies (1968), p. 22. Also on p. 128, he remarks that the doctrines in the Prajñāpāramitā literatures "derive not from metaphysical speculation, but from Yogic insights".

10 This was clearly stated in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, T.8.446,555. E. Conze also points out the source in the Sanskrit text, the Aṣṭāsāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, x, 225. See E. Conze, The Prajñāpāramitā Literature, 1960, p. 10.

11 Cf, Yin-shun, Ch'u-chi, p. 664. The process of compiling the Prajñāpāramitā literature did not cease until a very late period. Even in the eleventh century new texts were still being introduced into China.

Prajñāpāramitā literature as supplementary layers.12

3.2 Yogācāra Communities and Their Tradition

Due to this encounter the Yogācāra school as a new form of Buddhism was brought into being for the first time within the meditation-oriented Yogācārin community. In the beginning the Yogācārins were not regarded as members of any particular sect or community. They simply refused to be institutionalized during the time when the Buddhist monasteries were established as centers for learning and doctrines were monasticized in the form of a scholastic catechism (abhidharma). For those practitioner- thinkers, meditation was considered an authentic way to practice Buddhism. Gradually they were viewed as belonging to a group distinct from those devoted to scholastic learning.13

According to the Mahāvibhāṣā, a major Sarvāstivādin compendium composed in ca. 150 A.D., the members in the

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12 Yin-shun, Yin-tu fo-chiao ssu-hsiang shih (1988), pp. 86-87. E. Conze also clearly states in The Prajñāpāramitā Literature, p. 12: "Two kinds of ideas can be distinguished in the Aṣṭaisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā]: The first set contrasts point by point with Abhidharma, the second is newly created by the Mahāyāna. The persons against whom these writings are directed are perpetually referred to as the 'Disciples and Pratyekabuddhas'. Judging from the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (no. 5 cy 1) the new ideas arose historically speaking as a reaction against the Abhidharma traditions of the Sarvāstivādins."

13 Nāgārjuna pointed out this distinction in Ta chih tu lun (Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa): "There are two kinds of bodhisattva: those who practice meditation and those who study text. The former gains supranatural power and the latter is capable of reading." T.25.336.c.

Sarvāstivāda school were divided into two kinds: (1) those who were devoted to learning and expounding *sūtras*, and (2) those who were devoted to attaining the non-contaminated (*anāsrava*) Path. The former, usually called "*śāstra*-masters" (*lun-shih*), were good at exegetical analysis, whereas the latter, who were called the Yogācārins, were more concerned with direct realization through meditation. The latter was considered more spiritually decisive for Buddhism than the former.14

The method of meditation employed by the Yogācārins is progressive. The first step is "calming" (*śamatha*), in which the Yogācārins either contemplate dead bodies in their different stages of decomposition in order to overcome excessive covetousness or simply concentrate on inhaling and exhaling. Those two beginning methods, *aśubhabhāvanā* and *ānāpāna*, are in fact common to both Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions.

Based on the calmed state of consciousness, the Yogācārins then proceed to the second step, "discerning" (*vipaśyana*). In this stage, the totality of beings are classified by categories, such as "five aggregates", "twelve sense-fields" and "eighteen realms", etc.. Those categories are provided as conceptual tools for analyzing existents (*dharma*), especially analyzing the idea of self which is

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14 *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T.27.917.c.

inscribed in the cognition of existents.15

The discrepancy between the *śāstra*-masters and the *yoga*-masters (Yogācārin) increased as they developed different positions with regard to some doctrinal issues. As stated in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, direct realization gave the Yogācārins confidence in their philosophical position:

> Whether or not the testimony exists in the *sūtras*, certainly there is the mark (*ākāra*) of the non-selfness of all existents. This mark is apparent to the Yogācārins during the stage of practicing contemplation.16

This kind of direct approach compelled the Yogācārins to take a distinct philosophical stance. First, they challenged the Sarvāstivādin realist epistemology:

> Question: Do the five consciousnesses, such as the seeing-consciousness, etc., evolve continuously and manifest in front of [the eyes, etc.]?
> Answer: According to the Yogācārins, the five consciousnesses, such as the seeing-consciousness, etc., evolve continuously but do not manifest themselves in front of [the eyes, etc.], because they arise continuously from the apperceptive-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*). According to the Abhidharma *śāstra*-masters, the five consciousnesses, such as the seeing-consciousness, etc., evolve and arise continuously. If this were not so, the result would be in opposition to

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15 In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, the Abhidharmic soteriology is thus stated: "Because there is no means of pacifying the passions without close investigation of existents, and because it is the passions that cause the world to wander in this great ocean of transmigration, therefore they say that the teacher--which means the Buddha--spoke this metaphysical system aimed at the close examination of existents. For a student is not able to closely investigate existents without teaching in metaphysics." This translation is found in Paul Griffiths, *On Being Mindless*, p. 49. On this issue, also cf., E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 107-116, 178.

16 *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T.27.45.a.

> the doctrine of the aggregates of sense-faculties (*indriyas*)."17

The Yogācārins argued that one does not directly perceive an external object. What is perceived is, for them, always something *in* the consciousness. This position is totally contrary to Sarvāstivādin epistemology. To the latter, an object is directly perceived by the sense-organ, but not by consciousness.18

However, the Yogācārins of this period did not go as far as the later Mahayanized Yogācārins who finally theorized their experience of meditation into the doctrine of "noetic perception only" (*vijñaptimātra*). But it is clear that within the Sarvāstivāda there arose new trends of thought which were not limited to the Yogācārins only, but also seen in the other sub-communities. As recorded in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, for instance, a similar position was held by a Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika master called "Bhadanta", who argued that it is the visual consciousness, but not the eye, that sees.19 This new awareness of the fact that the perceived is constituted through consciousness rather than through senses had a great influence on the arising of Yogācāra Buddhism.

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17 *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T.27.206.c.

18 Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Realism of the Sarvāstivāda School", in *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization*, pp. 114-131.

19 Poussin, "Introduction" to *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, p. 33.

3.3 Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika Deviations from Sarvāstivāda

Starting with Kātyāyanīputra, who wrote the *Jñānaprasthāna* around the second century B.C., the Sarvāstivāda school reached its peak during the composition of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* in the second century A.D.[20] The school was active in the area of Mathura, Gandhara, and Kashmir.

As mentioned, within the Sarvāstivādin tradition the *yoga*-masters (Yogācārins) held a doctrinal position differing from that of the *śāstra*-masters. The latter represented the dominant position, whereas the former took a peripheral, yet challenging stance. Another deviation from the orthodox Sarvastivadins was led by the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas.[21]

The Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika is believed to have

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20 Yin-shun, *Shuo-i-ch'ieh-yu-p'u wei-tzu chih lun-shu yü lun-shih chih yen-chiu* (hereafter, *Shuo-i-ch'ieh-yu-p'u*) (1968), pp. 115, 120.

21 Cf. Poussin, "Introduction", pp. 35-38; Yin-shun, *Shuo-i-ch'ieh-yu-p'u*, pp. 355-407, 528-610. Collett Cox points out that "the history of the Dārṣṭāntikas and Sautrāntikas are closely interwined, with the Dārṣṭāntikas as the probable predecessors of the Sautrāntikas". See "On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousenss: Sarvāstivādin and Dārṣṭāntika Theories", in *JIABS*, II.1, p. 70, note 4. Generally speaking, this observation is acceptable. But, as Yin-shun remarks, we have to be aware of the distinction between the Sarvāstivāda-Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas. In regard to the ontology of existence and time, the former upholds the Sarvāsivada's position, while the latter contends that only existence at present, not in the future or the past, is real. See *op. cit.* p. 534.

originated with Kumāralāta22, the author of the Kalpanālamkrtīkayam (second to third centuries).23 According to other sources, however, the real founder of the school should be Srilata of Kashmir, who is said to have composed the Sautrāntikavibhāṣā in Ayodhyā about 350 A.D.24

It is interesting to note here that, according to Hsüan-tsang's narrative, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu championed their Mahāyāna-Yogācāra doctrine in Ayodhyā in the period right after Srilata.25 This seems to suggest some sort of historical and geographical affinity between the Sautrāntika School and the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra School. That is to say, the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra School was more likely to have originated in the area of Ayodhyā rather than Kashmir or Gandhara.26

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22 His name is also restored as "Kumāralābdha" or "Kumāralābha", both are corruptions of "Kumāralāta", as pointed out by Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyana in Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India, p. 116, note 56. Kumāralāta's biography is found in Si-Yu Ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World, tr. Samuel Beal, I, p. 139; II, p. 302. He was said to be the founder of the Sautrāntika school at the time of Nāgārjuna. For another biographical source, see P'u-Kuang, Chü-shê lun chi, scroll 2.

23 Yin-shun, ibid, pp. 528-543; also, Yin-tu fo-chiao ssu-hsiang shih (1988), p. 220.

24 Tāranātha, History of Buddhism in India, p. 117; Si-Yu Ki, I., p. 226; On the date of composition, see Yin-shun, Shuo-i-ch'ieh-yu-p'u, p. 560f.

25 Si-Yu Ki, I. P. 226; T.51.896.

26 Susumu Yamaguchi contends that Yogācāra-vijñaptimātra thought originated in the area of Gandhara during the fourth and fifth centuries while the faith in Maitreya as a Messiah Buddha developed under the influence of Iranian culture. See Hannya Shisōshi (1951), pp. 52-53.

Compared with the Yogācārins in the Sarvāstivāda school, the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas seemed to intentionally enter into doctrinal disputes with the orthodox Sarvāstivādins and this finally led them to establish their own independent position.27 Their doctrinal differences can be summarized as follows: First, while the Sarvāstivādins argued that only the atomistic elements (i.e., component elements) are real, the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas contended that what is real is only the process of cognition. For the latter, cognition can only provisionally be described as consisting of individual factors possessing unique activities, while in the process of cognition there in fact exists no distinct agent or cause as an ultimately real entity.28

Second, the Sarvāstivāda said that the self-nature (svabhāva) of consciousness is illumination and its function (kāritra) is understanding. Consciousness is capable of cognizing the form of an external object. On the contrary,

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27 In the Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools, Vasumitra synopsized the doctrines of the Sautrantika School as follows: (1) The skandhas transmigrate from the previous life to the next life; (2) Apart from the Paths there is no complete destruction of the skandhas; (3) There are mūlāntika-skandhas and eka-rasa-skandhas; (4) An average person also possesses the potentiality of becoming a Buddha; (5) There are paramārtha-pudgalas. See T.49.17.b; for English translation, see J. Masuda, Asia Major (1925), pp. 66-69. Although this brief account seems to be oversimplified, nevertheless it helps clarify the doctrinal relation between the Sautrāntikas and other Schools.

28 Collett Cox, "A Nonexistent Object", p. 39; Yuichi Kajiyama, "Realism of the Sarvāstivāda School", p. 115.

the Sautrāntikas argued that the object of cognition is not external to cognition, but an essential part of it.29

Third, the Sarvāstivādas said that because of self-nature a thing remains the same throughout all three time periods (the past, the present, and the future), while the Sautrāntikas declared that only a thing in the present is real, but not in the past or in the future.30

Another distinctive feature in the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas is that the metaphor of "seeds" (bīja) was used to explain the continuity of karma when they disagreed with the Sarvāstivādin realist ontology.31 The question they had to face is: If a thing or event (e.g., the action of murder) does not exist in the future and the past, how can the causal efficacy and continuity of karma be explained? Moreover, the energy of karma, good or evil, does not disappear until one attains arhatship. If past karma has not been destroyed, where and in what form is karma deposited? According to the Sarvāstivādins, since two constituent

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29 Kajiyama, ibid, pp. 118-119.

30 Kajiyama, ibid, p.119.

31 The theory of seeds was seen in Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamakakārika XVII.7-10. But Nāgārjuna and Candrakirti did not identify which school held that theory. In the Prajñāparadīpa, Bhāvaviveka vaguely attributed it to the Abhidharmas. See T.30.100.a. According to the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu and the Abhidharmanyāyānusāriśāstra of Saṃghabhadra, the theory of seed was said to originate with the Sautrāntika School. However, since this theory was not mentioned in the Mahāvibhāṣā, it probably appeared during the second and third centuries. See Yin-shun, Shuo-i-ch'eh-yu-p'u, p. 550.

elements can not operate simultaneously, how can the operation of good (*kuśala*) volitions in everyday life be explained, while evil (*akuśala*) volitions have not yet been annihilated? It is under such considerations that the metaphor of "seed" was employed by the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas to solve such theoretical problems.32

3.4 Discovering the Subtle Mind

Another doctrinal deviation from the Sarvāstivāda is that, for the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas, a kind of subtle mind (*sūkṣmacitta*) is said to exist during the attainment of cessation (*nirodhasamāpatti*).33 As a result of a doctrinal dispute involving several positions, this discovery of subtle mind might have compelled the Yogācārins to innovate their own concept of store-consciousness or appropriating-consciousness. We have to look into the dispute first so that the theoretical affinity and continuity between the two schools can be clarified.

The dispute between the Sarvāstivādins and the Dārṣṭāntikas is stated in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*:

> Question: For what reason have you composed this treatise?

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32 Cf. Padmanabh S. Jaini, "The Sautrāntika Theory of *Bīja*", in *BSOAS*, 22, Part II (1954), pp. 237-239.

33 The term *nirodhasamāpatti* denotes "a specific very precisely defined altered state of consciousness, one which occurs as the direct result of specified meditative techniques". See Paul J. Griffiths, *On Being Mindless*, "Introduction", p.xiv.

> Answer: Simply for the reason that we want to promote our own doctrine as well as to criticize other schools, particularly those of the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Vibhajyavādins. They uphold the view that a subtle mind is not annihilated in the attainment of cessation. They say that there is no sentient being without physical form, nor the altered state of consciousness (samāpatti) without the mind (acittaka). If the mind did not exist in the altered state of consciousness, the vital organ (jivita-indriya) would be eradicated; such a state is called death, not an altered state of consciousness. In contrast to their doctrine, we contend that in the attainment of cessation no mind exists at all.34

For the Vaibhāṣikas, there was no difficulty in arguing that mind can arise after the state of attainment of cessation even though during that state the mind had been completely absent. It is because, for them, all existents in their own being exist in the three time-periods. By the realist ontology the continuum of mind through the state of cessation is easily justified.35

However, since the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas rejected Sarvāstivādin ontology, they had to find another way to solve that problem. They contended that there must exist a kind of subtle mind during the altered state of consciousness in which consciousness has completely ceased. If such a subtle mind did not exist, they argued, the

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34 T.27.774.a; I have consulted Noriaki Hakamaya's translation with some modifications. See his "Nirodha-samāpatti--Its Historical Meaning in the Vijñaptimātratā System", in IBK, 13.2 (1975), p. 36. Also, cf. Poussin/Pruden, Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyam (1988), p.346, n. 257.

35 For a more detailed argument, see Paul Griffiths, ibid. pp. 60-63.

physical body will collapse. In other words, if physical body is still sustained during the attainment of cessation, then some sort of mind must be assumed to exist.

In the Mahāvibhāṣā this notion of subtle mind had not yet been fully defined by the Sautrāntikas. Later, Vasubandhu systemized this notion by using the "seed" doctrine:

> A group of the Sūtrāpramāṇikas [i.e., Sautrāntikas] hold that in the state [of the attainment of cessation] the subtle mind exists. The fruit-of-retribution consciousness (vipākaphalavijñāna), endowed with all of the seeds, from the time of coming into existence until death, continues in a series without being interrupted. From the moment of birth, due to different causes of retribution, it (i.e., the subtle mind, the fruit-of-retribution consciousness) takes on various forms until Nirvāṇa where it is definitely destroyed. Since this consciousness is not interrupted, [the subtle] mind existing during the state of mindlessness is claimed. Since the other six consciousnesses no longer function in this state, mindlessness is thus claimed. It is called mindless, because the six consciousnesses do not function temporarily due to the force of practicing the attainment of cessation. It does not mean that nothing exists at all. There are two kinds of mind: first, the mind of accumulation where numerous seeds are accumulated; second, the multiple mind which functions with different forms (ākāra) of object (ālambana). It is called mindless because the latter is lacking in the state of the attainment of cessation.36

To the Sautrāntikas, the subtle mind is not included in the six consciousnesses. It is rather defined as something underlying the six consciousnesses, acting as the subject of samsaric rebirth. It is also regarded as the place where the

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36 Vasubandhu, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, T. 31.784.b-c. I have consulted Lamotte/Pruden's and Anacker's translations. See Lamotte/Pruden, pp. 64-65; Steven Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu (1984), pp. 111-112.

seeds are located. Historically, this doctrine of subtle mind precedes and has influence upon the Yogācāra doctrine of store-consciousness found in the SNS and the Yobh, though the latter are obviously more complicated.37

3.5 Mahayanization of the Śrāvaka-Yogācāras

But it would be oversimplistic to assume that the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra school descended directly from, or was

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37 Based on other materials in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam and the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa of Vasubandhu and the Nyāyānusāra of Saṃghabhadra, we know that within the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas there were several positions regarding whether or not the mind exists in the attainment of cessation. Of these positions another group of the Sautrāntikas said that mind arises once again not from the mind in the state of the attainment of cessation, but from the physical body:

> But other former teachers ask how it is that physical form arises again for those, born in the formless realms, whose physical form has long since ceased. Their answer is that in such a case physical form arises only from mind and not from the physical body; similarly, mind [for one in the attainment of cessation] arises only from the body with its senses and not from the mind. For the mind and the body with its senses mutually seed one another. (Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, T.29.25.c. For English translation, cf. Paul Griffiths, p.64 and Poussin /Pruden, I, pp. 230-231.)

In attempting to solve the problem, the Sautrāntikas of this position proposed another interpretative model, i.e., the doctrine of mutual seeding between the mind and the body. Since the notion of subtle mind is not mentioned here, this doctrine seems closely affiliated with a similar Yogācāra model presented in the Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra:

> All dharmas are stored in consciousness and consciousness in all dharmas. They are always mutually fruit and cause of one another.(T.31.135.b. Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 46-47.)

This indicates that there might have been two lines of development from the Sautrāntika to the early Mahāyāna-Yogācāra. But since materials are not sufficient, we remain unsure about that development.

simply the result of a split from the Sautrāntikas. We must avoid closing the case too quickly. As mentioned, the deviation of the Sautrāntikas from the Sarvāstivāda indicates that the tendency to develop new doctrinal positions, including that of the early Mahāyāna-Yogācāra, did occur in North India. It is also certain that the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas had some influence on the formation of the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra. But genealogically, Mahāyāna-Yogācāra arose directly out of the Śrāvaka-Yogācārin community within the Sarvāstivāda.

Fortunately, the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra literature is preserved in the _Śrāvakabhūmi_, a part of _Yobh_.38 The fact that the _Śrāvakabhūmi_ developed out of the Abhidharma tradition can be seen in the following points. The beginning of the _Śrāvakabhūmi_ mentions the three Śrāvaka stages (_bhūmi_): lineages (_gotrabhūmi_), entrance (_avatārabhūmi_), and the way of deliverance (_naiṣkramyabhūmi_), which are non-Mahayanic in comparison with the classification of stages as seen in the Prajñāpāramitā literature.39

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38 Although Alex Wayman strongly argues that "various parts of Asaṅga's _Yogācārabhūmi_, and especially the _Śrāvakabhūmi_, are basically the doctrines of the later Mahīśāsakas", he agrees that "the Mahīśāsaka is a branch of the Sarvāstivādin". See Wayman, _Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript_, pp. 25-29.

39 _Śrāvakabhūmi_, T.30.395.c; Alex Wayman, _ibid_, pp. 43-44, 58; also, cf. E. Obermiller, _The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as Exposed in the Abhisamayālaṇkāra_ (1932), p. 48f, and E. Lamotte, _History of Indian Buddhism_ (1988), p. 625f.

Another example also shows that the *Śrāvakabhūmi* stays strictly within the Sarvāstivāda-Yogācāra tradition. In the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the Yogācārins are classified into three levels: (1) the beginner (*ādikarmika*), (2) the one who has done the exercise (*kṛtaparicaya*), and (3) the one who has transcended intensive thinking (*atikrānta-manaskāra*).40 The same classification already appeared in the *Hsiu-hsiang tao ti ching* (*Yogācārabhūmi-sūtra*) of Saṃgharakṣa and the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.41 This indicates that those texts belonged to the same tradition as a whole, i.e., the Śrāvaka-Yogācārin community in the Sarvāstivāda, before their encounter with the Prajñāpāramitā movement from the South.

The main thrust of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* can be seen from the quoted legend of the "The Questions of Revada"42:

> The venerable Revada questioned the Bhagavat: "O greatly revered one, when a monk, yoga-practitioner, is able to abide his mind on an object, for what purpose does he abide his mind on an object? On what object does he abide his mind? And how can it be said that he abides his mind on an object?

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40 T.30.439.b, and Alex Wayman, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

41 On Sangharakṣa's classification of the Yogācārin, see Alex Wayman, *op. cit.*, p. 42. Also, *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T.27.205.b. The same passage also appears in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyam*, T.29.117.b-c; Poussin/Pruden's translation, Vol. III, p. 918.

42 *Śrāvakabhūmi*, T.30.427.c-428.a; Alex Wayman, *Analysis*, p. 86. On the legend of Revada, see Yin-shun, *Shuo-i-ch'ieh-yu-p'u*, pp. 636-637; Alex Wayman, *Analysis*, p. 46. Although Revada as yoga-master was mentioned in Chinese Āgamas, the "Questions" was not found in the Āgamas or Nikāyas. As Yin-shun contends, the legend of Revada probably originated in the area of Kashmir and Gandhara.

As the text says, there are four kinds of meditation object: (1) the all-inclusive meditation-object (vyāpyālambana), (2) the meditation-object for purification of addiction (carita-viśodhanam ālambana), (3) the meditation-object as conceptual tool (kauśalyālambana), and (4) the meditation-object for purification of defilement (kleśaviśodhanam ālambana). In each category, further divisions are made.43 The meditation-object for purification of addiction is of five kinds. So is the meditation-object as conceptual tool.

Among those meditation-objects, each object is designed for a specific purpose and person. For instance, the mindfulness of inhaling and exhaling (ānāpanasmṛti) is designed for the person who is addicted to discursive thought (vitarkacarita); or the "aggregates" (skandha) are used as conceptual tools by the person who is confused about karmic volition (saṃskāra) or about self (ātma), and so forth.

Historically, the meditation-objects in the categories (2), (3) and (4) were nothing new in the Śrāvaka tradition. Both impurity as the object of meditation and mindfulness of inhaling and exhaling were regarded as the most fundamental forms of meditation. Contemplations on "compassion" as therapy for hatred, on "conditionality" as therapy for ignorance, on "aggregates", "realms" and "sense bases", were already included in those early Śrāvaka-Yogācāra texts. From

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43 Alex Wayman, ibid, p. 86.

this early Śrāvaka-Yogācāra tradition, categories (2), (3), and (4) were then inherited and systematized by the Śrāvakabhūmi.44

In category (1), the "all-inclusive meditation-object" was further divided into four kinds: (a) the image with discrimination (savikalpa-pratibimba), in which all meditation-objects in categories (2), (3) and (4) are to be discerned; (b) the image with non-discrimination (nirvikalpa-pratibimba), which is the object of calming; (c) the limits of the state of affairs (vastuparyantatā), which has two aspects: all-inclusive knowledge (yāvadbhāvikatā) and all-inclusive truth (yathāvadbhāvikatā); and (d) the fulfillment of the task (kārya-pariniṣpatti).45

The process of mahayanization of the Śrāvaka-Yogācāras is evidenced in the fact that category (1) became the cornerstone of the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra theory of meditation which, as seen in SNS VIII, finally led to the theorization of the notion of "noetic perception only" (vijñapti-mātra). According to SNS VIII, in the procedure of calming-discerning meditation one is taught to investigate all states of affairs (vastu) which are classified by various kinds of taxonomies. Those states of affairs are presented in the form of mental images during the state of

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44 On the Śrāvaka-Yogācāras and their meditation texts, see Yin-shun, Shuo-i-ch'ieh-yu-p'u, pp. 611-633.

45 Śrāvakabhūmi, T.30.427. Also, cf. Josho Nozawa, Daijōbukkyō Yugagyō no Kenkyū, pp. 31-41.

concentration. They are neither objective existents nor copies of the objective existents. They are copies (or simulacrums) of the known object (jñeyavastu-sabhāga-pratibimba).46

With the aid of visualization as an indispensable technique of meditation, the Mahāyāna-Yogācārins then came to realize that "any object of consciousness is nothing but the manifestation of consciousness".47 They thus claimed the "Suchness" (tathatā) of "noetic perception only", the hallmark of the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra school. This new discovery should be understood within the trend of mahayanization from the beginning of the fourth century, or even earlier, down to the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. In the next section we will briefly examine the cases of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu as part of the whole trend of mahayanization.

3.6 The Cases of Mahayanization: Asaṅga and Vasubandhu

According to Paramārtha's The Life of Vasubandhu, due to initial training in the Sarvāstivāda School Asaṅga attained the mental state of desirelessness through meditation, but later he became suicidal because of not being able to penetrate the meaning of emptiness (śūnyata). At that time, Asaṅga learned the Hīnayāna contemplation of

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46 Śrāvakabhūmi, T.30.427.b; 428.b.

47 SNS, T.16.698.b; E. Lamotte, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, pp. 90-91, 211-212.

emptiness from Arhat Piṇḍola and thus penetrated the meaning of emptiness. However, he was still not satisfied. After ascending to the Tuṣita Heaven and inquiring of Bodhisattva Maitreya, he was finally able to master the Mahāyāna contemplation of emptiness.48

According to Tibetan accounts, particularly that of Haribhadra, Asaṅga was said to receive from Maitreya the teachings of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras, Yogācārabhūmi and other Mahāyāna texts. The Abhisamayālaṃkāra, a summary of the Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras with a Yogācāra flavor, was also included in the Five Treatises of Maitreya.49 This Tibetan supplementary narrative suggests that the Mahāyāna comtemplation of emptiness could have been related to the Prajñāpāramitā movement.

Another case is the dramatic conversion of Vasubandhu from Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika to Mahāyāna, which demonstrates again that even down to the beginning of the fifth century the process of mahayanization was still vigorously proceeding in North India.50 Particularly in the area of Ayodhyā, the distinction between Mahāyāna and Śrāvakayāna was not as clear as later reconstructions have

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48 The Life of Vasubandhu, T.50.188.c; cf. J. Takakusu's translation, T'oung Pao (1904), pp. 273-274.

49 Bu-ston, The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet, tr. by E. Obermiller, p. 139; Chinese translation by Kuo Ho-ch'ing (1986), p. 136.

50 See The Life of Vasubandhu, T.50.199.c.

tried to make it. When Hsüan-tsang traveled in India in the first half of the seventh century, he observed that in Ayodhyā Buddhist monks studied both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna texts. He said, "it is in this place that Vasubandhu Bodhisattva, during a sojourn of several decades, composed various śāstras both of the Great and Little Vehicle".51 This sort of interchange between the Śrāvakayāna and the Mahāyāna was believed to have lasted for several centuries.

As we have already suggested, the early Mahāyāna-Yogācāra texts, i.e., SNS and Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, seem to come into being in the area of Ayodhyā instead of in Northwestern Indian areas such as Kashmir and Gandhra. There is another evidence to support this conjecture. First, as the homebase of the Sarvāstivāda School, Kashmir was strictly dominated by orthodox Vaibhāṣika scholasticism. According to Paramārtha's record, in order to prevent the orthodox Sarvāstivādin doctrine from being corrupted by other schools and Mahāyāna, a law was set up to prohibit anyone from carrying any text out of Kashmir at the time when the Mahāvibhāṣā was finished.52 Under such circumstances new schools of thought were not likely to start and grow.

Second, it was in Ayodhyā where the Sautrāntika and the

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51 Si-Yu Ki, tr. by Samuel Beal, Vol. I, p. 225.

52 See note 63, T.50.189; Takakusu, p. 279. A similar legend was also recorded in the Si-Yu Ki, tr. by Samuel Beal, I, p. 156.

early Mahāyāna-Yogācāra had their intellectual activities. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were born in Gandhara, but their missionary activities and works were carried out in Ayodhyā.53 And it was no accident that Vasubandhu was influenced by the Sautrāntikas in Ayodhyā where the Sautrāntika master, Srilata of Kashmir, composed the Vibhāṣā-śāstra of that school.54

Based on the foregoing observations, we conclude that North India, particularly the area of Ayodhyā, was the soil from which the early Mahāyāna-Yogācāra texts were brought forth.

3.7 Summary

In this chapter, the origins of Mahāyāna-Yogācāra were traced back to the Yogācārin communities in the Sarvāstivāda School. The transition from Śrāvaka-Yogācāra to Mahāyāna-Yogācāra is a critical process of mahayanization, which can be explained from three angles: (1) Within the Sarvāstivāda school, a couple of sub-communities, particularly the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras, had been deviating from the orthodox Sarvāstivāda before the SNS was composed. Definitely, the Mahāyāna-Yogācāras were indebted

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53 In Ayodhyā, Asaṅga received from Maitreya the teachings, such as Yogācārabhūmi, Mahāyānasūtrālaṇkāra, and Madhyāntavibhāga, etc.. See Si-Yu Ki, I, p. 226. On Vasubandhu's activities in Ayodhyā, see The Life of Vasubandhu, pp. 286-289.

54 Si-Yu Ki, I. p. 226.

to the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas for notions such as "seed" and the subliminal consciousness. (2) The continuity and difference between the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra and the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra can be seen from the comparison of the Śrāvakabhūmi and SNS. (3) As witnessed by the SNS and the materials of "Maitreya" and Asaṅga, the challenge of the Prajñāpāramitā movement is the key factor leading to the mahayanization of the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra. For the unknown authors of the SNS, their hermeneutical task was to disclose the Prajñāpāramitā profound realization within the Abhidharma conceptual horizon.

Chapter Four

Three Turnings of the Dharma-Wheel

As shown in the passage of "Three Turnings of the Dharma-Wheel" quoted below, the early Mahāyāna Yogācārins claimed their own teaching to be "unsurpassable and definitive", while the teachings of the Abhidharma and the Prajñāpāramitā traditions were judged to be "surpassable and indefinite".[1] Of particular concern here is how the early Mahāyāna Yogācārins viewed and judged their own task against a horizon shaped by a specific hermeneutical consciousness. Thus, instead of attempting to reconstruct the historical context "objectively", this chapter follows the interpretative framework presented by the *SNS* itself to depict the development of the Abhidharma, the Prajñāpāramitā and early Mahāyāna-Yogācāra.

The passage of "Three Turnings of the Dharma-Wheel" appears in chapter seven of the *SNS*:

> At that moment, Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata said to the Buddha again: "In the Deer Park at Ṛṣivadana in Vāraṇāsī, the World Honored One turned the dharma-wheel for the first time, teaching the four noble truths to the followers of the Śrāvaka vehicle. This turning of wheel was marvelous and wonderful, such as had never before been turned in the world by gods or men. Nevertheless, this first turning of the dharma-wheel

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1 This classification and judgment greatly influenced the later conception of Buddhist history. For example, based on this model, Chinese Buddhists developed the *p'an-chiao* systems (classification of teachings) to organize their knowledge of the entire corpus of Buddhist history.

> was surpassable, non-definitive (neyārtha), and subject to criticism. Then the World Honored One turned the dharma-wheel again for the Mahāyāna followers in an implicit way (yin-mi hsiang), teaching that all dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent, and nirvanic by nature. This second turning of the dharma-wheel was marvelous and wonderful. Nevertheless, it was surpassable, non-definitve, and subject to criticism. Now, the World Honored One turns the dharma-wheel for the third time for the sake of the followers of all vehicles in an explicit way (hsien-liao hsiang), presenting the teaching of non-self-nature-ness, that all dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent, and nirvanic by nature. This third turning of the dharma-wheel is absolutely marvelous and wonderful. It is unsurpassable, truly definitive (nītārtha), not subject to criticism.2

As confirmed by the opening question in the same chapter,

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2 SNS, T.16.697.a.23-b.9. Also, cf. Lamotte, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, pp. 85, 206. This passage has been translated into English many times. It probably appeared in English translation for the first time in the History of Buddhism by Bu-ston, trans. by E. Obermiller (1931), pp. 53-54. For the other translations, see, Robert A. F. Thurman, "Buddhist Hermeneutics" (1978), p. 26; Donald S. Lopez, Jr., "Interpretation of the Mahāyāna Sutras", in Buddhist Hermeneutics (1988), p. 58.

This hermeneutical classification is always considered to have been invented by the SNS for the first time. But in fact, before its occurence in the SNS a similar classification already appeared in the Mahāvaipulya-mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra, a third century collection of Mahāyāna scripture including many materials concerning the development of Tathāgatagarbha thought. The same classification also appears in the Ratnagotravibhāga (Chiu-ching i-sheng pao-hsing lun, T.31.822.a) in which the third turning of the dharma-wheel, as conceived by the Tathātagarbha trend as its own hermeneutical task, is said "to lead sentient beings into tathāgatadhātu". See J. Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra) (1966), pp. 151-152. Also cf., E. Obermiller, The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation, in Acta Orientalia, Vol. IX, Pt. II, III (1931), pp. 120-121. There, the notion tathagātadhātu is identical with the notion tathāgatagarbha. This could indicate that both the Yogācāra and the Tathāgatagarbha trends responded to the challenge from the Prajñāpāramitā movement with similar yet different historical-hermeneutical consciousnesses.

the early Mahāyāna Yogācārins confronted what seemed to be a doctrinal contradiction between the teachings of the first and the second turnings, viz. the Abhidharma and the Prajñāpāramitā teachings.3 In the first turning (i.e., the Abhidharma) one was instructed to analyse the self-natures of all dharmas and to meditate on how these dharmas arise and cease, whereas the second turning (i.e., the Prajñāpāramitā) declared that all dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased. However, since both positions are attributed to the Buddha, the apparent contradiction between them must be explained. The Abhidharmists in particular would be very puzzled about the position of Prajñāpāramitā. The mahayanized Yogacarins of the time thus developed a new Buddhist dicourse in order to disclose the Prajñāpāramitā insight.

The following discussion presents a survey of three phases of Buddhist development, viz. the Abhidharma, the Prajñāpāramitā, and early Mahayana-Yogacara.

4.1 The First Turning: The Four Noble Truths

In the Abhidharma period many exegetical and catechistic works were produced, using the _Āgamas_ and

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3 Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika school may be included in the second turning, as often assumed, to form a "Prajñāpāramitā-Mādhyamika" category. Historically, this grouping is legitimate. But Mādhyamika is not added to the second turning here, due to a lack of textual evidence that the unknown authors of the _SNS_ considered the Mādhyamika school to be part of the second turning.

Nikāyas as their canonical basis. Most of these works were organized in accordance with the order of the Four Noble Truths. For example, in Dharmaśri's chapter division of the Abhidharmahṛdaya: chapters one and two focus on the Truth of Suffering; chapters three and four on the Truth of the Cause of Suffering; chapters five and six on the Extinction of Suffering; and chapter seven on the Path to Nirvana. The same systematization also appears in the Abhidharmahṛdayasūtra and the Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra.[4]

The Abhidharmists ultilized the Four Noble Truths as a soteric-therapeutic model. The Abhidharmakośa states that a practitioner should meditate upon those Truths in the given order:

> Why are the Truths organized in this order? They are mentioned in the order in which they are intuitively realized (abhisamaya)....Here the Truths are mentioned in the order in which they are practiced by the Yogācārins in the stage of intuitive realization. Why must they be intuitively realized in this order? Because, in the preparatory stage, one shall discern any dharma to which one is attached, by which one is tormented, and therefore from which one seeks to be delivered. For this reason, in the preparatory stage a Yogācārin discerns suffering first. That is the Truth of Suffering. One then discerns the cause of suffering. That is the Truth of the Cause of Suffering. One goes on to discern the extinction of suffering. That is the Truth of Extinction. Finally one discerns the path to extinction. That is the Truth of the Path. So too, having seen a disease, one searches out its cause, then

4 See Wataru S. Ryose, "A Study of the Abhidharmahṛdaya", unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1987), pp. 36-38.

its cure by means of its antidote.5

Rather than merely going through the order of Four Truths once, a practitioner is required to meditate on the Four Truths, in sequence, three times. The twelve step procedure is called "the threefold cycling and twelve steps".

Two explanations have been given for this procedure. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the threefold cycling are: (1) "this is the Truth of Suffering"; (2) "it should be perfectly known"; and (3) "it has been perfectly known". The same order of cycling applies to the other three Truths. Thus, since one meditates on each Truth in a sequence of three steps, the four Truths require twelve steps. Another explanation, proposed by the Sautrāntika, slightly changed the meditation order,6 which was inherited by the Mahāyāna-

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5 Abhidharmakośābhāṣyam, T.29.113.c.28-114.a.13; My translation, in consultation with Poussin/Pruden, Vol. III, p. 897. The same passage also appears in the Mahāvibhāṣā (T.27.404.b).

6 The twelve steps of meditation proposed by the Sautrantika are as follows:
(1-1) "This is the truth of suffering";
(1-2) "This is the truth of the cause of suffering";
(1-3) "This is the truth of extinction";
(1-4) "This is the truth of path";
(2-1) "The suffering should be perfectly known";
(2-2) "The cause of suffering should be perfectly eliminated";
(2-3) "The extinction should be perfectly realized";
(2-4) "The path should be perfectly cultivated";
(3-1) "The suffering has been perfectly known";
(3-2) "The cause of suffering has been perfectly eliminated";
(3-3) "The extinction has been perfectly realized";
(3-4) "The path has been perfectly cultivated".
See Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, T.29.128.c; Poussin/Pruden, pp. 996-997. This model also appears in the Lalitavistara, as

Yogācārins.7

Upon completing this rigorous procedure, one attains the true knowledge of the Four Truths characterized by sixteen aspects (ākāras). According to the Sarvāstivādin tradition, the four aspects of suffering are (1) impermanence (anitya), (2) suffering (duḥkha), (3) empty (śūnya), and (4) non-self (anātman). The four aspects of the cause of suffering are (1) cause (hetu), (2) origin (samudaya), (3) successive causation (prabhava), and (4) associated causation (pratyaya). The four aspects of the extinction of suffering are (1) cessation (nirodha), (2) calm (śānta), (3) excellence (praṇīta), and (4) deliverance (niḥsaraṇa). The four aspects of the path are (1) path (mārga), (2) reasoning (nyāya), (3) attainment (pratipad), and (4) definite departure (nairyāṇika).8

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pointed out by Alex Wayman in "The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites", Buddhist Insight, p. 127.

7 See Vastusaṃgrahaṇī of Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.843.b.

8 Mahāvibhāṣā, T.27.399.c-400.a; Abhidharmakośa, T.29.119.b. Also cf. E. Obermiller, The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, p.18; E. Lamotte, History, pp. 612-613; J. Keenan, "A Study of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa", Pt. I, pp.41-42; Poussin/Pruden, Kośabhāṣyam, p. 930. For a full discussion on this issue, see Alex Wayman, "The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites", in Buddhist Insight, pp. 117-127. In this study, Wayman compares the Abhidharma version and Asaṅga's exposition. The therapeutic function of the 16 aspects with reference to their respective coverings or adversaries is also paricularly explained. This confirms what we have said about the Four Noble Truths being taken as a soteric-therapeutic model.

In the Sarvāstivādin theory of Two Truths, the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths are viewed as universal characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) and as ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya).9 When the universal characteristics of all dharmas have been comprehended, the next step is to attain the knowledge of the self-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) of dharmas.10 This conception of truth was later challenged by the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers, as will be discussed later.

The Kośa claims that five stages of practice are required for intuitively realizing (abhisamaya) the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths:11

1. In the first stage, the Path of Accumulating Merit (saṃbhāramārga), one practices two kinds of elementary meditation: meditation on the repulsive (aśubhabhāvanā) and breath control (ānāpanasmṛti). These enable one to realize the four aspects of the first Truth. However, since this knowledge is not yet absolutely free of defilement and

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9 Mahāvibhāṣā, T.27.399.c-400.a. Also, cf. Yin-shun, K'ung chih t'an-chiu (1985), pp. 124-125.

10 For the distinction between sva-lakṣaṇa and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, see Mahāvibhāṣā, T.27.217.a. On Dignāga's exposition of this distinction, see Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception (1968), p. 24.

11 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: "What is the meaning of the word abhisamaya? This word signifies abhisaṃbodha, 'understanding, comprehension.' The root i signifies 'to understand'." (Poussin/Pruden, III, p. 897. This word abhisamaya is rendered by Obermiller as "the process of intuition of the Highest Truth", see The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā, p. 7. It is also rendered by Lamotte as "direct comprehension", see E. Lamotte, History, p. 614. Also, cf. Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 58.

perversion (*viparyāsa*), it is still considered impure and imperfect.

2. In the second stage, the Path of Advanced Training (*prayogamārga*), one attains the knowledge of all the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths, although such knowledge still remains impure.

3. In the third stage, the Path of Insight (*darśanmārga*), one is able to intuitively comprehend the sixteen aspects of the Four Truths as well as to destroy defilements.12 Due to such efforts, a practitioner becomes one who is incapable of regression (*srotaāpanna*).

4. In the fourth stage, the Path of Meditation (*bhāvanamārga*), one eliminates innate defilements that cannot be destroyed by insight (*darśana*) alone. In this stage, the battle against those stubborn defilements can be won only through repeated confrontation and prolonged effort at meditating on the Four Truths.

5. In the final stage, the path of the Aśaikṣa or Arhat, all defilements are finally eliminated and one becomes an Arhat.

In this progressive process, the Four Truths are taken as the object of intuitive realization and are further subdivided into sixteen aspects so that the states of

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12 One attains this intuitive comprehension through a gradual process taking sixteen instants of thought (*cittas*) by which the practitioner eliminates doubt and defilement. On the sixteen thoughts, see *Kośa*, T.29.121; Lamotte, *History*, pp. 614-615.

affairs can be more precisely comprehended. Underlying this system are the methods of taxonomy and analysis. The Abhidharmists contended that the elements classified by the categories, such as the five aggregates, twelve sense-fields, or eighteen realms, are real. They further classified all elements into seventy-five dharmas, which they regarded as encompassing what is real.13 With the exception of three non-conditioned dharmas, the other seventy-two dharmas are conditioned and defiled. The Buddhist task therefore is to illuminate the nature of those dharmas and convert them "into a condition of rest, out of which they never will emerge again".14 This method is referred to by the Chinese Buddhist as " an analysis of dharmas into emptiness" (Ch. hsi-fa ju-k'ung).

The path towards deliverance as conceived by this scholastic method is gradual or progressive (anupūrva), but never sudden (yugapat). Although some Abhidharma schools

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13 According to the Kośa, dharma is defined as "that which bears (dhārana) self-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa)." See T.29.1.a; Poussin/Pruden, p. 57.

14 Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism and The Meaning of The Word "Dharma" (1923), p. 3. Paul J. Griffiths makes a similar observation: "It is arguable, though by no means certain, that the Abhidharmic taxonomic enterprise had its origins in the practice of certain types of introspective analytical meditation which were highly valued in the early Buddhist tradition and which essentially require the practitioner to deconstruct the gestalt of everyday experience into its component parts and to learn to label and identify the separate and transient mental events from which Buddhist theory thinks the continuities of everyday experience are constructed." On Being Mindless, pp. 54-55.

were inclined to accept the notion of an instantaneous comprehension of the Truths ("The clear understanding of a single instant would immediately lead to knowledge of all the aspects of the four truths"15), the Sarvāstivādins maintained that intuitive realization must be gradual and progressive because it develops in sixteen thought-moments: four for each of the Four Truths.16 It is precisely this Abhidharmic conception of truth and practice that leads to a counter-response by Prajñāpāramitā thinkers.

4.2 The Second Turning: The Prajñāpāramitā Movement

The first turning of the Dharma-Wheel (i.e, the Abhidharma) was judged by the SNS to be non-definitive (neyārtha) and subject to criticism from the standpoint of the second turning.17 Yüan-t'se argued that this second

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15 E. Lamotte, History, p. 619. These Schools include the Theravādins, Mahāsaṃghikas, early Mahīśāsakas and Vibhajyavādins.

16 E. Lamotte, ibid, pp. 614-615, 618. See also, Yin-shun, K'ung chih t'an-chiu, pp. 126-127. For textual sources on the controversy between "gradual" and "instantaneous" comprehension, see the Mahāvibhāṣā, T.27, ch. 78 and Paramartha's translation of the Kośa, T.29.273.c-274-a.

17 Monier-Williams, Dictionary, p. 569: neyārtha (neya + artha) means "(a word or sentence) having a sense that can only be guessed". Neya, deriving from the root nī, means "to be led or guided or managed or governed; to be led away or to be led to; to be brought into any state or condition; to be moved; to be spent or passed; to be guessed". Its Chinese equivalent, wei-liao i, means "the meaning has not yet been fully illuminated or exhausted".

turning referred to the Prajñāpāramitā teaching:18

> All of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras expound the teaching of no-mark (animitta) by claiming that "all dharmas are without self-nature...nirvanic by nature". While the first turning of the Dharma-Wheel is devoted to explaining existence while neglecting to reveal emptiness (Ch. yin-k'ung shuo-yu), the second turning of the Dharma-Wheel is devoted to explaining emptiness while neglecting to reveal existence (Ch. yin-yu shuo-k'ung). For this reason, the second turning utters such statements in an implicit way (yin-mi hsiang), which is also called "secret" (Ch. mi-mi). It is said in the Mahā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, vol. 572: "That [all dharmas are] neither arisen nor ceased...is the secret teaching of Buddhas."19

Nevertheless, since the SNS did not literally identify the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras as the source of that "secret" teaching, how can we be so sure that the profound teaching that "all dharmas are neither arisen nor ceased" does represent the Prajñāpāramitā position?

In the Abhidharmasamuccaya Asaṅga identified the Vaipulya, one of the Twelve Genres, as the source of that "profound and deep" statement. This genre is also called Bodhisattvansam pāramitā-piṭaka, meaning that "in this genre all perfections of wisdom are well expounded".20 In the

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18 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 18.1.b.

19 Ta po-juo po-lo-mi-to ching, T.7.954.b.

20 Ta-sheng a-p'i-ta-mo tsa-chi lun, T.31.697.c-698.a. Sanskrit text, see Pradhana ed., Abhidharma-samuccayabhāṣya, pp. 83-84. Even in the Sarvāstivāda school the Mahāyāna doctrine of wisdom was included in the Vaipulya. See Mahāvibhāṣā, T.27.660.a; E. Lamotte, History, 160/146. Here, the Vaipulya as one of Nine or Twelve Genres is differentiated from the Vetulyavāda as a sect, though they might be related to each other historically and doctrinally. According to the Ceylon histories, the Vetulyavāda belongs to the Mahāsuññatavāda (Great Emptiness

Bodhisattvabhūmi, the same statement is also quoted as taken from those "sūtras spoken by the Tathāgata with profound, deep meaning in association with emptiness" (gambhīrāṇāṃ tathāgata-bhāṣitānāṃ śūnyatā-pratisaṃyuktānāṃ sūtrāntānam).21 This textual evidence leads to the conclusion that the second turning refers to the Prajñāpāramitā tradition.22

The Prajñāpāramitā literature arose in the area of Andhra, South India, in the first century B.C.E. The non-Aryan people of Andhra, who may belong to the Dravidian culture, spoke a Telugu dialect and lived in a matriarchal society.23 But why and how the Prajñāpāramitā thought originated in this area is still not completely clear.24 All

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School), which adopted a nihilist position. Such a position also was criticized by the Mahayanists, such as Nāgārjuna; see Nāgārjuna, Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-śāstra, T.25.61. Cf. A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (1980), p. 414, and Yin-shun, Ch'u-chi, pp. 535-538.

21 Yü-ch'ieh-shih ti lun, T.30.541.a; Unrai Wogihara ed., Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 265.

22 Later Vaipulya is taken as a reference to Mahayana literature.

23 E. Conze, The Prajñāpāramitā Literature (1960), pp. 9-10.

24 In 1960, E. Conze said that "at present we have no clear idea of the circumstances under which these [Prajñāpāramitā] Sūtras were composed. Who wrote them, or why, how, or for whom they were written--all that is lost in the fog of the past." See "The Development of Prajnaparamita Thought", in Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies (1968), pp. 123-124. Since then many scholars' efforts have been directed towards clarifying this issue. Among many prominent studies, two are worthy of note: Yuichi Kajiyama, "Hannya shisō no seisei" (For a partial English translation, See

we know for certain is that this revolutionary Mahāyāna movement occurred within the Buddhist tradition.25

What deserves our special attention is the early stage of Prajñāpāramitā movement, particularly the Ur-text of the Prajñāpāramitā texts.26 Also, since the Heart Sūtra and the Diamond Sūtra are deemed to represent the true spirit of the Prajñāpāramitā philosophy, they also will be utilized as basic materials.

Thanks to the efforts of several celebrated scholars, the Aṣṭāsāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Abbr. Aṣṭa) has been identified as the Ur-text.27 In the first chapter of the

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"Stūpas, the Mother of Buddhas, and Dharma-body", appears in Anthony K. Warder, ed. New Paths in Buddhist Research, 1985, pp. 9-16.); and Saigusa Mitsuyoshi, "Hannyakyō no seiritsu". Both are collected in Akira Hirakawa, et al., eds., Koza Daijōbukkyō, Vol. 2, Hannya Shisō (1983). Another excellent, but little known, study has been done by Yin-shun in Ch'u-chi (1981), pp. 591-758.

25 Cf., E. Conze, "Preface" to The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & Its Verse Summary (hereafter, 8,000 Lines) (1973), p. xv.

26 The compilation of the Prajñāpāramitā texts extended over some 1,000 years. According to E. Conze, there are four phases: (1) In the first phase (ca. 100 B.C. to 100 A.D.), the so-called Ur-text appeared for the first time, representing the originality of Prajñāpāramitā thought; (2) In the second phase (ca. 100 A.D. to 300 A.D.), the basic text was expanded into the Large PPS; (3) In the third phase (ca. 300-500) short sutras appeared, such as the Heart Sūtra and the Diamond Sūtra, and versified summaries, such as the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. (4) The last period (600-1200) involved Tantric developments. See E. Conze, The Prajñāpāramitā Literature, p. 9.

27 More precisely, the Ur-text of the PPS is found in Lokakṣema and Kṣamabuddha's Chinese translation, Tao-hsing po-juo ching (T. No. 224). This conclusion has been reached by several Japanese scholars. Among them, Koun Kajiyoshi's

Aṣṭa, particularly significant for its originality, the dialogue between two characters, Subhūti and Śāriputra, suggests the relationship between Prajñāpāramitā and Abhidharma.

4.2.1 Subhūti and Śāriputra

Since the beginning of Buddhist tradition, Subhūti has been considered the "foremost of those who dwell in *araṇā*".28 As explained by E. Conze, the term *araṇā* "may denote freedom from strife, battle, or fighting, i.e., harmlessness; or freedom from passion and any kind of defilement, i.e., purity; or it may also mean that Subhūti lived in solitude, retired from the world, in a remote forest, in quietude and peace".29 As indicated by its

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Genshi Hannyakyō no Kenkyū (Tokyo, 1943) is the most noteworthy. K. Kajiyoshi contends that the first chapter of the *Tao-hsing po-juo ching* (T.8.425.c-427.a) is the Ur-text. This view is accepted by Yin-shun. See *Ch'u-chi*, pp. 620-626. But Ryusho Hikata argues that, except for those parts concerning Akṣobhya-buddha, Chapter 1 to Chapter 25 of the *Tao-hsing* can be viewed as the Ur-text of the PPS. See his "An Introductory Essay on Prajñāpāramitā Literature", in *Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* (1958), pp. xxviii-xxxxiv. The *Tao-hsing* corresponds to the extant Sanskrit *Aṣṭa*. E. Conze also agrees with R. Hikata's hypothesis. See *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, p. 9. Recently, Saigusa Mitsuyoshi said that the Ur-text of *PPS* contains the first three chapters of the *Tao-hsing*. See "Hannyakyō no seiritsu", p. 102.

28 E. Conze, *8,000 Lines*, pp. 84, 90; *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*, pp. 35, 72, 97-98; *Buddhist Wisdom Books*, pp. 44-45.

29 E. Conze, *Buddhist Wisdom Books*, p. 45. For a more detailed explanation, see his *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*, pp. 97-98.

Chinese equivalent, rendered by Kumārajīva as wu-cheng ("no verbal dispute"), araṇā also might imply a critique of "discursive construction" (prapañca).30 In this sense Subhuti as a forest-dweller (araṇya-vihārin) represents a tradition of practice which took particular care with regard to the psycho-epistemological distortions caused by language and concepts.

In the Prajñāpāramitā literature, Sariputra, recognized as the foremost of those who excel in wisdom, represents the Abhidharma tradition.31 In the dialogue, Śāriputra is pictured as one who, due to his abhidharmic mentality, has difficulty comprehending Subhūti's parodoxical thinking.

4.2.2 Subverting the Ontology of Language

The way these characters (Subhūti and Śāriputra) are used provides an important clue for understanding how the Prajñāpāramitā movement viewed itself in relation to the Abhidharma. That is, the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers are critical of an analytical, yet somewhat naive, approach. While the Abhidharmists are theory-oriented, the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers are rather deconstruction-oriented in their critique of language and ontology.

At the beginning of the 8,000 Lines, when the Buddha asks for an explanation of how a bodhisattva goes forth into

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30 Hsiao-p'in po-juo-po-lo-mi ching, T.8.538.b.

31 E. Conze, "Preface" to 8,000 Lines, pp. xii-xiii.

perfect wisdom, Subhuti gives an answer demonstrating typical Prajñāpāramitā deconstructive thinking: "I do not, O Lord, see that dharma 'Bodhisattva', nor a dharma called 'perfect wisdom'."32 What is called into question by Subhūti here is the ontology of language. In everyday language, a word is assumed to have "something" as its referent on which the meaning is grounded. The word "bodhisattva", for example, has meaning because it is assumed to correspond to a referent that is a real bodhisattva-entity. But the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers claimed that the referent is itself groundless. As the text says: "What is designated by 'Bodhisattva' is indeterminate, groundless. Why? Because 'bodhisattva' possesses nothing."33 Anyone who takes refuge in the referent as the ground of meaning, they argued, is ignorant of the fact that what is designated by a word is interdependently originated. That is, the referent itself is not transcendentally determinate. The mistake is committed because the referent has been ontologized. Such a mistake is

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32 8,000 Lines, pp.83-84; Kumarajiva, tr. Hsiao-p'in po-juo po-lo-mi ching, T.8.537.b.

33 Kumārajīva, trans. Hsaio-p'in po-juo po-lo-mi ching, T.8.537.c. Kumārajīva's translation is slightly different from the extant Sanskrit text. For the English translation from Sanskrit, see E. Conze, 8,000 Lines, p. 85. Another Chinese translation by Shih-hu (980 A.D.-) reads as follows: "In the words I search for Bodhisattva, but I gain nothing at all. What is designated [by 'Bodhisattva'] does not abide anywhere, nor does it abide nowhere; it is indeterminate, nor is it not indeterminate. Why? Because by nature what is designated [by 'Bodhisattva'] does not exist." T.8.587.c.

deeply rooted in existential anxiety and insecurity. When one is existentially compelled to abide in something, or to take something as the ground of existence, one then mistakes the conventional designations (*prajñapti*) for reality.

The Prajñāpāramitā thinkers did not, however, deny the use of language. Instead they sought to save language by means of separating enlightened discourse from conventional discourse.34 Ostensibly based on enlightened experience, they usually formulated enlightened discourse in a paradoxical style: "X is not X, therefore X". For instance, the *Diamond Sūtra* says: "The so-called 'all dharmas' are not all dharmas, therefore they are called 'all dharmas'."35 Such paradoxical discourse is used to break the ontological assumption underling conventional discourse.36

4.2.3 Experience of the Abyss: No-Abiding

Rather than being merely interested in speculative deconstruction, the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers were deeply concerned with existential problems. They put themselves directly into a radically de-centered situation, emptying themselves and putting themselves at the edge of an abyss.

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34 The theory of Two Truths is seen in the Large *PPS*, such as *25,000 Lines*. See Kumārajīva, tr. *Mo-ho po-juo po-lo-mi ching*, T.8.374.b; 378.c.

35 Kumārajīva, tr. *Chin-kang po-juo po-lo-mi ching*, T.8.751.b. Cf. E. Conze, *Buddhist Wisdom Books*, p. 58.

36 "Subhūti: I...do not find anything to correspond to the word 'Bodhisattva'." See *8,000 Lines*, p. 85.

In the *sūtras* this is often reported as a fearsome experience.37

This direct path is guided by a key notion, "non-abiding" (*a-pratiṣṭhita*, *a-sthita*, *a-sthitaka*). This notion, rendered by Conze with various meanings and implications,38 can be conceived as the cornerstone of Prajñāpāramitā thought. Before this notion is expounded in further detail, one must first examine the notion of "abiding" (Skt. *sthita*; Pali: *ṭhita*). In the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, II.25, among other usages *ṭhita* is used in the compound *dhammaṭṭhitatā* ("the dwelling of dharma"), meaning that the Buddhist teaching abides in the doctrine of dependent origination.39 Only through knowledge of the doctrine of dependent origination is one able to attain Arhatship. In this sense, the notion

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37 See *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, T.30.541.a; *SNS*, T.16.696.a.

38 In E. Conze's *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*, pp. 95-96, the meanings of *a-pratiṣṭhita* are well itemized: 1. Derived from relations between bodies: (1) Not relying on anything; (2) unsupported by anything, or unsupported anywhere; (3) not depending on anything, or having nothing to be dependent upon; (4) not standing anywhere; (5) not established anywhere; (6) not carried by anything; (7) not fixed on anything; (8) not resting on anything; (9) not leaning on anything; (10) not holding on to anything; (11) not abiding in anything, or, not intent on anything abiding anywhere; (12) not attached to anything; (13) not clinging to anything. 2. Derived from emotional experience: (14) not settling down anywhere; (15) not making oneself at home anywhere; (16) not seeking a secure basis anywhere; (17) seeking no refuge, or security, anywhere; (18) not rejoicing in anything. 3. Derived from social relationships: (19) expecting no help from anything; (20) trusting in nothing (except perfect wisdom); (21) without believing in anything.

39 K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (1963), p. 448.

of "abiding" or "dwelling" in early Buddhism is not totally negative; rather it indicates that, just as Buddhism dwells in the doctrine of dependent origination, a Buddhist should also abide in the Buddhist teaching.

The notion of "the dwelling of dharma" also appears in the Large Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra.40 But its meaning is re-interpreted and reversed in terms of "non-abiding". For the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers, the best way to dwell in Buddhist teaching is non-dwelling, non-abiding. This notion of non-abiding should be understood primarily in terms of the practice of meditation. In practicing meditation, Buddhists focus their minds on an object chosen from among the "five aggregates" or "twelve sense-fields", and so forth. But in the Prajñāpāramitā practice of meditation, a practitioner is advised not to let the mind abide on any object. As stated in the Aṣṭa:

> Moreover, a bodhisattva who courses in perfect wisdom and develops it, should not abide in form, nor in feelings, perceptions, volitions and consciousness. Because, when he abides in form, etc., he courses in its formative influence, and not in perfect wisdom. For, while he courses in formative influences, he cannot gain perfect wisdom, not exert himself upon it, nor fulfill it.41

The same idea is elaborated further in the Diamond Sūtra:

> Therefore then, Subhuti, the bodhisattva, the great being, should produce non-abiding mind (apratiṣṭhitam cittam), i.e., mind which abides nowhere, mind which

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40 Mo-ho po-juo po-lo-mi ching, T.8.402.c.

41 8,000 Lines, p. 85, with my underlines and slight modifications.

> does not abide in sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touchables or mind-objects.[42]

Abiding in something is always accompanied by the desire to dominate and possess something. However, those who desire to dominate and possess the other, always turn out to be those who are dominated and possessed by the other. Hence they become ensnared in the samsaric cycle.

4.2.4 Mark (Nimitta) and No-Mark (Animitta)

Another key notion as significant as "non-abiding" is "no-mark" (animitta; Ch. wu-hsiang). This notion was taken by Chinese Yogācāra to characterize the second turning, while the notion of mark (nimitta; Ch. yu-hsiang) was taken to characterize the first turning.[43]

In early Buddhism, no-mark (or marklessness), emptiness and wishlessness are called the "Three Doors to Deliverance".[44] As a method of meditation, the meditation of no-mark (animitta-samādhi) is used to eliminate "marks" which refer to that which appears in consciousness. However, it would be misleading merely to say that the mark is the intended object of consciousness, because the real driving force of consciousness toward something as its object derives not from the external object, but from sense-organs

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42 See E. Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books, pp. 47-48; Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, pp. 35-36.

43 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 17.30.a; 18.1.b.

44 E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, pp. 59-69.

(*indriya*).45 According to Buddhist psycho-epistemology, intentionality derives from the somatic side as much as from the psychic and epistemic sides. That is to say, intentionality abides in the body. Due to this somatic impulse to reach out, to grasp something, "something" is therefore apprehended. One then recognizes that "something" as a man or a woman, etc. At this stage language and interpretation occur to pin down the perception of "something".

Instead of referring to particular objects, marks involve misconceptions superimposed upon those particular objects, such as notions of permanence, happiness and I-ness, etc.46 The meditation of no-mark, therefore, reverses the path and eliminates marks. The whole course of no-mark practice consists of four meditations and four formless meditations, a system which is too complicated to be fully discussed here. According to the Pāli tradition, a practitioner goes beyond any external sensory mark and attains no-mark during the formless state. At this stage one is still trapped in some kind of mental mark. One will not

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45 "*Indriya*, the Sanskrit word for 'sense-organ', is derived from *indra*, and best translated as 'dominant'. It is akin to *dynamis*, 'a power in us by which we can do as we do', and denotes a directing, controlling, governing force, a power alien to us which has to be subdued." See E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, p. 62.

46 The Abhidharma schools give a different account of the variety of marks. See Peter Harvey, "'Signless' meditation in Pāli Buddhism", *JIABS* (1986), pp. 33-36; E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, pp. 68-69.

attain no-mark completely until one goes beyond the fourth formless state. At the final stage, no-mark as nibbāna is attained through the meditation of discerning (vipassanā).47

This Hīnayāna doctrine of Three Doors to Liberation was inherited by the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers. Nevertheless, they interpreted the meaning of no-mark in accordance with the guiding principle of non-abiding and non-appropriation. A bodhisattva is taught not to abide in marks, nor to abide in no-marks, but refuses to abide in the nirvana of no-marks simply because a bodhisattva must have knowledge of marks in order to save sentient beings. As the Aṣṭa says:

> Buddha: What does a bodhisattva practice when he practices perfect wisdom?
> Subhūti: The ultimate (paramārtha).
> Buddha: When practicing the ultimate does he practice with marks?
> Subhūti: No, World-Honored One!
> Buddha: If so, do you think that a bodhisattva should have eliminated marks or not?
> Subhūti: No, World-Honored One!
> Buddha: Why is a bodhisattva said to have eliminated marks?
> Subhūti: World-Honored One, because he did not practice and learn in the right way: If during practicing the Bodhisattva Path a bodhisattva has cut off marks in his present life, he has not yet completed the Buddha Path and, therefore, he will become a Śrāvaka only. World-Honored One, due to the power of upāya a bodhisattva is aware of the enchantment of marks and therefore does not appropriate no-mark.48

In contrast to the Śrāvaka Path, a bodhisattva does not

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47 Peter Harvey, op. cit. pp. 47-48.

48 Aṣṭa 356. My translation here is based on both Kumārajīva's and Shih-hu's translations. T.8.567.b; 646.c. Hsüan-tsang's translation (T.7.831.c) is very clear and helpful. See also E. Conze, 8,000 Lines, pp. 214-215.

enter into, nor to abide in, the completely no-mark state. Due to the Bodhisattva ideal of saving all sentient beings, the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers were fully aware of the provisional necessity of knowledge of marks.

In the chapter following the above quotation, this idea of not abiding in the no-mark state is further elaborated as a bodhisattva is taught to practice emptiness, without attaining emptiness:

> Subhūti: As the World-Honored One said, a bodhisattva should not attain emptiness. How does a bodhisattva who has entered into the concentration of emptiness not attain emptiness?
> Buddha: It is because...he contemplates emptiness, but does not attain emptiness. [He says to himself that] "I should learn emptiness. Now it is the time for learning, not for attaining. Therefore, I should not deeply tie my mind to an object"....He abides his mind in the concentration of compassion in which he takes all sentient beings as the object of concentration....He dwells in the concentration of emptiness, but he does not extinguish the outflows. Subhuti, at that time when a bodhisattva dwells in the concentration of emptiness, which is one door to liberation, he does not attain no-mark, nor does he fall into marks. It is just like a bird flying in empty space and not falling. It courses in the empty space, but it does not abide in the air.49

For the Śrāvakas, the attainment of emptiness is tantamount to the attainment of final liberation, i.e., the attainment of Nirvāṇa. The salvific task is fulfilled by the Śrāvakayānist at this point of attainment, and no further task remains. But for a Bodhisattva, the task should never be concluded until all sentient beings are liberated.

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49 Hsiao-p'in po-juo po-lo-mi ching, T.8.568.c-569.a; 649; 7.843; Conze, 8,000 Lines, pp. 222-224.

4.2.5 What is Deep and Profound: the Original Health

Based on the deconstructive practice of non-abiding, non-appropriating and no-mark, the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers came to realize the idea of non-arising (anupādadhi): "All dharmas are neither arisen, nor ceased".50 This conclusion immediately became a puzzle to the Abhidharmists who were, on the contrary, taught to contemplate how dharmas arise, abide, and cease.

In the Aṣṭa, this profound realization of non-arising by the irreversible Bodhisattva is described thus:

> Buddha: Well said, Subhuti. You are capable of showing the deep, profound characteristics of bodhisattvas, that is, emptiness, marklessness, wishlessness, no-arising, no-ceasing, no-possession, no-defilement, detachment and nirvana.
> Subhūti: Are those deep, profound characteristics not also fitted to all dharmas?
> Buddha: All dharmas are also deep and profound. Why? Subhuti, as form is deep and profound, so are feeling, perception, karmic volition, and consciousness. Why is form deep and profound? For Suchness is deep and profound. Why are feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness deep and profound? For Suchness is deep and profound. Subhūti, where there is no form, etc., there is the depth and profundity of form, etc..51

For the Abhidharmists, all conditioned dharmas are defiled,

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50 8,000 Lines, p. 86; T.8.538.a, 588.b. E. Conze points out that "this 'non-production' is in itself, of course, not a new idea, since the anutpādajñāna is well known to form a regular part of the stock of Hīnayāna teaching." See Thirty Years of Buddhist Stuides, p. 127, n. 1.

51 Kumārajīva's tr., Hsiao-p'in po-juo po-lo-mi ching, T.8.566.a; Shih-hu tr., Fo-shuo fo-mu ch'u san-fa-tsang po-juo po-lo-mi-to ching, T.8.644.a-b; Conze, 8,000 Lines, p. 209.

and real by nature. On the contrary, the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers claimed that all dharmas are pure, unconditioned and empty by nature. That is, all dharmas are inseparable from Nirvāṇa. Such an affirmative, positive conclusion was reached through the deconstructive praxis which only eliminates abiding and appropriation, but not all dharmas. As a consequence, what is recovered is the "original face", to borrow Ch'an's expression, of all dharmas.52

The Prajñāpāramitā thinkers took a radical step in proposing a positive way of seeing, claiming that all dharmas should be seen from the perspective of enlightenment. They contended that disease cannot be simply analyzed away; the best way for the patients to recover from an illness is rather to meditate on health. For those who are mentally and spiritually ill, methods of therapy that over-emphasize the details of the sickness would cause patients to suffer even more by leading them to pathologically fixate on their disease. For this reason, the Prajñāpāramitā school proposed another way of meditation, that is, to meditate on the originally healthy, pure nature of all dharmas. From the perspective of the ultimate truth, they claimed that "in its essential nature thought (citta) is transparently luminous (prakṛtiś cittasya

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52 This position is clearly shown in the Heart Sūtra. See E. Conze, Buddhist Wisdom Books, pp. 107-111.

prabhāsvaratā)"53, because "all dharmas are by nature perfectly pure."54

4.3 The Last Turning: Yogācāra Hermeneutic

As discussed, some Abhidharma sub-communities, the Yogācārins in particular, deviated from orthodox Abhidharma as a result of the subversive influence of Prajñāpāramitā thought. Under such circumstances the SNS arose as an Abhidharmic re-constructive response to Prajñāpāramitā de-construction. Being largely confined to the Abhidharmic style and conceptual framework, the early Mahāyāna Yogācārins produced a new form of Buddhist literature called Mahāyānābhidharma, including both the SNS and the Mahāyānābhidharma Sūtra.55

In the passage of "Three Turnings of the Dharma-Wheel", the Prajñāpāramitā teaching is judged to be "surpassable and non-defininitive", not due to its philosophical position, which was in fact accepted by Yogācāra, but because it was presented in an implicit way (guhya-dharm'akhyānam). Similarly, they regarded the Prajñāpāramitā message as the "hidden meaning" or "secret", which, as a purely hermeneutic

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53 Aṣṭa 5, Conze, 8,000 Lines, p. 84; T.8.537.b. See also Yin-shun, Ju-lai-tsang chih yen-chiu (1981), pp. 67-88.

54 8,000 Lines, p. 250; T.8.574.b.

55 Here Yüan-t'se is correct in classifying the SNS under the Abhidharma category. See Yüan-t'se, Shu 1.27.a: "Of three baskets, the Abhidharma basket is that which [the SNS] belongs."

problem, does not have any mystical or esoteric implications.

For the Yogācāra, the distinction between "non-definitive" and "definitive" is understood in terms of the distinction between the "implicit" (guhya) and "explicit" (vivṛta) ways of presentation.56 The Abhidharmic inclinations of the SNS led it to consider theories and methods to be indispensable for revealing the "hidden meaning" of the Prajñāpāramitā thought, making it explicit. The main task for the SNS thus is to take a hermeneutical detour to articulate what has not been fully articulated, explaining how the samsaric life-world is constructed and how one can be liberated from it.

The details of the Yogācāra hermeneutic as presented in the SNS will be discussed in Part Two. The last part of this chapter expounds the theme of the third turning by explaining the meaning of the title saṃdhi-nirmocana.

According to Yüan-t'se's commentary, nirmocana means (1) interpretation (Ch. chieh-shih) and (2) liberation (Ch. chieh-t'o); while saṃdhi means (1) that which is deep and concealed, (2) a knot-like complexity, and (3) a stream-like continuum. As a compound, saṃdhi-nirmocana can be construed either as a hermeneutic of what is hidden and concealed, or as an attempt to achieve liberation from the knot-like complexity or the stream-like continuum, i.e., saṃsāra. The

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56 Cf. Unrai Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 82.

former is largely based on Hsüan-tsang's interpretation, while the latter is shown in Guṇabhadra's and Bodhiruci's translations, which rather stress the significance of liberation (nirmocana; chieh-to).57

The term saṃdhi-nirmocana also was rendered by Paramārtha as chieh-chieh (lit. "unwrapping the knot"). In his commentary on the SNS, a lost yet very valuable source, he provided a rather complicated etymological exegesis:

> Chieh (nirmocana) means interpretation; chieh (saṃdhi) means a hard knot which is fixed and twined such as the knot of a tree and the joints of bones. Because the extremely deep and profound meaning illuminated by this scripture is so difficult to penetrate and explain, and is not accessible to ordinary people and junior bodhisattvas, it is therefore characterized as a "hard knot". This scripture is named saṃdhi-nirmocana (lit. "unwrapping the hard knot") because it is able to unwrap the hard knot.
> In brief, there are five meanings of chieh-chieh (saṃdhi-nirmocana): (1) This scripture is thus named because it is capable of exploring the deep and profound knot-like meanings, e.g., dharma-kāya, etc. which are hard to penetrate. (2) The hard knot (saṃdhi) refers to the mental-intellectual confusion caused by the sedimental residues (vāsanā) of ignorance (avidyā) which cannot be demolished by ordinary people and adherents of the two vehicles [i.e., the śrāvakayāna and the pratyekabuddhayāna]. Saṃdhi-nirmocana is named after the truth by which one is able to destroy this confusion. (3) Saṃdhi-nirmocana is also named after the wisdom which takes truth as its object. That is, it is named after the object [i.e., truth]. (4) Saṃdhi-nirmocana is named after what is disclosed by the words of the scripture. (5) This scripture makes explicit the subtle, unfathomable meanings in all three vehicles. Thus it is called saṃdhi-nirmocana.58

Of these five kinds of exegesis, Paramārtha favored the

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57 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 1.2.a.

58 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 2.2.b-3.a.

first. His interpretation was in fact not different from Hsüan-tsang's. Both of them agreed that the SNS is intended to accomplish a hermeneutic task, namely, to make explicit the implicit messages concealed in the previous scriptures.

Even though Hsüan-tsang's interpretation has been widely accepted, the old interpretation of saṃdhi-nirmocana as liberation from the samsaric cycle should not be disregarded.59 The meaning of the term nirmocana as "liberation" and "deliverance", preserved in the old Chinese translations, is instructive. According to Monier-Williams, nirmocana in the sense of deliverance is derived from nir-\/muc, meaning "to loose, free from, liberate".60 Therefore, as that which is modified by nirmocana (liberation), saṃdhi can be construed as that which needs to be liberated.61

Philosophically the old meaning of saṃdhi-nirmocana is more compelling than Hsüan-tsang's translation. As a

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59 In Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, II, p. 558, saṃdhi-nirmocana is defined by Franklin Edgerton as "setting forth, unfolding of the real truth, fundamental explanation", which is derived from Tibetan and Chinese renderings. The emphasis on the hermeneutical character of the SNS also is seen in other renderings, e.g., "l'explication des mysteres" by E. Lamotte, "Elucidation of Intention Scripture" by Robert A. F. Thurman (Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold, p. 191), "the Sacred Text Which Reveals What is Hidden" by Paul J. Griffiths (On Being Mindless, p. 77).

60 A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 556.

61 In the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, saṃdhi is used to mean "connection with rebirth", while asaṃdhi or parimocana means liberation from that connection with rebirth. This was pointed out by F. Edgerton in his Dictionary, p. 557.

hermeneutic by which the profound, deep meaning is retrieved, the *SNS* is intended to disclose that meaning, and at the same time to liberate sentient beings from the knot-like complexity of the life-world. Disclosure of the hidden meaning is directed toward liberation from *saṃsāra*. Interpretation and liberation thus must be viewed as two sides of one coin. For Yogācāra Buddhism, a hermeneutic of the life-world is taken as a path to enlightenment and deliverance. In this sense the *SNS* can be understood as a hermeneutic of liberation.

Part Two

Yogācāra Hermeneutic of the Life-World

Chapter Five

Consciousness and the Embodiment of the Life-World: From the Doctrine of Dependent Origination to the Notion of Appropriating-Consciousness

The most fundamental task in Buddhist thought is the disclosure of the structure of the samsaric life-world. This task is, from the beginning, formulated as the doctrine of dependent origination, the cornerstone of all Buddhist schools. The Yogācāra school is no exception. In this chapter we will attempt to locate both the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra and the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra treatments of the doctrine of dependent origination within the historical context of Buddhism, particularly in terms of consciousness.

Early accounts of the doctrine of dependent origination can be found in the Nikāyas/Āgamas and Abhidhamma/Abhidharma literature. Yogācāra further recast the doctrine of dependent origination in a new conceptual framework: tne doctrines of appropriating-consciousness and three natures. These doctrines cannot be properly understood unless their relationship with the doctrine of dependent origination is examined.1

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1 The doctrine of dependent origination was re-formulated by Nāgārjuna in terms of the eight-fold negation, by the Mahāyāna-Yogācāras in terms of store consciousness, by the Tathāgatagarbha school in terms of the "embryo of Tathagata" (tathāgatagarbha), by the Hua-Yen school in terms of the Dharma Realm (dharmadhātu), and by the T'ien-tai School in terms of the Inclusiveness of Nature (hsing-chü), etc. For a brief history of the doctrine of dependent origination, cf. Alfonso Verdu, The Philosophy of Buddhism:

5.1 The Samsaric Life-World

To begin with, a brief survey of the notion of samsāra is necessary to explicate the doctrine of dependent origination. The word samsāra, as originally used in the Indian context, means "perpetual repetition" of the life-world.2 This key notion can be better understood if it is traced back to its pre-Buddhist, Brahmanical context. In that period, there were two modes of orientation: (1) the ritual-oriented trend, in which sacrifice was performed in the village and (2) the world-renouncing trend, in which the renounciant chose to live in the forest.3

Drawing on C. Malamound's research, Steven Collins calls attention to the correlation between "village" and the notion of "repetition":

> This repetition means a group of related things: first, the perpetual repetition of ritual and social forms, caste rules and obligations, in contrast with the renouncer's progress (in theory) towards complete freedom and isolation....;then, the repetition of social life imaginatively transcribed as the series of births and deaths experienced in the 'worlds' of

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A "Totalistic" Synthesis; Takeuchi Yoshinori, The Heart of Buddhism (1983), pp. 64-73.

2 Etymologically derived from the root sar--"run, hasten, flow, stream", samsāra has the following meanings: "going or wandering through, undergoing transmigration, passing through a succession of states, circuit of mundane existence, the world, secular life, worldly illusion." See Monier-Williams, p. 1119; Steven Collins, Selfless Persons (1982), p. 43.

3 Steven Collins, ibid., pp. 63-64; also cf. Hirakawa Akira, A History of Indian Buddhism, p. 16.

> sacrifice and saṃsāra....
> Now we can see that this same structure represents at once the ideas of repeated birth and death in the sacrifice, of repeated birth, through sacrificial initiation, into village society with its constant round of social ties and caste obligations, and of repeated birth and death in the eschatological scheme of saṃsāra. The forest-dwelling renouncer escapes them all.[4]

Rooted in the socio-historical fact that the continuity and repetition of the caste system are too rigid to be broken, the notion of saṃsāra eschatologically transcribes the caste system. On the contrary, a forest-dwelling renounciant seeks liberation (mokṣa) from the continuity and repetition of saṃsāra.

In the case of Buddhism, the Buddha and his followers are closely associated with the world-renouncing trend in contrast to the Brahmanic tradition, although Buddhism is also distinguished from those world-renouncers in its emphasis upon the rational analysis of the structure of saṃsāra and the path of liberation.

5.2 The Doctrine of Dependent Origination in the Nikāya/Āgamas

According to the traditional account, the Buddha realized the doctrine of dependent origination under a bodhi tree when he attained Enlightenment. The standard formula of dependent origination in the form of twelve links, however, has undergone a long formative process, starting from an

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4 Steven Collins, ibid., pp. 63-64.

archetypal form consisting of two or three links.

The prose form of the doctrine of dependent origination, as pointed out by Noritoshi Aramaki, starts from three or four links, i.e., consciousness (vijñāna), birth (jāti), decay-and-death (jarāmaraṇa) or consciousness, name-form (nāmarūpa), birth, and decay-and-death:5

> That which is intended (ceteti) and imaginatively constructed (pakappeti) becomes the object (P. ārammaṇa; Skt. ālambana) upon which consciousness abides to persist. The object being there, there comes to be a station of consciousness. Consciousness being stationed and growing, rebirth of renewed existence takes place in the future, and from here birth, decay-and-death, grief, lamenting, suffering, sorrow, and despair come to pass. Such is the arising of this entire conglomeration of suffering.6

In the Saṃyukta Āgama #361, name-form is placed after consciousness.7 According to this archetypal expression, the construction of the samsaric life-world is explained as consisting of objects which in turn become the residence of consciousness. This kind of dialectical interdependence between consciousness and its intended object underlies the structure of the samsaric life-world in such a way that neither consciousness nor the external object are

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5 See an excellent study on this issue, Noritosni Aramaki, "On the Formation of a Short Prose Pratītya-samutpāda Sūtra" (1985).

6 Saṃyutta-Nikāya 12.38. See Mrs. Rhys Davids, tr., The Book of the Kindred Sayings (Saṃyutta-Nikāya), Part II, p. 45. I have modified slightly her translation after consulting the Chinese translation of Saṃyukta-Āgama. Cf. Tsa a-han ching, T.2.100.a-b (no. 359).

7 Tsa a-han ching, T.2.100.b. Cf. Kindred Sayings, II, p. 46.

reductionistically taken as an ultimate cause.

Such dialectical interdependence cannot be viewed as merely a logical or epistemological relationship between a subject and an object or cause and effect.8 The interdependence between consciousness and object should be be characterized as an intentional relationship. In such a relationship, consciousness is conditioned by the object, which in turn is intended and appropriated by consciousness.

5.2.1 The Foods and Dwellings of Consciousness

Consciousness does not exist in a substantial form. It arises and grows because of outside nourishment. This aspect is illustrated by similes employed in the Buddhist texts. First, in the Saṃyutta-nikāya 12.64, four kinds of food (āhāra)--solid food, contact, volition (manosañcetana) and consciousness, are said to be necessary for consciousness to grow.9 Consciousness therein is sustained and cultivated by its desire and appetite for consuming those objects, including anything physical and ideological.

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8 The notion of dependent origination has two usages. As an abstract and logical principle, it is described as follows: "When this is, that is; this arising, that arises. When this is not, that is not; this ceasing, that ceases." (Majjhima-nikāya III, p. 63. See W. Rahula, What the Buddha Taught, p. 53). Its second usage as a concrete description of samsaric existence, is much more relevant to the present discussion.

9 Rhys Davids, Kindred Sayings, II, pp. 70-71; T.2.102c-103a. Also cf. N. Aramaki, "On the Formation of a Short Prose Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra", pp.92-94.

A similar metaphor for consciousness is "seed". In Saṃyutta-nikāya, 22.54, consciousness is defined as that which is accompanied by appropriation (ādāna). Just as it depends upon four "foods", consciousness also depends on four other aggregates (skandha), i.e., form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), conception (saṃjñā), and volition (saṃskāra). All the four aggregates are appropriated by consciousness as the objects upon which consciousness abides.10 When consciousness is compared to a "seed", the four other aggregates are compared to soil while desire/appetite is water.

According to the above-mentioned similes, the doctrine of dependent origination centers on the dynamics of consciousness, that is, how consciousness develops and gains its plausible status as autonomous subject. The main reason why sentient beings are trapped in the cycle of re-birth and re-death can be seen in such a allegorical situation: consciousness, as some kind of symbiotic organism, grows and becomes a monster. Like a wild bull that needs to be tamed, Buddhism considers consciousness to be something with a great appetite in need of being controlled.11

5.2.2 Desire and Cognition

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10 Saṃyukta-āgama, no. 39; Tsa a-han ching, T.2.8c-9.a.

11 The description in this passage is purely allegorical, and is not intended to substantialize any factor of dependent origination, particularly consciousness.

Desire/appetite underlies consciousness. In two short *sūtras* on dependent origination in the form of five links, *Saṃyukta-āgama* #285 and #286, the flux of the samsaric life-world is depicted as follows: The arising of birth is conditioned by becoming (*bhava*); the arising of becoming is conditioned by appropriation (*upādāna*); the arising of appropriation is conditioned by desire (*tṛṣṇā*).12 Yet desire is in turn increased and expanded by the objects with which a subject is obsessed.

This notion of desire (*tṛṣṇā*) is often considered to be the cause of suffering, as explained in the second Noble Truth: "It is this *taṇhā* (*tṛṣṇā*) which produces re-existence and re-becoming (*ponobhavikā*)."13 However, desire cannot be taken as the first cause. It is always accompanied by ignorance (*avidyā*). Being ignorant of impermanence, one always craves for something as an "object".14

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12 *Tsa a-han ching*, T.2.79c-80.b.

13 *Mahāvagga (of the Vinaya)*, quoted by Walpola Rahula in *What the Buddha Taught*, p. 29. The term *tṛṣṇā/taṇhā* is usually translated as "thirst", "craving" and "desire". The quotation is also found in H. Oldenberg's *Buddha*, p. 225 and E. Lamotte's "Conditioned Co-production and Supreme Enlightenment", p. 118.

14 It is said in the *Saṃyukta-Āgama* 294 (SN 12.19): "Having been covered by ignorance and tied by desire, an ordinary man, dull and unlearned, is thus endowed with consciousnesses. By the consciousnesses from inside and name-form from outside is conditioned the arising of contact." (T.2.83.c) In this *sūtra*, both consciousnesses and name-form are conditioned by ignorance and desire. This clearly shows that the format in the form of 10 or 12 links could easily mislead our interpretation if we do not trace its archaeological process.

Later the links of consciousness, name-form, the six sense bases (sadāyatana), contact (sparśa), and feeling were introduced into the formula to explain the cognitive aspect of dependent origination.15 But we should be very wary of the fact that the epistemology in the doctrine of dependent origination is not isolated from desire, by which cognition is deeply conditioned.

5.2.3 Consciousness and Name-Form

Another understanding of the relationship between consciousness and name-form is found in the Saṃyutta-Nikāya II. 65. These two links reciprocally condition each other:

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15 In the Saṃyutta-Nikāya II, 2, the meanings of these links and their conditioning relationships are clearly defined:

> And what, monks, is feeling? There are six groups of feeling: feeling born from eye-contact, feeling born from ear-contact, feeling born from nose-contact, feeling born of tongue-contact, feeling born of body-contact, feeling born of mind-contact. This called feeling.
> And what, monks, is sense contact? There are six kinds of sense contact: eye-contact, ear-contact...
> And what, monks, is six sense bases? The eye-base, ear-base...
> And what, monks, is name-and-form? Feelings, ideations (saṃjñā), volitions (cetana), sense contacts (sparśa), mental orientation--this is called name. The four great elements and the forms derived from the four great elements--this is called form. Such is this name and this form that is called name-and-form.
> And what, monks, is consciousness? There are six kinds of consciousness--eye-consciousness, ear-, smell-, taste-, touch-, and mind-consciousness. This is called consciousness.

See Mrs. Rhys Davids tr. Kindred Sayings II, p. 4; Alex Wayman, "Dependent Origination-The Indo-Tibetan Tradition", Journal of Chinese Philosophy 7, (1980), p. 279.

name-form is conditioned by consciousness, and consciousness is conditioned by name-form.16 The text goes on to say: "This consciousness turns back, it goes no further than name-form." Another somewhat different account also is provided in the Saṃyutta-Āgama 287: "During such contemplation I turn back from consciousness and I am not able to go beyond it (consciousness)."17

But what do these statements really mean? We have to examine the notion of "name-form" (nāma-rūpa) first, a key idea which is, as Alex Wayman remarks, "of great importance in the development of Indian religion and philosophy."18 Our survey will be confined to the scope of the Buddhist discourse only, although we must presuppose some knowledge of the usage of "name-form" deeply rooted in the Veda-Upaniṣads tradition.19

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16 Mrs. Rhys Davids, Kindred Sayings, II, pp. 72-73. The same account is also seen in the Samyutta Nikaya II, 67 and elsewhere.

17 The textual materials are collected in Shinkan Hirano, "Engijodosetsu shiryo", IBK 13.1 (1965), p. 191.

18 Alex Wayman, "A Study of the Vedāntic and Buddhist Theory of Nāma-rūpa", Indological and Buddhist Studies (1982), p. 617.

19 Knowlege of the origin of nāma-rūpa in the Brahmanical sources is necessarily required for a better understanding of its usage and meaning in the Buddhist context. In addition to Alex Wayman's recent study, as already mentioned, there are some excellent studies on this subject: Maryla Falk, Nāma-rūpa and Dharma-rūpa (University of Calcutta, 1943); Sengaku Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara (University of Tokyo Press, 1979). In The Heart of Buddhism, pp. 99-104, Takeuchi Yoshinori also sheds new light on this issue by using

As defined in the Saṃyutta Nikāya II.2, name-form refers to the five aggregates. This is accepted by most of the Buddhist schools. However, if, as Yuichi Kajiyama suggests,20 such a systematic definition could not have appeared earlier than the Abhidharma period, this notion would be better understood in light of the previous analysis of "four foods" and "four dwellings of consciousness". That is, name-form plays the role of "foothold" for consciousness, and vice versa.21

Still, what does "name-form" exactly mean? It has been rendered as "the (new) psycho-physical individuality"22, "psyche and body"23, and "name-and-formation".24 But these renderings are of little help unless the notion of name-form is understood within its specific context.

A passage in the Aṭṭhaka-vagga of the Suttanipāta, probably the oldest Buddhist text, is worthy of note:

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provocative, yet controversial, Heideggerian language.

20 Cf. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Rinne to choetsu", Tetsugaku Kenkyū 47-8 (1984), pp. 348-349.

21 Mahā-nidāna-suttanta, Dīgha Nikāya, ii. 64. See T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, III, pp. 60-61.

22 K.N. Jayatilleke, The Message of the Buddha (1974), p. 223.

23 R. E. A. Johansson, The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism (1979).

24 Alex Wayman emphasizes the meaning of rūpa with the connotation of 'touching up', 'filling up' and 'giving body to'. See "A Study of the Vedāntic and Buddhist Theory of Nāma-rūpa", p. 620.

> Depending upon name (nāma) and form (rūpa), contact exists....By the cessation of form contacts (phassa) do not contact.
> At what stage of one's practice does form cease to exist?....
> Not being with consciousness, nor being with wrong consciousness, not being without consciousness, nor being with consciousness disappeared--to the person who has practiced in this way, form disappears, for the papañcasaṁkha is conditioned by ideation (saññā).25

According to this passage, rūpa (or nāma and rūpa) has something to do with papañcasaṁkha, which means the "proliferating tendency of designation" or "designation characterized by the proliferating conceptualization of the mind".26

In early Buddhist meditation, it is said that "form" is transcended in the altered state of the "non-manifestative consciousness" (anidassana-viññana). In such a state of consciousness nothing is manifested out of our world of concepts. As Bhikkhu Nanananda says, "all concepts have become transparent to such a degree in that all-encompassing vision, that their boundaries together with their umbra and penumbra, have yielded to the radiance of wisdom".27 That is to say, that which is cut off is not form, but the

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25 This passage is quoted by Hajime Nakamura in "The Theory of 'Dependent Origination' in its Incipient Stage", pp. 167-168. Also, cf. K. R. Norman's translation in The Rhinoceros Horn and Other Early Buddhist Poems (Sutta Nipāta) (1985), p. 145.

26 See Bhikkhu Nanananda, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought (1971), p. 5. H. Nakamura's rendering of this term as "the discrimination about the phenomena world" is not as adequate as Nanananda's.

27 Nanananda, ibid, p. 60.

proliferation of conceptualization and verbalization.

Rūpa refers to the material basis that is not yet tainted by concepts. As a compound, nāma-rūpa refers to the form of being in which physical and psychical entities and their functions are not yet bifurcated.28 In other words, it is that which has not been conceived as "individuality", though it does serve as the "foothold" of individuality-to-be.

The notion of name-form can be further interpreted in the embryological sense. As stated in the Mahā-nidāna-suttanta of Dīgha Nikāya:

> I have said that consciousness is the cause of name-form. Now this statement, Ānanda, is to be understood in the following manner: If consciousness did not come into the mother's womb, would the name-form spring up in the mother's womb?
> It would not, Lord.
> If consciousness, Ānanda, comes into the mother's womb and becomes extinct, would the name-form be born into this world?
> It would not, Lord....
> Therefore, this is the cause, the source, the origin and the condition [for the birth of the] name-form, namely the consciousness.
> Now it is also stated that name-form is the cause of consciousness. This statement is to be understood in the following manner: if, Ānanda, consciousness did not find a foothold in name-form, would the arising again of birth, decay, death and suffering be manifested?
> It would not, Lord.
> Therefore, Ānanda, this is a cause, a source, an origin

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28 As observed by Takeuchi Yoshinori, in the mythology of the Rig Veda, nāmarūpa "represents the primary mode through which the world reveals itself". The same ancient term is employed in early Buddhism to describe the experience of enlightenment in which "there is neither consciousness nor nāma-rūpa". The notion of nāma-rūpa refers to the pre-interpreted, pre-conceptualized life-world. See Takeuchi Yoshinori, The Heart of Buddhism, p. 80.

> and a condition [for the manifestation of] consciousness, namely the name-form.29

The cycle of rebirth is deeply rooted in the mutual dependency and conditioning that exists between consciousness and the name-form. If we look closely at the relationship between consciousness and object (ārammaṇa), then we find that it is similar to the reciprocity between consciousness and name-form. But, still there is a subtle difference, viz., the latter's emphasis on the symbiotic relation between consciousness and the primordial unity of life-form.

5.3 The Sarvāstivāda's Interpretation

In the Sarvāstivāda literature, as initiated in the Jñānaprasthāna and completed in the Mahāvibhāṣā, the doctrine of dependent origination was interpreted in accordance with their realist ontology of existence and time. The twelve links are arranged into the model of "three life-periods and twofold causation".

To summarize this model briefly, the links of ignorance (12) and karmic volition (11) in the past time-period entail as their effect the five links of the present time-period, i.e., consciousness (10), name-form (9), six faculties (8), contact (7), and feeling (6). In the present time-period,

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29 For a translation of this passage, see T.W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, III, pp. 60-61, and K. N. Jayatilleka, The Message of the Buddha, pp. 223-224.

the links of desire (5), appropriation (4) and becoming (3) entail as their effect the remaining two links in the future time-period, i.e., birth (2) and decay and death (1).30

This new model seems to shift the focus slightly from the construction of the life-world to the continuation of the life-world (i.e., the problem of rebirth). The division of three time-periods is employed to explain the causal continuity between three life-periods. On this particular issue, the Sarvāstivādins propose the concept of "linking-up mind" (pratisaṃdhi-citta) as a mediator between two life-periods.

In a catechism on a sūtra cited from the Āgama, the Sarvāstivādin used this notion of linking-up consciousness to explain why during backward contemplation on the twelve links one "turns one's mind back by not going beyond consciousness":

> During his bodhisattva stage, our Lord left his palace home because of the problem of decay, sickness and death. He meditated on the following: What causes decay, sickness and death? In meditation he realized that they are caused by the linking-up mind. He mediated again: What causes the linking-up mind? It is caused by karma....[Karma] is caused by defilement (kleśa)....[Defilement] is caused by events (vastu)....The [events] are evolved by the linking-up mind. At that moment, the Bodhisattva had this realization: "All misery is caused by this [linking-up] mind"....That is the reason why one turns one's mind back by not going beyond consciousness.31

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30 Mahāvibhāṣā T.27.117.a-b. Also, cf. Kośabhāṣya, T.29.48.

31 Mahavibhasa, T.27.124.b. This theory was also held by Ghosa.

"Defilement" refers to ignorance, desire and appropriation; *karma* refers to kamric volition and becoming, and "event" refers to the remaining links.32 Accordingly, it is obvious that the linking-up mind is conceived as consciousness linking together three life-periods.

The notion of the "linking-up mind" can also be considered as a forerunner of the notion of store-consciousness. Yet we should not overlook an important difference between them. The linking-up mind, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, is not separate from the apperceptive consciousness (*manovijñāna*), while the Yogācāra notion of the store-consciousness refers to a consciousness different from the six consciousnesses.33 Nonetheless we do see a new approach to disclosing the underlying structure of the samsaric life-world, as suggested by the notion of the linking-up mind.

5.4 Śrāvaka-Yogācāra's Interpretation

As seen in the basic sections of the *Yobh*, the Śrāvaka-Yogācāras also interpreted the theory of dependent origination with an emphasis on the problem of rebirth. They further developed the notion of the linking-up consciousness (*pratisaṃdhi-vijñāna*). On this issue, the Śrāvaka-Yogācāras did not depart very far from the Sarvāstivāda's position.

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32 *Ibid*, T.27.122.b.

33 Cf. L. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, Part I, p. 36.

Since a large amount of pre-SNS sources are preserved in the basic sections of the Yobh, which are indispensable for contextualizing the content of the SNS, we should look into these materials closely.

According to the Savitarkā-savicārā-bhūmi of the Yobh34, the present life-period is considered pivotal to the possibilities of either heading toward the next samsaric life or attaining ultimate liberation. In this present life, consciousness is conditioned by the ignorance and karmic volition of the past. This consciousness is called the "consciousness-with-karma", which lasts throughout an entire life and causes the arising of the linking-up consciousness. The arising of the latter is also fostered by a secondary condition, viz., desire.

In the present life-period, after having merged into name-form, the linking-up consciousness, now called "the consciousness-as-the-result-of-maturation" (vipaka-vijñāna), co-dependently evolves with name-form. In this context, name-form refers to the "six bases" (āśraya): rūpa consists of the five sensory bases, while nāma designates the immediately preceding moment of thought.35 It is further stated that those "six bases", viz., name-form, serve as the

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34 T.30.321.a.17-322.a.18.

35 Lambert Schmithausen identifies the six bases (āśraya) as the six sense-faculties (cakṣurādi). For the textual evidence, see T.30.827.c.16; Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, II, p. 462, note 1102.

bases of the six consciousness.36 Now we see that the "linking-up consciousness" is not distinguished from the six consciousnesses. At least as can be seen from the textual source investigated here, the linking-up consciousness or the consciousness-as-the-result-of-maturation was not yet considered a subliminal consciousness distinct from the six consciousnesses. In other words, like early Buddhists and Sarvastivadins, early Yogācārins interpreted the process of samsaric evolution in terms of six consciousnesses.37

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36 T.30.321.b.3-4.

37 A tentative translation of the passage in the Savitarkā-savicārā-bhūmi of Yogācārabhūmi (T.30.321.a.16-b.9) is provided:

What is the essential of dependent origination? Briefly speaking, dependent origination is established by three characteristics: From the past originates the present; from the present originates the future. After the present has occured, there are two ways: either going towards the evolving [samsara] or going towards complete purification.

How does the present again go toward the evolving after it has been born from the past? If one does not know that the past was covered by ignorance and if one is thus conditioned by ignorance, one will create and increase the verbal, mental and physical karmas, good, bad and neutral. The consciousness accompanying those karmas evolves ceaselessly till the end of life. This consciousness will cause the linking-up consciousness (pratisaṃdhi-vijñāna) later.

When this consciousness is about to bear fruit, it is accompanied as well as assisted by the internal and external lustful desires, which also appear at that moment. After leaving the past life, it is born into a (new) life-body (ātmabhāva) in the present.

In the mother's womb after being conditioned by the cause-consciousness, the linking-up fruit-consciousness (pratisaṃdhi-phala-vijñāna) is born and develops through the various stages such as kalala, etc. During the time in the womb, the linking-up fruit-consciousness develops with name-form and gradually grows till decay.

At that moment, after having connected with the [new] life and having received the [previous] karmas, the matured

Even though the Śrāvaka-Yogācāras did not explicitly name any consciousness other than the six consciousnesses, they did detect the subliminal function of the linking-up consciousness or consciousness-as-the-result-of-maturation. Their awareness of this new feature of consciousness can be seen by the following two points:

(1) Consciousness in the cycle of dependent origination is called "consciousness as the result of maturation of previous karmas" (vipaka-vijñāna), which is virtually taken as synonymous with the store-consciousness.38 It is also defined as "cause-consciousness" (hetu-vijñāna), by which one's next existence arises through the mediation of the linking-up consciousness.

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fruit is given to [this consciousness]. This consciousness as the result of maturation (vipaka-vijñāna) evolves on the basis of name-form, because it must evolve on the six bases (satsu āśrayesu). Thus the sūtra states that "consciousness is conditioned by name-form". Rūpa refers to the sense-bases which are synchronically associated with [the five sensory consciousnesses], and nāma refers to the preceding thought as the basis. Those six bases, viz., name-form, serve as the bases of the six consciousnesses. Due to reliance upon those [nāmarūpa] bases, consciousnesses evolve till the end of life. There is another interpretation: rūpa refers to the five sense organs, including those primary elements which are the bases of sense organs and those which are able to produce primary elements. What remains refers to nāma. Because the sense organs are appropriated (or upheld) by consciousness, they fall into the flow of continuity and thus are able to evolve. These two kinds (i.e., nāma and rūpa) are stationed upon the consciousnesses and therefore evolve ceaselessly. For this reason, in the present life-period consciousness is conditioned by name-form and vice versa. Like [two bunches of] stacked reeds, they evolve by depending on each other till the end of life.

38 Cf. L. Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, p. 8.

(2) This consciousness (= vikapa-vijñāna) is not essentially different from the linking-up consciousness. The latter as "fruit" (phala) is derived from the former as "cause". Hence we see that consciousness serves as the vehicle of rebirth between two existences, by means of which the various "seeds" (bīja) of name-form, the six sense faculties (ṣaḍāyatana), contact and sensation, are thus able to be carried over to one's next existence.

The impelling force of rebirth, nevertheless, is assigned to ignorance and desire. As stated in the formula of dependent origination, consciousness is conditioned by and therefore conceived as the result of the maturation of ignorance and karmic volition from the past life-period. But desire also plays an indispensable role for beings moving towards another existence. Desire is in turn conditioned by pleasurable, painful and neutral feelings. Appropriation /clinging is conditioned by desire, and becoming is conditioned by appropriation. Thus follows the entire cycle of re-birth and re-death.39

The above account of dependent origination in the Yogācārabhūmi shows that the construction and repetition of the samsaric life-world, according to the Śrāvaka-Yogācāras, is impelled by the force of ignorance and desire embodied in the mutual dependency between consciousness and its object. On this point they did not deviate at all from

39 T.30.321.c.

the fundamental position of early Buddhism.

5.5 Life-world Confined by Eros

Buddhism in general has difficulty in balancing the problem of rebirth with the doctrine of non-self. The notion of "intermediate-state" (antarā-bhava) was therefore employed by some Buddhist sects as a conceptual tool to solve this problem.40 Although this notion was very controversial in Buddhist communities, it was accepted and fully discussed by the early Yogacarins in the Manobhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi.41

What is particularly relevant for our discussion, is not the notion of "intermediate-state", but the implied insight into the secret of life-in-this-world. It is precisely due to this insight that in penetrating into the intermediate-state the Śrāvaka-Yogācārins show their new interpretation of the construction of the samsaric life-world.

According to the Manobhūmi, after consciousness leaves the body at the moment of death, due to the force of narcissism (ātmasneha) one is born into the intermediate-

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40 See Alex Wayman, "The Intermediate-state Dispute in Buddhism", in L. Cousins (eds.), Buddhist Studies in Honor of J. B. Horner (1968).

41 T.30.282.a-283.a. Also, Kairyu Shimizu provides the Sanskrit text, Hsüan-tsang's translation and a Japanese translation together in "Yugashijiron no genten kenkyū (III)", Osaki Gakuhō 140 (1985).

state through one's own "seeds" (*svabīja*). The seeds refer to attachment to the proliferating conceptualization and verbalization (*prapañca*) as well as (pure and impure) karmas.42

The nature of the intermediate-state can be seen in its various synonyms. As the text puts it: "The term *antarābhava* is used because it manifests in the interval between the death-state and the birth-state. The term *gandharva* is used because it has access by way of odour and has growth by way of odour. The term *manomaya* ("made of mind") is used because it proceeds to the birthplace by way of the mind. This means that it is not the object of the mind, but the body which goes to [the birth-place]. The term *abhinirvṛtti* is used because it is directed towards birth."43

If all conditions for rebirth are present, one in the intermediate-state then arrives at the moment of rebirth. The text continues to describe the journey of the intermediate-state toward the possible destinies:

> In the intermediate-state one sees oneself playing with companions and has the desire to go to a birthplace. At that moment, due to the fantasy (*viparyāsa*) caused by seeing semen-blood discharged by the parents-to-be during sexual intercourse, one is thus caught by fantasy in such a way that, instead of perceiving the parents-to-be performing sexual intercourse, one

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42 T.30.282.a; 284.b. Also, cf. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, p. 53.

43 T.30.282.b.4-8. I have adopted Wayman's translation with slight modifications. See Alex Wayman, "Intermediate-state Dispute in Buddhism", p. 233 and Shimizu, p. 22.

> illusorily perceives oneself as the one performing sexual intercourse. Erotic desire (*saṃrāga*) thus arises. If one desires to be a female, one then attaches to (or has desire for) the father; if one desires to be a male, one then attaches to (or has desire for) the mother. One thus approaches the desired. If desiring to be a female, one wants the mother to stay away; if desiring to be a male, one has the same attitude towards the father. Because this desire arises, one approaches the birthplace when one is seeing either male or female only. Gradually one only sees the male or female sexual organ without seeing any other parts of the parents-to-be. One is thus caught right at that place.44

What surprises us here is not the "mythological exuberance" that anticipated the Freudian notion of the Oedipus complex, but the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra conception of life-in-the-world driven by Eros.45

The meaning of the above account will be more obvious when it is seen in light of the Twelve Links. Just as ignorance and desire can be seen as the fuel for the motor of life, perversive fantasy (*viparyāsa*) and Eros (*saṃrāga*) are viewed as the most crucial forces at the moment of rebirth.46

Due to the force of fantasy and Eros the store-consciousness merges into new existence:

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44 *Yogācārabhūmi*, T.30.282.c.14-25. Also cf. K. Schimizu, "Yugashijiron no genten kenkyū (III)", pp. 26-28.

45 Since a similar account also appeared in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* III (T.29.46.c), it confirms the foregoing observation that the Śrāvaka-Yogācāras were doctrinally affiliated with the Sarvāstivādins.

46 *Viparyāsa* means a reversal, a turning up-side down, in the sense that the impermanent is considered permanent, non-self as self, etc.

> At the most exciting peak of sexual intercourse, a drop of viscid semen is discharged from the father and a drop of blood is provided by the mother. Two drops merge into a film which abides in the mother's womb in the same way as boiled milk becomes cream. At that moment, [the film of semen-and-blood] merges and abides in the store-consciousness, which is comprised of all seeds as the [result of] maturation and which is also the basis of appropriation (upādāna).
> How does it (i.e., ālayavijñāna) merge and abide [into the film of semen-and-blood]? The film of viscid semen-and-blood and the intermediate-state, which has been caught by the object of perversive fantasy, cease to exist. At the same time, due to the function of the consciousness-containing-all-seeds (sarvabījavijñāna) there arises the conglomeration of the remaining subtle sense-faculties (indriya) and gross elements (mahābhūta) as well as the conglomeration of the remaining semen and blood. At this stage, consciousness is said to be abiding [in new existence] and Linking-Up is said to be re-established. This is the state of kalala.47

The text then goes on to describe the embryological development that occurs before the six sense-organs are completely formed. It goes on to point out the mutual dependence between rūpa and nāma:

> In the kalala, rūpa shares the same destiny with mind (citta) and mental associates (caitta). This is called mutual dependency. That is, rūpa does not collapse because it is supported by mind and mental associates. If rūpa changes, they also change. Therefore, it is said that both of them share the same destiny. Also, since the kalala is the first place where consciousness abides, it is called "flesh-mind". For the same reason kalala is the last place from where consciousness leaves.48

The co-dependency between rūpa and the mind-and-mental-

47 T.30.283.a.1-10. The Sanskrit passage and its English translation are also seen in Schmithausen's Ālayavijñāna, pp. 127-128. My translation is based on Hsüan-tsang's version in consultation with Schmithausen's work.

48 T.30.283.a.15-20.

associates (*citta-caitta*) at this stage is the same as that between the film of semen-blood (primordial corporeal body) and the store-consciousness. Though in this context the mind-and-mental-associates seem to be considered identical with the store-consciousness, the relationship between these two concepts is not yet made clear, as is done in the later Yogācāra development.49 However, it is clear that the concept of the store-consciousness in the *SNS*.V was preceded by the ideas in this passage.

5.6. The Mahayanic Turn

When the doctrinal continuity between the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra and the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra has been explored, one should not fail to discern the distinctly Mahayanic elements in the early Mahāyāna-Yogācāra texts. In the *SNS* V, at least the following two Mahayanic elements need to be considered:

Firstly, the theory of consciousness in the *SNS* V does not mention the notions of "intermediate-state" and "linking-up conscousness". It should also be noted that the notion of intermediate-state already has been denied by Nāgārjuna.50 The absence of this notion in the *SNS*,

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49 For example, in the verse 3 of the *Triṃśikā* Vasubandhu states that *ālayavijñāna* is always associated with contact (*sparśa*), attention (*manaskāra*), knowledge (*vid*), conception (*saṃjñā*) and volition (*cetanā*). Cf. Thomas A. Kochumuttom, *A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience*, p. 135.

50 This has been pointed out by Alex Wayman in his paper, "The Intermediate-state Dispute in Buddhism", pp. 228-229. Nāgārjuna's position is shown in a short treatise,

therfore, may be due to the influence of the Prajñāpāramitā-Mādhyamika on the early Mahāyāna-Yogācāra.

Secondly, in the *SNS* V the concept of store-consciousness did not originate directly from the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*).51 As demonstrated by L. Schmithausen, the milieu of "attainment of cessation" found in the *Samāhita-bhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, a section representing the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra position, is taken as the origin of the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra concept of store-consciousness.52 However, the *SNS* does not mention any possible relationship between the notion of store-consciousness and the meditational experience of "attainment of cessation".

Such a discrepancy between the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra and the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra can be better explained if the "Mahāyāna elements" are considered.53 This Mahayanic turn appeared in the *SNS*, when a systematic attempt was made by

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Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya-vyākaraṇa. Its Chinese translation discovered in Tun-huang has been edited and included in *Taishō Daijokyō* (T.32.490-491). A recent meticulous study on this treatise is Yuichi Kajiyama's "Chūkan-ha no jūnishi-engi no kaishaku" (1980).

51 L. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, pp. 47-48.

52 T.30.340.c.27-341.a.1. For a translation and analysis of these passages, see Schmithausen's *Ālayavijñāna*, p. 18f. Also, cf. Noriaki Hakayama, "Nirodhasamāpatti--Its Historical Meaning in the *Vijñaptimātratā* System", in *IBK* XXIII.2, (1975).

53 See Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, pp. 46, 341 (note 435).

early Yogācāra to explain the structure and continuity of the samsaric life-world by means of an archaeology of consciousness. In the following we will investigate the doctrine of appropriating-consciousness in chapter V of the SNS.

5.7 The Archaeology of Consciousness: An Analysis of Chapter V of the SNS

According to the Buddhist tradition, sentient beings in the cycle of life-and-death exist in different categories. They are born into one of six destinies in one of four life-forms.54 If those four life-forms and six destinies are not simply read in the mythological sense, they can be construed philosophically to signify the multiplicity of the life-world.55

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54 The four forms of life are the oviparous, the viviparous, those born from moisture and the metamorphic. The six destinies are those of the hell-born, animals, hungry ghosts, mankind, gods and *asuras*. Cf. E. Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 629-630.

55 Instead of being conceived in a purely naturalistic or subjective sense, the notion of "destiny" (*gati*) may be taken as referring to the intersubjective world that embodies karmic history. Sanskrit *gati* (destiny) literally means "going, moving, march, passage and procedure." See Monier-Williams, p. 347. The life-world in which we live, therefore, is a result of a passage from the past toward the present, as well as from the present toward the future. What really underlies the structure of the life-world is temporality.

This notion of world-as-destiny is later systematically philosophized in Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā* in light of *vijñaptimātra* (noetic perception only). While Vasubandhu's interpretation can not be completely equated with the *vijñaptimātra* theory in the SNS, nevertheless, since the

The Yogācārin hermeneutic of the life-world begins with an archaeology of consciousness. Yogācāra points out that there is twofold structure of consciousness: the discernible level (the six consciousnesses) and the indiscernible level. As stated in the SNS V, the indiscernible consciousness is called "consciousness-containing-all-seeds" (sarvabījaka-vijñāna), "appropriating-consciousness" (ādāna-vijñāna), "store-consciousness" (ālaya-vijñāna) or "mind" (citta).56

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concept of vijñaptimātra was indeed coined in SNS VIII, it is reasonable to argue that both the SNS and Vasubandhu are primarily interested in disclosing the construction of the life-world.

56 In the following these notions will be explicated within their respective contexts.
(1) Consciousness as "seed"
In the Nikāya/Āgama literature, the metaphor of "seed" (bīja) was first employed to denote the growing dynamics of consciousness. As stated in SN 22.54: SA-A 2.7 (no. 39), it refers to the consciousness accompanied by appropriation (ādāna). Like the seed that depends on soil and water for growth, the consciousness accompanied by appropriation also depends upon the other two subsidiary conditions, i.e., (1) four other aggregates (form, feeling, conception, karmic volition) as the dwelling/object of consciousness, and (2) desire (pleasure and greed). The four other aggregates are likened to soil, while desire is likened to water. In this context, the metaphor of seed is used to refer to consciousness itself, but not something contained in consciousnees.
(2) Sopādānavijñāna
This notion of the consciousness accompanied by appropriation, with a new name sopādānavijñāna (Ch. yu-ch'u-shih), was inherited and adopted by the Sarvāstivādins. (The Sarvāstivāda's usage of sopādānavijñāna is seen in the Vastusamgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna-śāstra (T.26.1031.c) and the Abhidharmakośa (T.29.116.a). See Yodo Sasaki, "Araya-shiki seirirsu no ichiyoin", pp. 186-187.) The new term sopādānavijñāna refers to the consciousness that leads one on to the next existence. (see Abhidharma-jñānaprasthāna, T.26.1031.c; Y. Sasaki, op. cit., p. 187; Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, p. 69f.) According to the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of dependent

The consciousness-containing-all-seeds (sarvabījakam vijñāna) is characterized by the twofold activities of appropriation (upādāna):

> During the first moment [of birth] the consciousness-containing-all-seeds matures, evolves, merges, grows and increases. It is based upon the twofold activities of appropriation (upādāna): (1) appropriating the sense-faculties and their bases, and (2) appropriating the sediments (vāsanā) of proliferating discourse (prapañca) and everyday language (vyavahāra) [which result from] the discrimination (vikalpa) of the mark/signified (nimitta) and name/signifier (nāma). These twofold activities of appropriation [of the consciousness-containing-all-seeds] exist in the form-

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origination, it is the sopādānavijñāna as the propelling consciousness which moves the present life toward the future life. In this sense, the notion of sopādānavijñāna is equivalent to the notion of the "linking-up consciousness" (pratisaṃdhivijñāna). It also anticipates the notion of appropriating-consciousness that first appears in the SNS.

(3) The notion of "seed" in the Śrāvakabhūmi

The meaning of the metaphor of a seed in connection with consciousness changes slightly, yet significantly, in the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra literature. In the Savitarkā-savicārā-bhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi (T.30.321.c), bīja specifically refers to the seeds of name-form, the six sense-faculties, contact and feeling. Consciousness is chased (-anugata or -upagata) by the seeds of name-form. The seeds of name-form are chased by the seeds of the six sense-faculities. The seeds of the sense-faculities are chased by the seeds of contact, which in turn are chased by the seeds of feeling.

A similar account is seen in the Śrāvakabhūmi (T.30.454.b). In this text, karmic volition (saṃskāra) can appropriate and possess (parigṛhīta) the seeds of consciousness, which in turn appropriate and possess the seeds of name-form, sense-faculities, etc.. See Alex Wayman, Analysis, p. 114; on the usage of -parigṛhita, see Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, pp. 277-278 (note 147).

In these two accounts, the metaphor of a seed is used in the context of dependent origination to explain the continuity and causality that exists between the present and the future. At this early Yogācāra stage, it refers to biological and psychological factors in the personal domain only, but does not refer to the seeds of all dharmas. Also, the consciousness in relation to seed was not yet explicitly understood to be the subliminal consiousness.

> realm (*rūpadhātu*), but do not exist in the formless realm (*ārupadhātu*).(T.16.692.b)

Rather than being a passive vessel in which the seeds of the past are deposited, the consciousness-containing-all-seeds actively appropriates physical and psycho-linguistic objects. Precisely due to these appropriating activities, the consciousness-containing-all-seeds grows. In this sense Yogācāra's discovery of the subliminal consciousness did not go beyond the early Buddhist doctrines of the "four foods" and "four dwellings" of consciousness. Consciousness is conceived by both early Buddhists and Mahāyāna Yogācārins as that which appropriates something, such that what is appropriated in turn reinforces consciousness' obsession.

The objects appropriated by the consciousness-containing-all-seeds are the corporeal body and its sense-faculties. The body does not collapse because it is appropriated as well as sustained by the subliminal consciousness. But, the appropriation of body can not be merely viewed in the biological sense. It is also a psychological, narcissistic act. The *SNS* goes on to explain this point:

> This consciousness is also called "appropriating-consciousness" (*ādāna-vijñāna*). Why? Because this consciousness chases and grasps the body. This consciousness is also called "store-consciousness" (*ālaya-vijñāna*). Why?
> Because this consciousness takes the body and hides itself in the body so that both of them share the same

destiny.57

The subliminal consciousness appropriates the body not only to keep the body alive, but also to take the body as the object it chases and grasps, as the "place" to hide and dwell. This is seen in the relationship between the subliminal consciousness and the body as depicted by expressions such as "appropriation" (Ch. chih-shou), "chasing and sustaining" (Ch. sui-chu chih-ch'ih) and "appropriating and hiding" (Ch. she-shou ts'ang-yin). These expressions suggest that the body is taken as a narcissistic object.

Since the subliminal consciousness, as the support of the body, is structured by/in language and discourse, the body is also supported by, or embodied in, language and the proliferation of discourse. This conception of body-in-language-and-discourse is attributed to the second appropriational activity of the consciousness-containing-all-seeds, namely, appropriating the sediments of language and discourse produced by discriminating the mark/signified from the name/signifier.

The meaning of nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca needs to be examined here.58 This phrase refers to the

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57 Cf. Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, p. 22. For the restored Sanskrit, see p. 289 (note 181).

58 As Schmithausen correctly points out, these concepts are introduced from the Mahāyāna sources. See Ālayavijñāna, pp. 297 (no. 221), 341 (no. 435). The Mahayanic origins of these so-called "five dharmas" can be

discursive world constructed by the everyday language system, a complexity of communication involving desire and power. As a pre-reflected life-world, this discursive world precedes the bifurcation of subject and object.

As an intended object of perception, the mark/signified is accompanied by desire and language. It is what an object appears to be to consciousness. But it does exist by itself, because it is always associated with the name/signifier. Naming does not reach the "object" itself, but only reaches the mark/signified of the object. Based upon the structure of the mark as the signified and the name as signifier, all sorts of psychological and cognitive discriminations then arise.

But how does Yogācāra explain how perception in the life-world is accompanied by, embodied in, and conditioned by desire? Or, how do they explain the arising of the illusoriness and impurity of the samsaric life-world? Why

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found in the Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.345.b, 697-701. Also, D. T. Suzuki, The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, p. 195.

The phrase is rendered by Schmithausen as "the diversity of (/proliferous involvement in) the everyday usage of phenomena, names, and conceptions." As further explained in his footnotes, the notion of prapañca has two meanings: (1) the process of proliferation, especially conceptual proliferation, or even (emotionally) proliferating or diversifying conceptual activity; and (2) that which is the result of such a process ("diversity") or the object of such an activity. Nimitta is defined as "objective phenomena as they are experienced or imagined, admitting of being associated with names, and being (co-) conditioned by subjective conceptual activity (vikalpa), which has become habitual so that it permeates all (ordinary) perception and cognition." See Ālayavijñāna, pp. 71, 356, 357.

does this samsaric life-world keep moving on repeatedly in the cycle of life-and-death?

By topographically drawing a distinction between the discernable consciousnesses and the subliminal consciousness, Yogācāra points out a circularity between two levels of consciousness, i.e., "that which is appropriated" and "that which appropriates". The sensory perceptions as "those which are appropriated" are deposited in the form of sediment (vāsanā) in the subliminal consciousness, which is "that which appropriates".

That is the reason why this subliminal consciousness is also called "mind" (citta), etymologically meaning "accumulation". As the text puts it:

> This consciousness is also called "mind" (citta). Why? Because it accumulates and incubates color, sound, smell, taste, touch, etc.

While the subliminal consciousness appropriates the sense-faculties and accumulates the sediments of perceptual experience, those sediments of the past nourish the new experience of perception.

Perception occurs momentarily. But since perception occurs through a mechanism by which the experience of the present is associated with and conditioned by the experience of the past, no pure perception or cognition exists in the everyday life-world.

The subliminal consciousness is further depicted by the similes of a torrent and a mirror:

> On the basis of construction (*saṃniśritya pratiṣṭhāya*), i.e., appropriating-consciousness, the six consciousnesses evolve. The six consciousnesses are seeing-, hearing-, smelling-, tasting-, tactile-consciousness and apperceptive consciousness (*manovijñāna*). When the eyes and the visible are given as the conditions, the seeing-consciousness arises. Co-arising with the seeing-consciousness, the discriminative apperceptive consciousness (*vikalpaka manovijñāna*) evolves at the same time and with the same object...
>
> Viśālamati, if the seeing-consciousness is evolving at a particular moment, it is co-evolving with the discriminative apperceptive consciousness simultaneously. If there are two, or three, or four, or five, consciousnesses evolving, only then does the discriminative apperceptive consciousness co-arise simultaneously with them.
>
> Viśālamati, it is like a torrent. If there emerges an condition to produce a wave, only then does a wave arise. If there emerge many conditions to produce two or more waves, there arise many waves. Yet the torrent itself runs forward continually. It is also like a perfectly pure mirror. If there emerges a condition to produce an image, only then does an image arise. If there emerge many conditions to produce two or more images, then there arise many images. The mirror does not transform itself into the images, nor is it worn out either.
>
> Similarly, Viśālamati, on the basis of the torrential flow, i.e., appropriating-consciousness similar to the torrential flow, if at the very moment that the conditions for a visual consciousness arise, precisely at that moment a visual consciousness occur. If the conditions for the body of five consciousnesses arise, precisely at that moment do the five consciousnesses occur. (692.c.8)

First, let us examine the simile of the torrent. Like a torrent running forward fiercely and ceaselessly underneath the seemingly peaceful surface, the appropriating-consciousness or store-consciousness is not depicted as a steady container or pool in which the "seeds" are deposited.

It is rather pictured as a blind, dangerous river.59 In early Buddhism this imagery of a torrent always was used to denote the river of desire and life-in-saṃsāra. Saṃsāra is like the river of desire which needs to be crossed over moving from this shore to the other shore.60 To Yogācāra, the flux of saṃsāra is explained in terms of the stream of appropriating-consciousness.

The text also utilizes the simile of a mirror. In Buddhist tradition a clean and perfect mirror is used to represent "the mind that is intrinsically pure but covered by defilements".61 Nevertheless, the application of this simile to the appropriating-consciousness in this context rather is taken to stress the circularity between that which reflects and that which is reflected. Instead of saying that the appropriating-consciousness reflects an object in the way a mirror reflects something, the simile intends to explain the mediated character of perception. That is, when the sensory objects are given, the perceptions of these objects will arise through the mediation of the appropriating-consciousness.

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59 This metaphor is reminiscent of of Sigmund Freud's description of the id: "It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality....We approach the id with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations." See Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1965), p. 65.

60 Cf. Steven Collins, Selfless Persons, pp. 247-261.

61 Alex Wayman, "The Mirror as a Pan-Buddhist Metaphor-Simile", in Buddhist Insight, p. 132.

5.8 Concluding Remarks

According to the *SNS*, the samsaric life-world is constructed on the basis of the circularity between two levels of consciousness. On the discernible level, all sorts of discourse and interaction take place in a semiotic system. These discursive and interactive activities are also carried out through the body and the six consciousnesses. On the subliminal level, the semiotic sediments (*vāsanā*) are appropriated by, and subsequently deposited into, the appropriating-consciousness, which appropriates and supports both the body and the six consciousnesses.

Under this principle of circularity, the life-world appears to be a reflected image by means of the appropriating-consciousness. This image-like or wave-like life-world is by nature a conceptual-linguistic "labyrinthine network" (*prapañca*).62 This "labyrinthine

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62 Being derived from *pra* + root *panc*, *prapanca* literally means "spreading out", "expansion", "diffusion" and "manifoldness". As excellently explained by Bhikkhu Nanananda, it refers to conceptual proliferation in the process of sense-perception. This process is clearly shown in the canonical account: after sensory perceptions /consciousnesses arise, feeling follows; "what one feels one perceives (*sañjānati*); what one perceives, one reasons about (*vitakka*); what one reasons about, one proliferates conceptually (*papañceti*); what one proliferates conceptually, due to that, concepts characterized by the prolific tendency (*papañcasaññasankha*) assail him in regard to material shapes cognisable by the eye, belonging to the past, the future and the present." See Bhikkhu Nanananda, *Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought*, pp. 3-6. Since this conceptual proliferation must proceed by means by the linguistic medium, *prapañca* is better characterized as a

network" results from a psychological and cognitive processes, viz. mark/signified, name/signifier, and discrimination. Along with the process of perception and naming, there is a deeper existential and psychological dimension. Described in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, ordinary people cling to names and ideas. Thus the distinction between "I" and "mine" is thus created. Through the linguistic act, clinging leads sentient beings to produce the actions of greed and anger. "As karma is accumulated again and again, their minds become swathed in the cocoon of discrimation as the silk-worm."63 Hence the the cycle of life and death instantiates repetitious fire, and thereby becomes self-perpetuating. Discursive construction (prapañca) is like a cocoon.

In the SNS, the semiotic character of discursive construction is particularly emphasized. Human beings are swathed in the cocoon of discourse. This emphasis also can be seen in the Chinese rendering of prapañca (Ch. hsi-lun), meaning "play-like discourse". By the same reason prapañca also was translated by Gunabadra as "hsü-wei", meaning "falsity, made-up or vain artificiality".64 Indeed, because the psycho-linguistically fabricated life-world looks so

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conceptual-linguistical "labyrinthine network" in which sentient beings are confined.

63 Ibid., p. 195.

64 SNS, T.16.718.b.

"real", ordinary people never realize their "vain artificiality".

While individuals will eventually cease to exist, the samsaric life-world continues. Or, put an other way, what is transmitted is discursive construction, not the "individual".

Chapter Six

Transformative Disclosure: The Doctrine of Three Natures

What is the everyday world surrounding us? To ordinary people, the world in which we live is simply taken for granted, and presumed to exist self-evidently. However, this unexamined assumption is cast into serious doubt by Yogācāra. Concerning this fundamental question, Yogācāra presents the doctrine of three natures (trisvabhāva) to serve both as a hermeneutic device for interpreting the construction of the life-world and as a guide to the praxis for liberation.

Briefly, the "three natures" refer to three dimensions of the life-world: the "psycho-linguistically fabricated" (parikalpita) dimension, the "other-dependent" (paratantra) dimension, and the "perfected" (pariniṣpanna) dimension. Those three dimensions and their inner logic will be explained below.

6.1 The Psycho-linguistically Fabricated Dimension

The doctrine of three natures begins with the investigation of immediate experience, i.e., the surrounding everyday world which is assumed to be real. It questions what this "reality" is and how it is constructed. The investigation starts by probing into the role of language in the fabrication of everyday reality. As the SNS states:

> What is the [psycho-linguistically] fabricated characteristic of all dharmas? This refers to all the dharmas which are conventional designations by which the differentiation of self-natures (svabhāva) are established. Consequent on this, discourse arises. (T.16.693.a)

The first dimension of the everyday world is characterized by Yogacara as "that which is imagined or fabricated" (parikalpita). A Chinese equivalent of parikalpita rendered by Bodhiruci is hsü-wang fen-pieh, meaning "that which is falsely discriminated"; the other Chinese equivalent translated by Hsüan-tsang is pien-chi so-chih, meaning "that which is attached by discrimination".1 While Budhiruci's rendering puts more emphasis on the false or illusory character of the life-world, the translation by Hsüan-tsang rather stresses the life-world as the object of attachment. Both of them did not interpret parikalpita as the "imagined", as often seen in English translation. Instead, the life-world is understood by both of them as the construction of discrimination (vikalpa), which is not merely an arbitrary imagination.

Basically, Yogācāra depicts this life-world of discrimination as the complexity of semiotic or discursive systems (vyavahāra). At the semiotic or discursive dimension, "difference" is logically preceded by "identity" ("self-nature", svabhāva). The proposition "X is different from Y" is meaningful, according to naive realism, if the

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1 SNS, T.16.669.c; 693.a.

"self-natures" of X and Y are asserted, which are taken as the ground of difference. In contrast to naive realism, Yogācāra contends that both self-nature and difference are derived from conventional designations (prajñapti). Naming precedes self-nature.

Two related questions immediately arise. First, what is naming or signifying? Second, what is the status of the named (or the signified)?

According to Buddhist thinking, naming never simply means to name something. It is an act of fixing, framing or categorizing something. Without the act of naming, "something" will always remain anonymous and never become an "object". Naming is thus tantamount to objectifying. By the same token, that which is named is not different from that which is objectified. In this sense, naming precedes the named as an object. It is not the named, but the naming which serves as the ground of the meaning of a name.

Naming is not a purely linguistic act; it is also accompanied by desiring. If something is named, it is also desired. In this context of desiring, an object and a subject are connected by naming. Put in another way, as an act of connecting an object and a subject, naming occurs not merely within the semiotic context, but also within a psychological and socio-political context. What really concerns Yogācāra Buddhism here is the act of desiring which embodies semiotic system.

This psycho-semiotically fabricated dimension of the life-world is woven as a closed system of communication and interaction. Each and every individual is confined to one's specific closed system which embodies both subjective and intersubjective history. By the same token, society and tradition are also enclosed in their own psycho-linguistically fabricated systems.

6.2 The Effectiveness of Language

The psycho-linguistically fabricated dimension of the life-world is essentially constituted by perception and knowledge in which language as the embodiment of desire is at work. As metaphorically stated in the _SNS_, perception and knowledge are tainted, or colored, by the sediments of language and discourse which are deposited in the store-consciousness. What is perceived (_nimitta_), therefore, reflects the encoded past of a perceiver.

An example in the _SNS_ illustrates how perception is mediated:

> If a transparent crystal contacts blue dyestuff, it will give the illusory appearance of an _indranīla_ _maṇi_-jewel or a _mahānīla_ _maṇi_-jewel, etc. Since one may mistakenly attach to the illusory appearance as it were a real _indranīla_ _maṇi_-jewel or a _mahānīla_ _maṇi_-jewel, sentient beings are therefore confused and agitated.... Just like a transparent crystal may reflect any kind of dyestuff, the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristic is constructed upon the other-dependent characteristic through the psycho-linguistic sediments (_vyavahāra-vāsanā_). Just as one wrongly attaches to [the crystal as it were] the _indranīla_, _mahānīla_, amber, _marakata_ and gold, the psycho-linguistcally fabricated charactersitic is attached to the other-

> dependent characteristic. The other-dependent characteristic is like the transparent crystal. The appearance of *indranila*, *mahanila*, amber, *marakata* or gold reflected in the transparent crystal are always already neither real nor with self-nature; likewise, the perfected characteristic means that the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristic constructed upon the other-dependent characteristic is always already neither real nor with self-nature. (T.16.693.b)

As indicated in the above analogical interpretation, the early Yogācārins did not consider perception to be simply produced from the contact of the sense-organ and the sense-object. They rather argued that perception is *always already* involved with psycho-linguistic factors which have been appropriated and deposited in the store-consiousness or appropriating-consciousness, the basis of the activities of the six consciousnesses.2 According to Yogācāra, the naive realist theory of perception fails to see that both the sense-organ and the sense-object are conditioned by the past through the medium of language. Yogācāra claims that both that which perceives and that which is perceived exist in the flux of conditionality/causality, the "other-dependent".

The *SNS* continues to explain "the other-dependent":

> What is the other-dependent characteristic of all existents? Because the self-nature of all existents is that they are produced by conditions, therefore, this

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2 In chapters VI and VII of the *SNS*, the doctrine of three natures does not mention the notion of appropriating-consciousness or store-consciousness. This could suggest the different sources from which two doctrines originated. However, it is justifiable to interpret the doctrine of three natures in light of the doctrine of appropriating-consciousness, when the redactional order of two chapters is considered.

> exists if that exists, this arises if that arises. That is, ignorance gives rise to volitional actions and so on. In this way a great mass of suffering arises. (T.16.693.a)

It is on the basis of dependent origination that perception occurs. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, the twelve links of dependent origination center around the appropriating reciprocity of consciousness and name-form (<u>nāma-rūpa</u>). In the <u>SNS</u>, consciousness refers to the appropriating-consciousness or store-consciousness, whereas mind-body refers to the physical body and psycho-linguistic sediments. The psycho-linguistic sediments are appropriated by, and then deposited in, the appropriating-consciousness or store-consciousness. Through this reciprocal mechanism, perception is conditioned by the psycho-linguistic elements. It is in this sense that there is no pure perception.

In everday experience, according to Yogācāra, rather than simply being the "copy" of an object, perception reflects the past of the perceiver within the flux of conditionality and contextuality (i.e., dependent origination).

Perception does not become determinate knowledge until it categoried through language. In this process of categorization a key factor is "attachment" (<u>abhiniveśa</u>). Yogācāra argues that only through attachment are those

perceptions determinated *as* something.3

The notion of "attachment" is usually understood in the psychological sense, signifying an inclination to attach oneself to something, to cling to something. But in view of the theory of perception and knowledge, "attachment" functions as categorization. More significantly, attachment is an interpretative, allegorical act. It is precisely due to this kind of allegorical attachment as interpretation that knowledge is made possible.

6.3 The Mind Accompanied by Language

But, how does attachment arise? The *SNS* argues that attachment results from the mind perfumed by language:

> Due to the linguistically perfumed mind (*vyavahāra-prajñaptyā parivāsitacitta*), the comprehension (*anubodha*) accompanied by language and the [dormant] proclivity (*anuśaya*)accompanied by language, one attaches to the characteristics of the [psycho-linguistically] fabricated self-nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva-lakṣaṇa*) in the other-depending self-nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) and the perfected self-nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*). (T.16.694.c)

In addition to the linguistically perfumed mind, attachment is also caused by the comprehension accompanied by language

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3 As defined in Edgerton's *Dictionary* (p. 53), *abhiniviśati* means "adheres to, is attached to...especially of adherence to disproved objects; more specially with object *dṛṣṭi*, heretical view. Hence, cleaves to (belief in), holds fast to, takes for real or true (things which are false or fanciful)."

and the dormant proclivity accompanied by language.4 In

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4 A textual discrepancy should be pointed out here. In the Tibetan version (Lamotte, pp. 71, 196) and Bodhiruci's Chinese translation (T.16.671.b.6), "comprehension" (anubodha) is replaced by "consequence" (anubandha) and "consequence-mind" (anubandha-citta; Ch. sui-shun-hsin) respectively. Literally anubandha means "binding, connection, attachment; uninterrupted succession; sequence, consequence, etc." (Monier-Williams, p. 36) In the Abhidharmakośa, "consequence" (anubandha) is equivalent to dormant proclivity (anuśaya) in the sense that it is favorable to the production of other dormant proclivities. (Poussin/Pruden, Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, III, pp. 769, 870.)

Hsüan-tsang's text seems to emphasize the state of mind, awake or dormant, in relation to the effect of language. The emphasis can be seen in the distinction between "comprehension" (anubodha) and dormant proclivity (anuśaya). Derived from anu-\/budh, meaning "to awake, to recollect, to learn by information," anubodha (Ch. sui-chüeh) literally means "recollection, an after-thought, comprehension." (Monier-Williams, p. 36; Edgerton, p. 32) In the Bodhisattvabhūmi, anubodha is used in the sense of comprehension and understanding. (Ui, Bonkan Taisho Bosatsuji Sakuin, p. 220.)

In contrast to "comprehension" (anubodha), anuśaya is emphasized by its dormant character. Derived from anu-\/si, meaning "to sleep with, lie along or close, adhere closely to", anuśaya is used in the sense of propensity to evil, innate proclivity inherited from former life, and disposition to do something evil. (Monier-Williams, p. 39; Edgerton, p. 35.) Also, for different positions on the notion of dormant proclivity (anuśaya) held by the Theravādins, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, cf. P. S. Jaini, "Introduction" to Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, pp. 101-110. For Theravāda's interpretation, see Narada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, pp. 329-330.

The concept of anuśaya has been embedded in a long history of scholastic dispute. As recorded in Vasumitra's Origin and Doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools, the dispute was centered upon such issues as whether or not anuśaya is associated with mind (citta) and the mentally associated factors (caitasika-dharmas), whether or not it has an object (ālambana), and whether or not it is identical with pervading proclivity (paryavasthāna).

The Mahāsaṃghikas hold that the dormant proclivity is neither mind nor the mentally-associated factor; they do not have an object. The dormant proclivity and the prevading proclivity (paryavasthāna) are different from each other. The former is not associated with the mind, whereas the

latter is. This position is agreed to by most schools, such as the Ekavyavahārika, Lokottaravāda, Kaukkuṭika, and Mahīśāsaka. The Sarvāstivāda holds another position by claiming that all dormant proclivities are mentally associated with mind. They have objects. All dormant proclivities are included in the category of pervading proclivity; but all pervading proclivities cannot be included in the category of dormant proclivity. See Jiryo Masuda, tr. Origin and doctrines of Early Indian Buddhist Schools, pp. 30, 47, 59. Also, T.49.15-17.

By refuting the Sarvāstivādin position, the Sautrāntikas interpret the notion of dormant proclivity in light of the theory of seeds (bīja). The seeds of evil (akuśala-bīja) are called anuśaya, while the seeds of good are called kuśala-dharma-bīja. (P. S. Jaini, op. cit., pp. 102-103) The anuśaya is further divided into two levels, the sleeping state (prasupta) and the awakened state (prabuddha). The latter is attributed to the pervading proclivity. It is stated in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam:

> [The Sautrāntika position:] What is called anuśaya is the kleśa itself in a state of sleep (prasupta), whereas the paryavasthāna is the kleśa in an awakened state (prabuddha). The sleeping kleśa is the non-manifested (asammukhibhuta) kleśa, in the state of being a seed; the awakened kleśa is the manifested kleśa, the kleśa in action. (Poussin/Pruden, Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, III, p. 770; T.29.99.a. The same passage is also quoted in Saṃghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra, T.29.596.c.)

At least on the surface, the distinction between the sleeping state and the awakened state parallels the distinction between dormant proclivity (anuśaya) and comprehension (anubodha). If this comparison is accepted, comprehension can be explained in the sense of pervading proclivity, the manifested form of dormant proclivity, which is not too different from "consequence" (anubandha).

However, this reasoning must be treated very carefully, if the doctrinal deviation of the Mahāyāna-Yogācāra from the Sautrantika is considered. The idea of dormant proclivity is not as essential in the SNS as it is in the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika texts. For the Mahāyāna-Yogācāras, the primary thrust seems to have shifted to the problem of language.

Nonetheless, the distinction made in the SNS passage between "comprehension accompanied by language" (vyavahāra-anubodha) and "dormant proclivity accompanied by language" (vyavahāra-anuśaya) may indicate influence from the Sautrantika distinction between the awakened state and the sleeping state. This comparison cannot be pushed too far, since comprehension (anubodha) is clearly not the same as

Yüan-t'se's commentary on this particular passage, comprehension (anubodha) and dormant proclivity (anuśaya) are interpreted in terms of linguistic competence and incompetence respectively:

> Due to languages and discourses three causes of [attachment] arise. First, "due to the mind perfumed by language" refers to the sediments of discourse (abhilāpavāsanā), one of three sediments (vāsanās).5 Second, "due to the comprehension accompanied by language" refers to the conceptualization and comprehension of those who are able to command language, for instance, human beings and heaven beings, etc. Third, "due to the dormant proclivity accompanied by language" refers to the discrimination of dormant proclivity of those who are not able to command language, such as cow and sheep. They have discrimination through dormant proclivity only.6

That is to say, the effectiveness of language does not only work at the awake state of understanding, but also at the dormant level of mind, the complex of affliction (kleśa).

Yüan-t'se's interpretation has its textual support in the Bodhisattvabhūmi-Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, in which the psycho-linguistically fabricated self-nature (parikalpita-svabhāva) is said to possess two kinds of attachment: attachment by comprehension (anubodha) and attachment by dormant proclivity (anuśaya). The former refers to that by which the self-nature of things is

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pervading proclivity (paryavasthāna).

5 The other two sediments are the sediment of self-view (ātmadṛṣṭivāsanā) and the sediment of members of becoming (bhavāṅgavāsanā). See Mahāyānasaṃgraha, T.31.137.b; Lamotte, La Somme Du Grand Vehicle D'Asanga, Vol. II, pp. 80-81.

6 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 14.24.a.

semiotically determined, while the latter refers to the determination of the self-nature of things deeply rooted in dormant proclivity.7

In short, Yogācāra contends that language perfumes the mind at both awake and dormant levels. The mind perfumed by language then gives rise to attachment by which the psycho-linguistically fabricated is attached to or superimposed upon the other-dependent and the perfected.

6.4 Penetrating the Fabricated

In the psycho-linguistically fabricated dimension, everything is perceived as that which possesses self-nature (svabhāva) and thus considered permanent. Certainty and predictability are therefore attributed to whatever is perceived. This ontologizing fabrication conceals the problem of suffering from most of people. They are not capable of truly understanding the problem of suffering until they are awakened to the concealing character of the fabricated network which disguises the problem. To the

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7 T.30.705.b.10-12, 705.c.25-706.a.3. Another instance in the same context also presents a clear definition of comprehension (anubodha) and dormant proclivity (anuśaya): There are three kinds of object-realm which correspond to three kinds of mind. First, the object-realm which consists of name (nāma) and mark (nimitta) is appropriated by the comprehension (anubodha) accompanied by language. Second, the object-realm which consists of mark without name is appropriated by the dormant proclivity accompanied by language. Third, the object-realm which consists of neither name nor mark is appropriated by the one who uses language without the dormant proclivity. See T.30.700.c.29-701.a.5.

Yogacaras, awakening is possible only if the fabricated network is critically exposed.

The practice leading to awakening begins with examining the association (saṃbandha) of mark/signified and name/signifier, the basic structure of the psycho-linguistically fabricated dimension.8 This structure can be revealed through the analysis of a name or a proposition. For instance, if the term "red apple" or the proposition "This apple is red" is given, a Yogācārin is instructed to know that this name or proposition does not refer to "that" apple existing there, but rather refers to the "mark" (nimitta) of the apple which is already presented in consciousness with language.

According to Vinśg. of Yogācārabhūmi the notion of "mark" is defined as "the state of affairs (vastu) which serves as the foothold of all discourse".9 But, what is meant by the "state of affairs" in this context? Does it refer to a thing/event existing outside the mind? Or does it merely refer to the impression of a thing/event existing within the mind? As stated in the Vinsg., "mark" refers to

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8 SNS, T.16.693.b.

9 Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.696.a.2. In the The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, "mark" refers to those which reveal themselves to the senses of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, the body and the apperceptive consciousness (mano-vijñāna) and are perceived as form, sound...and idea. See D.T. Suzuki, (tr.) The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (1932, 1978), p. 195.

"the object-realm (*gocara*) of discrimination (*vikalpa*)".10 Since discrimination consists of the totality of mind and mentally associated factors in the Three Realms (*dhātus*)11, the object-realm of discrimination also consists of innumerable marks which are the objects of mental activities.12 Those marks are not simply the "copies" of the external objects; nor are they "created" by consciousness or mind either. That is, Yogācāra notion of "mark" can not be understood in terms of realism or idealism. But, what really concerns Yogācāra is the noetic construction of the "mark". Without understanding the noetic aspect of "mark", the dispute on the label of "realism" or "idealism" will be totally misleading. In the doctrine of three natures, the noetic construction of mark is fully disclosed in the discussion of the other-dependent dimension.

6.5 The Other-Dependent Dimension

In the *SNS*, the other-dependent dimension is defined as dependent origination. From the beginning the doctrine of dependent origination has been employed to explain how the

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10 *Ibid*, T.30.697.a.9.

11 *Ibid*. T.30.696.a.4.

12 A list of marks as the object-realm of discrimination, see T.30.697.a. The meaning of *vastu* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* has been defined by Janice D. Willis as "the given thing at hand; the object upon which cognitive attention is focused; any perceivable entity serving as a base for cognition/imputation". See *On Knowing Reality* (1979), p. 190.

samsaric life-world is constructed and concealed to worldly beings. The answer lies, simply put, in the mutually appropriating reciprocity between consciousness and object. An object in everyday experience is always the object appropriated and abided by consciousness. This fundamental insight is never missing in Yogācāra Buddhism.

However, due to the discovery of the store-consciousness, Yogācāra understands that the perceived mark of an object is that which arises within the context of circularity. That is, a perceived mark does not simply result from the contact of a subject and an object. What underlies subject and object is the contextuality and circularity by which the karma of the past is embodied in the process of perception and understanding. For Buddhism, an epistemological enterprise will not be fully accomplished until a hermeneutic of the life-world and history is introduced. This is described in the following passage which has been partly quoted above:

> Based on the characteristics of the [psycho-linguistically] fabricated self-nature, sentient beings bring forth language within the other-dependent self-nature and the perfected self-nature. Language then proliferates. Due to the mind perfumed by language, the comprehension accompanied by language and the dormant proclivity accompanied by language, one attaches the characteristics of the [psycho-linguistically] fabricated self-nature to the other-dependent self-nature and the perfected self-nature. Since attachment proliferates, one attaches the fabricated self-nature to the other-dependent self-nature and the perfected self-nature prolifically. Due to this reason, the other-dependent self-nature is produced in the next life. Also due to this reason, [sentient beings] are either defiled by the impurity of defilement, the

> impurity of karma, or the impurity of birth. They are thus evolving in the cycle of life-and-death restlessly for a long time. They are suffering either in the world of hell, animals, ghosts, heavenly being, asura, or human beings. (T.16.694.c)

In this passage, at least three points need to be noted: First, both the other-dependent dimension and the perfected dimension are the basis (āśraya) of the psycho-linguistically fabricated dimension of the life-world. Second, the spinning of the other-dependent is caused by the attachment of the psycho-linguistically fabricated system. Third, the repetition of the samsaric world is explained by an interaction between the other-dependent dimension and the psycho-linguistically fabricated dimension.

In the flux of dependent origination, the mark of the state of affairs appears as the object of mental activities. It is purely an appearance as long as it has not yet been semiotically determined. Mark arises in the other-dependent context. The SNS gives a further explanation:

> The other-dependent characteristic refers to the mark of conditioned existence (saṃskāra-nimitta) which is the object-realm of discrimination (vikalpa-gocara) and the base (āśraya) of the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristic. (T.16.696.b)13

As one of the five aggregates and twelve links, saṃskāra

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13 Another translation of this passage is also seen in Robert A. F. Thurman's Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence, p. 202, which is quoted here for comparison: "The relative nature consists of conditional processes, which are the ground of the imagined nature, and the object of imaginative construction". In his translation, saṃskāra-nimitta is rendered by "conditional processes". It seems to me that the significance of nimitta is not fully considered in his rendering.

means volitions by which the mind is directed to the sphere of good, bad or neutral activities. However, the word *saṃskāra* can also be used in the broader sense, meaning "anything conditioned" which includes all five aggregates.14 In this sense, the notion of the "mark of conditioned existence" refers to the appearance which arises in the context of conditions.15

The *SNS* goes on to illustrate the conditioned nature of the other-dependent characteristic by similes, such as

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14 See Narada ed. and tr., *A Manual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha)* (1956), p. 18: "When sankhara is used to signify that which is subject to change, sorrow, etc., it is invariably applied to all conditioned things." Also cf. Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught*, p. 22.

15 The Sanskrit restoration by Lamotte is based on the Tibetan-Sanskrit equivalents, *hdu byed* = *saṃskāra* and *mtshan ma* = *nimitta* (pp. 38, 43-44, 81). The term in these places is rendered by Hsüan-tsang as *hsing-hsiang*. However, since in most cases, particularly in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyam*, the term *hsing-hsiang* is chosen by Hsüan-tsang as the equivalent of *ākāra*, the term *hsing-hsiang* in the *SNS* is also restored by some scholars to *ākāra*. See Hajime Nakamura, *Bukkyōgo Daijiten* I, p. 244 b-c. In fact, the Tibetan equivalent of *ākāra* is *rnam pa*. This term appears in Chapter VIII. See Lamotte, p. 116; T.16.702.c. Cf. Akio Ujike, "Yuishikisetsu niokeru akara no mondai," *IBK* 17-2, 1969, and Koitsu Yokayama, "Yuishiki shisō niokeru ninshiki sayo no itkosastu", *Tōhōgaku* 46 (1973).

This problem has been observed by Jitsudo Nagasawa, who rather restored *hsing-hsiang* by Sanskrit *saṃskara-lakṣana*. See Nagasawa, *Yugagyō Shisō to Mikkyō no Kenkkyū*, pp. 366-367.

The confusion of *ākāra* and *saṃskāra-nimitta* had already occurred in Yüan-t'se's commentary, in which he mentioned two interpretations of the term *hsing-hsiang*: (1) *Hsing* refers to the subject of perception, while *hsiang* refers to the object of perception. This interpretation obviously considers *hsing-hsiang* as *ākāra*, as already remarked by Nagasawa. (2) *Hsing-hsiang* simply means the conditioned existence (*saṃskṛta*), namely, the *paratantra*. The latter is preferred by Yüan-t'se. See *Shu*, 17.6.a.

"phantom" (māyā), "the illusory scene seen by eyes with timira-disease", or "the magical creatures invented by a magician".16 These similes seem to favor an idealist interpretation by suggesting that the other-dependent existence is unreal. However, even the ontological status of a phantom cannot be affirmed or denied without further qualifications.

In everyday experience, the other-dependent characteristic does exist in a way that, for instance, a magically created tiger or elephant appears to an audience. This appearence is characterized in the SNS by the notions of "resemblance" (Ch. szu), "resembling image" (szu...hsiang) and "manifestation" (hsien-hsien).17 The question is, what is this "quasi-real" character of the other-dependent? Again, the answer is found in the reciprocal relationship of the other-dependent dimension and the psycho-linguistically fabricated dimension.

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16 SNS, T.16.693.a; 694.b; 689.b.

17 Lamotte, pp. 61-62, 91; T.16.693.b, 698.b. The Sanskrit origins of these terms might be restored as khyāti, ābhāsa, pratibhāsate (Tibetan, snaṅ ba), etc. See Koitsu Yokoyama, "Yuishiki shisō niokeru ninshiki sayo no itkosatsu", Tōhōgaku 46 (1973), pp. 104-110.
In the later development the other-dependent is either characterized by the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya III.3 as "existent and yet not real" or by the Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun as "not existent, though seeming to exist". See T.31.468.c.24; 46.4. Also cf. Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, p. 232; Paul W. O'Brien, "A chapter on Reality from the Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra", in Monumenta Nipponica IX (1953), p. 289; Wei Tat, tr. Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun: Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness (1973), p. 637.

The arising of the other-dependent characteristic caused by the attachment of the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristic is also compared to the sight of hair, etc., caused by the eye-disease.18 The pathogenic cause of the other-dependent characteristic is, at the surface level, attributed to the psycho-linguistic appropriation and attachment by which the the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristic is crystalized. But at bottom, the real problem is the vicious circle of the other-dependent characteristic and the the psycho-linguistically fabricated.

6.6 Breaking the Vicious Circle

The vicious circle of the samsaric life-world can be stated as follows: As a given facticity the other-dependent refers to the marks of conditioned existence, i.e., the object-realm of discrimination. Underlying this object-realm there is reciprocity between the store-consciousness and the other six consciousnesses. Due to this structure the psycho-linguistic sediments are appropriated and collected as the "dye" by which perception and understanding are "tainted".

The sediments of discourse result from the psycho-linguistically fabricated system in which the differentiated

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18 SNS, T.16.693.a-b. In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the psycho-nominally fabricated self-nature is stated to be responsible for the arising of the other-dependent self-nature. See T.30.705.c.

self-natures are constructed through conventional designations. In this fabricated system, what is signified by the conventional designation is not the thing/event itself, but the mark of the thing/event arising within the conditioning context. It is the mark of the conditioned thing/event which serves as the "basis" of the fabricated.

As explained above, the circular structure of the other-dependent and the fabricated thus operates as the main mechanism that motivates the cycle of birth and death. In order to break this vicious circle, two steps are taken: (1) de-constructing and de-attaching the fabricated system from the other-dependent, and (2) ceasing the defiled dimension of the other-dependent.19

The first step is taken, because in the life-world one is enclosed in the psycho-linguistically fabricated system which is most accessible to analysis. With the psycho-linguistic analysis, one de-constructs the notion of self-nature which is inscribed into everyday knowledge and discourse. Instead of simply destroying language and discourse, at this step one only needs to shift the mode of discourse, namely, from "the discourse with attachment" to "the discourse with non-attachment". The problem of

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19 When the other-dependent characteristic is said to be eliminated, as stated in the SNS (T.16.695.a.10), it means that what needs to be eliminated is the defiled aspect of the other-dependent characteristic. In the SNS the other-dependent characteristic is considered to be defiled. See SNS, T.16.693.b.

attachment still remains most pivotal to the task of transformation.

The shift from attachment to non-attachment needs to be made at the level of the other-dependent, i.e., the reciprocity in the domains of the six consciousnesses and the store-consciousness. When the shift has been done, what is disclosed is the bare fact of the conditionality and contextuality in which desire drives one to construct all forms of discourse and action.

This procedure of breaking the vicious circle through the shift from attachment to non-attachment is epitomized later by the dictum "transformation of consciousness (vijñāna) into wisdom (jñāna)". The SNS says:

> Insofar as they (i.e., the sentient beings) have heard the teaching [of the doctrine of the three non-natures (niḥsvabhāva)]...and only by investigating, meditating on, and penetrating the teaching, are they able to not attach (abhiniveśa) to the characteristic of the psycho-linguistically fabricated self-nature in the other-dependent self-nature. Because of the wisdom not perfumed by language, the wisdom in which the comprehension (anubodha) is not accompanied by language, and the wisdom in which the dormant proclivity is disassociated with language, they are able to bring an end to the other-dependent characteristic. Being supported by the power of wisdom at the present moment of existence, they are also able to utterly destroy the cause of future rebirth. (T.16.695.a)

As a soteriological/therapeutical practice, the task of transformation aims at eliminating the psycho-linguistic embodiment of discourse first. For Yogācāra, everyday consciousness and understanding are inseparable from language as the embodiment of the past. When consciousness

and understanding arise *in* language, they are already defiled by the psycho-linguistic sediments which are embodied in language. A critical analysis of everyday language is therefore required for preventing consciousness and understanding from being defiled and distorted. When the defilements embodied in language are eliminated, the psycho-linguistically fabricated system then can be penetrated, the vicious circle can be transformed into the positive circle, and the perfected state can be attained either.

6.7 Entering the Positive Circle

In the samsaric life-world, the circularity between the psycho-linguistic fabrication and the other-dependent dimension is vicious. But, is this mechanism of circularity still operating during the process of fundamental transformation? If it is, then how? This question can be pushed further: Does this circularity exist in the enlightened and liberated state?

Early Yogācāra thinkers contended that the fundamental transformation is accomplished within the same circularity and conditionality. The Buddha's discourse, which is said to be also none other than the fabricated (*parikalpita*), should be taken to replace the defiled everyday discourse at the beginning of meditation.20 Although all the "twelve genres"

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20 For the fabricated, provisional character of the Buddha's discourse, see the *SNS*, T.16.688.c-689.a.

are considered to be the Buddha's discourses, the *SNS* particularly favors its own doctrines, i.e., the doctrines of three natures and three non-natures. By the guidance of these doctrines in the course of meditation, one moves into the positive circle which leads to liberation.

6.8 The Perfected State

However, the Yogācāra does not consider the positive aspect of the circularity to be identical with the perfected state, because the Buddha's discourse, particularly its mark or trace, is provisional and functional, and needs to be left behind eventually. The question is, what is left in the ultimate, perfected state?

According to *SNS* I.3, the enlightened one is said to be the one who has realized the "inexpressible *dharmatā*" (*anabhilāpya-dharmatā*; Ch. *li-yen-fa-hsing*).21 This seems to suggest that language is totally excluded from the perfected state. In that perfected state there is absolute silence only.22

The perfected state is also defined in the *SNS* as the non-discriminating state, or the state of as-it-is or Suchness (*tathatā*), of all existences.23 This state is in

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21 *SNS*, T.16.689.a.7.

22 In the *SNS* II.3 (T.16.690.a), in contrast to worldly discourse, inner quiescence and sagely silence are taken to be the characteristics of the ultimate truth.

23 *SNS*, T.16.693.a.

opposition to the discriminating state or the state of not-as-it-is. In other words, the conceptual and psychological excesses, which are inscribed into our everyday knowledge, are removed and the "original face" of the state of affairs, to borrow a Zen slogan, is recovered.

The most crucial conceptual-psychological excess is the notion of self or ego-centrism. When the notion of self or ego-centrism is eliminated, the states of affairs as they are are known. This is called the "perfected state":

> The perfected characteristic refers to the purified object-realm, the suchness of the non-self-ness of dharma, i.e., the non-self-ness of the [fabricated] self-nature, which is tantamount to the unreality of the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristic in the mark of the conditioned existences (saṃskāra-nimitta) which is the object-realm of discrimination (vikalpa-gocara) and the base (āśraya) of the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristic. (T.16.696.b.23-26)[24]

According to this passage, the "perfected" means (1) the realization of the unreality of the psycho-linguistic fabrication, which is identical to the realization of (2) selflessness and Suchness. That is, the perfected is

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24 My translation is intended to be literally close to Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version. For comparison, the same passage translated by Robert Thurman from Tibetan version is provided here:

> The perfect nature is that very same conditional process, the ground of the imagined nature and object of imaginative construction, as it intrinsically lacks precisely the reality (attributed to it) in the imagined nature, which is not established therein, which is the objective selflessness, the ultimate reality, and pure object.

See _Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence_, p. 202.

attained through the radical destruction of the notions of I-ness and self-nature which are psycho-linguistically fabricated.

The main thrust of this definition is centered upon the absence of the psycho-linguistic fabrication, but not the absence of the other-dependent dimension. Yogācāra claims that the perfected is none other than the other-dependent when superimpositions (ārOpya) of the fabricated system have been eliminated.25 What matters to Yogācāra is the transformation of the defiled state of affairs into the purified state of affairs. If the other-dependent is in the defiled state, then it should be purified. When the other-dependent is purified, it is called the perfected. In such a perfected state, language is no longer the problem. Silence does not mean elimination of language, but to be free from attachment.

25 Lamotte, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, p. 71.

Chapter Seven

Text, Reading and Liberation

As indicated by the name "Yogācāra", the early Yogācārins considered yoga-praxis indispensable for seeking complete liberation. The same emphasis is shown in the SNS VIII, a chapter which explains the methods of Mahāyāna-Yogācāra meditation. Generally, both the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra and Mahāyāna-Yogācāra methods of meditation are organized by two guiding practices, calming the mind-body (śamatha) and discerning the state of affairs (vipaśyanā). What makes a distinction between Śrāvaka-Yogācāra and Mahāyāna-Yogācāra is not so much due to the method of meditation as due to its philosophical implications.

Briefly, the Yogācāra method of meditation is designed to interiorize all states of affairs within the domain of consciousness as objects of reflection and analysis. Those objects do not refer to anything existing outside consciousness; they are merely methodical projections. By analyzing those methodical projections, the practitioners come to realize that all states of affairs are impermanent, suffering, empty, nothing but noetic perception only (vijñaptimātra). This realization of Buddhist truths then guides the practitioners to liberate themselves from the

bondages of marks and "gross wickedness" (*dauṣṭhulya*).1

7.1 The Text-based Hermeneutic

In the course of meditation, there are two prerequisites which should to be fulfilled, i.e., relying on scriptures and dwelling in the vow of attaining the Supreme Wisdom of Enlightenment.2 As the initial step of meditation, reading scriptures plays an important role in Yogācāra liberating hermeneutic. Reading is the way toward liberation.

The first issue which concerns us here is Yogācāra's conception of scripture. Amidst the process of canonization, the Yogācārins of the fourth century were no exception to the Mahāyāna tendency of sanctifying Buddhist texts. They claimed that one will gain merit if the Buddhist texts are recited, circulated and well protected. Conversely, suffering in the cycle of birth and death will not be ended if Buddhist texts are disbelieved, vandalized and

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1 *SNS*, T.16.691.b; Lamotte, p. 47. The term *dauṣṭhulya* has been rendered variously as "wickedness" (Edgerton), "evil tendency or error" (D. T. Suzuki), "susceptibility to harm" (Anacker), "crude barriers" (Dan Lusthaus), "fault" (Thomas E. Wood), and so on. Its Chinese equivalent, *ts'u-chung*, literally meaning "coarseness and heaviness", is used to refer to that which prevents one to attain "fineness and lightness". According to Yogācāra usage, it refers to the twofold obstructions: mental obstruction (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*) and cognitive obstruction (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*).

2 *SNS*, T.16.697.c; Lamotte, p. 88.

disgraced.3

However, this sanctification of Buddhist texts did not engender a fundamentalist conception of sacred text. In the Buddhist tradition, the sacredness of scripture is not grounded in any sort of notion of Transcendence. Without exception, the Buddhist scriptures are consitituted by intertextuality and conditionality. They are empty in themselves in the sense of lacking self-nature. Thus any claim of the sacredness of Buddhist scriptures is absurd, because the notion of sacredness is grounded nowhere.

A Buddhist text is a hermeneutic device provisionally constructed for the sake of transformative education and liberation.4 This device has two features. First, it is the vessel carrying the experience of enlightenment. Second, particularly in light of the Abhidharma heritage, a Buddhist text provides an inclusive taxonomy by which all states of affairs can be classified for analysis.5

Concerning the first feature, the Yogācāra conception of text could be viewed as parallel to the conception of text in Romantic hermeneutics.6 That is, through reading and

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3 SNS, T.16.696.a; 697.b.

4 In Sanskrit, this is called dharma-prajñapti-vyavasthāpana; in Chinese, fa-chia an-li. See Lamotte, p. 88; T.16.697.c.

5 Cf. Paul Griffiths, On Being Mindless, p. 53.

6 Donald S. Lopez, Jr. characterizes the Yogācāra hermeneutic as "Romantic in the sense that their primary concern is to stand behind the text in an effort to

interpreting a scripture one can re-experience the author's experience. In the case of Buddhism, one is instructed to re-experience the Buddha's process of enlightenment by means of reading and meditating on the scripture.

7.2 Reading as Interiorization

By what way of reading the scripture does a Buddhist practitioner engage in meditation-praxis? Generally speaking, the process of reading is itself the process of meditation-praxis. This process is divided into several steps.

First, a Buddhist practitioner has to reside in solitude so that he is able to concentrate on reading and thinking. Reading in this initial stage is less directed outwardly to the text than inwardly to the mind-body. To

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establish the intention of the Buddha in terms of his audience." See "Buddhist hermeneutics: A conference report", Philosophy East and West 37 (1987), p. 74. Later in his article "Interpretation of the Mahayana Sutras", he points out the divergence between Schleiermacher and Buddhism:

> Rather, the task of the Buddhist hermeneutician appears more akin to Schleiermacher's divinatory method in which the interpreter seeks "to transform himself, so to speak, into the author" in order to understand the meaning of the text. But again, the Buddhist exegetes are not dealing with the mental processes of an ordinary author. The author is the Buddha, the Awakened One, endowed with the knowledge of all aspects (sarvākarajñāna), fully aware in each instant of the modes and varieties of all phenomena in the universe, and possessed of superknowledge (abhijñā)....Nor is the Buddhist exegete to discern the unconscious of the Buddha, for he has none.

See Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (ed.), Buddhist Hermeneutics (1988), pp.50-51.

engage in reading here is none other than to calm the mind-body. This is called "calming" (śamatha).7

Once one has calmed and concentrated on one's mind-body, one realizes that usually the mind, rather than being singularly concentrated in thought, is instead a sparkling, seething, agitated thing. The mind by nature constantly looks outwardly for something as its object to let itself be obsessed. Unless such a state of consciousness is altered, a text can not speak for itself.

The method of calming the mind-body allows the mind to abide in an "image with non-discrimination" (nirvikalpa-pratibimba). We have to explain the notion of "image" (pratibimba) first, because this notion leads to innovation of the doctrine of "noetic perception only".

In the Yogācāra tradition, meditation is soteriologically and therapeutically oriented. Various types of persons are instructed to meditate upon the objects which are designed as antidotes for their specific existential and psychological problems. For example, a lustful person should focus his mind on a repulsive object; a hateful person, on compassion; an ignorant person, on dependent origination, and so on.

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7 By rendering śamatha as "calming the mind", Alex Wayman seems to fail to see that the body also needs to be calmed. It is stated that both bodily alleviation (kāya-praśrabhhi) and mental alleviation (citta-praśrabhdi) are required as the condition for philosophical contemplation. See SNS, T.16.698.a.7; Lamotte, p. 89.

In the Śrāvaka-Yogācāra tradition, those meditation objects are classified into four major categories, namely, the universal meditation object, the meditation object for purification of dispositions, the meditation object for skill, and the meditation object for purification of defilement.8 These are the images which are presented, particularly in visual form, in the state of concentration. Instead of being a copy of the external object, these images are a copy of the known objects which manifest from and within consciousness. It is called "the image as the equivalent of the known object" (jñeya-vastu-sabhāga-pratibimba).9

When the image of a meditation object is retained and not analysed, it is used to calm the mind-body. The meditation object of calming is called "the image with non-discrimination". When the image is analysed, it is called "the image with discrimination" (savikalpa-pratibimba), the meditation object of discerning.

When all states of affairs are interiorized as meditation objects of the basic Buddhist categories, e.g.,

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8 For details of those meditative objects, see Śrāvakabhūmi, T.30.427f; Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript, pp. 86-87; Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (1978), pp. 105-110.

9 K. Shukla, ed. Śrāvakabhūmi of Acarya Asaṅga, p. 194; T.30.427.b. Also cf. Koitsu Yokoyama, Yuishiki no Tetsugaku (1979), p. 7. This term is rendered by Schmithausen as "the object-like images", see "On the problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism", p. 244.

"five aggregates", "twelve sense bases", "eighteen realms" and "four noble truths", the practitioner then attains "all-inclusive knowledge" (yāvadbhāvikatā). When the Suchness (tathatā) of each and every state of affair is realized, he is ready to attain "all-inclusive truth" (yathāvadbhāvikatā).10

Seeing states of affairs as they are in concentration state is called "the limits of states of affairs" (vastu-paryantatā). In this stage, calming and discerning are operating synchronically. Calming and discerning also operate synchronically in the last stage, the accomplishment of the task (kārya-parinispatti). In this stage, due to the unfailing efforts of calming-discerning meditation in the preceding three stages one is able to destroy all "gross wickednesses" (dausthulya) and, therefore, to attain the fundamental transformation (āśraya-parāvṛtti). After one is fundamentally transformed, one possesses non-discriminative wisdom by which the image is also transcended.11

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10 The term yāvadbhāvikatā (Ch. chin-so-yu-hsing) is defined by the SNS as the limit of all states of affairs, pure and impure, such as those comprised in five aggregates, six internal sense bases, and six external sense bases. See SNS, T.16.699.c. The same account is also seen in the Śrāvakabhūmi, T.30.427.b-c. This term is rendered as "the phenomenal limit of the entity" by Alex Wayman, and "Being-to-its-limit" by Nagao/Keenan. The term yathāvadbhāvikatā (Ch. ju-so-yu-hsing) is rendered "the noumenal limit of the entity" by Alex Wayman, and "being-as-such" by Nagao/Keenan.

11 Śrāvakabhūmi, T.30.427.c; Alex Wayman, Analysis, p. 86.

7.3 Reading and Liberation

According to the above brief account, yoga-praxis can be viewed as a kind of meditative reading which leads to liberation. Reading in the state of concentration is required to advance the image as the object of meditation. Unlike everyday reading which assumes that meaning already exists in the text, Yogācāra reading is introspectively directed to the structure of the life-world. The method of disclosing the structure of the life-world is to analyze the image of a known object, realizing that everday perceptions and cognitions are constructed through a circularity between consciousnesses and language, the fabricating and the fabricated. Not being simply interested in speculation about natural entities, a Yogācārin is rather concerned with the thing/event which appears in the context of the life-world.

The context of the life-world is always concealed from the everyday consciousness. According to the foregoing discussion, the context of the life-world is structured in the form of language and discourse which have their sediments deposited in the store-consciousness. To the Yogācārins, meditation-praxis is designed to delve into the sedimental dimension of consciousness in order to make explicit the implicit context of the life-world.

However, because the store-consciousness is so subtle and inaccessible to the reflection of consciousness, it can be approached only through the mediation of text. Text is

taken as the mirror-like medium by which the structure of the life-world in the store-consciousness is reflected. Buddhist texts provide taxonmies which correspond to the manifold of the life-world.

The procedure of meditational analysis is to analyze the items listed in taxonomies piece by piece. Each and every item in the life-world should be visualized as an image in the state of concentration. Instead of being copies of external entities, those images perceived by the practitioner in the concentrated state are in fact projected by mind itself, whereas the contents of mind are nothing but the totality of the psycho-linguistic sediments of the past. That is to say, the analysis of the image is tantamount to the analysis of mind, and the analysis of mind is tantamount to the analysis of the whole life-world as the embodiment of the past.

7.4 Noetic Perception Only

In the SNS it clearly states that "the object of discerning is the mind itself".12 This means that the discerned image is nothing other than the mind itself. What is analyzed in the form of an image is not anything outside the mind. But, since the method of discerning must proceed within the structure of the discerning subject and the discerned object, how is it possible to claim that the

12 SNS, T.16.698.a.25.

subject is identical to the object? The problem of identity and difference between the discerned image and the discerning mind arises. As the SNS puts it:

> Bodhisattva Maitreya asked the Buddha again: "World Honored One, are the images as objects of discerning-praxis in the state of concentration identical with or different from the mind?"
> The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, there is no difference. Why? Because those images are nothing but "noetic perception" (*vijñapti*). Son of Good Family, I say, the object (*ālambana*) of consciousness (*vijñāna*) is nothing but what is manifested of the noetic perception (*vijñapti*)."13
> "World Honoured One, if the images as objects of mind are not different from the mind, how can the mind be seen by the same mind?"
> "Son of Good Family, in this case there is nothing which is able to see anything. However, while the mind is arising, there the images manifest in the same way. Son of Good Family, for instance, when a thing (*rūpa*) is taken as an object, the same thing is seen as a reflection in a clean mirror. But [ordinary people assume that] the image is seen by 'me'. Consequently they assume that the manifested images exist in separation from that thing. Hence, while the mind is arising, the images that manifest in a concentrated state are seen as something separate from the mind."
> "World Honoured One, in the case of sentient beings who stick to the notion of self-nature (*svabhāva*) and take form (*rūpa*) and so on, as the objects of mind, is the image [of the object of mind] also not different from mind?"
> "Son of Good Family, there is no difference. However, due to reversed understanding those ordinary people are not able to truly understand that the images are nothing but noetic perceptions (*vijñapti*). Hence their

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13 I follow Hsüan-tsang's version. Another reading suggested by the Tibetan translation, which is slightly different from Hsuan-tsang's reading, can be rendered as such: "*Vijñāna* refers to the object which is manifested (*prabhāsate*) by *vijñapti*." Cf. Nozawa (1957), p. 204; Nagasawa (1978), p. 383; M. Takemura (1976), pp. 78-79; Alex Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians" (1979), p. 68.

misconception."14

According to this passage, the dualistic structure of subject-object arises at the level of psycho-linguistic fabrication. In spite of its fabricated character, however, this dualistic structure should be utilized by the Yogācāras in the initial stage of meditation-praxis, because a "controlled distanciation" is methodically necessary.15

In such a methodically controlled state, i.e., samādhi, the images are manifested from consciousness, becoming objects of discerning/reflection for analysis. As pointed out before, the Yogācāra notion of consciousness must be understood in terms of consciousness-containing-all-seeds, store-consciousness or appropriating-consciousness. The contents of consciousness are nothing but the totality of psycho-linguistic sediments in the form of seed. Therefore, by means of the methodically controlled technique, those "seeds" are brought into the discernible level for analysis. Those images are manifested (avabhāsa) from seeds in a manner similar to how a photograph is developed from a negative film. It is in this sense that the image is called

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14 This passage is quoted in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha II.7. See T.31.138.b; Lamotte, La Somme, Tome II, pp. 93-95.

15 The notion of "controlled distanciation" (Verfremdung) is adopted from Jurgen Habermas, who criticizes Gadamer's hermeneutical "fusion of horizons" by counter-arguing the indispensibility of methodology which is embedded in distanciation. See Jurgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method", in Brice R. Wachterhauser, ed., Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy (1986), p. 266.

"noetic perception only", meaning "that which is manifested from/of consciousness only".

Since the notion of "noetic perception only" (vijñaptimātra) was taken to be the doctrinal basis of Yogācāra Buddhism, it needs to be further clarified. This notion has been translated as "representation-only",16 "ideation-only",17 "perception-only"18, "mere conception",19 etc. As remarked by Bruce C. Hall, however, "none of these glosses is completely satisfactory".20

Although the term vijñaptimātra as a specific Yogacara concept appeared in the SNS for the first time, the notion of vijñapti was already used in the Sarvāstivādin text. In its ordinary usage, as is well explained by Bruce. C. Hall, vijñapti (Pali viññatti) is "a noun of action derived from the causative stem (jñapaya- or jñāpaya-) of the verb root jna ("know") with the prefix vi-. Etymologically the term vijñapti would mean the act of causing [someone] to know [something] distinctly, or in a concrete sense, that which

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16 Clarence H. Hamilton, Wei Shih Er Shih Lun (1938). Also, cf. A. Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians", p. 67.

17 Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, "The Thirty Verses on the Mind-Only Doctrine", in S. Radharkrishnan ed., A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (1957), pp. 333-337.

18 S. Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, pp. 159f.

19 David J. Kalupahana, The Principles of Buddhist Psychology (1987), p. 212.

20 Bruce Cameron Hall, "The Meaning of Vijñapti in Vasubandhu's Concept of Mind", JIABS 9-1, p. 8.

causes [one] to know distinctly."21 In the Sarvastivadin Abhidharma, as shown in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, vijñapti is defined as the various momentary perceptions of sense objects which constitute perception (vijñāna).22

Nevertheless, Yogācāra rejects Sarvāstivādin theory of perception, arguing that in everyday experience there is no pure perception, but only psycho-linguistically mediated perception. Furthermore, the ontological nature of a thing/entity grounded in the notion of self-nature, as held by the Sarvāstivādins, is also radically suspended by the Yogācārins. In contrast to realism, the noetic aspect of the object, which embodies a psycho-linguistic history, is emphasized by Yogācāra to the extent that what is perceived does not refer to an external entity, but refers to that which manifests from the noetic impulse which embodies the past. Perception in this sense is called vijñapti-mātra, "noetic perception only".23

SNS VIII.7, quoted above, claims that the doctrine of noetic perception only is universally valid. That is, this doctrine applies not only to perception in the methodically controlled state, but also to perception in the everyday

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21 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

22 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, T.29.4.a; cf. Poussin /Pruden, I, p. 74; Bruce C. Hall, ibid., p. 13.

23 The notion of "noetic" is employed to denote the whole complexity of conditions and inter-contexts which constitute the intentional object.

state. The question is, how can the universal validity of the doctrine be justified? Regarding this issue, Lambert Schmithausen argues that the SNS starts from the ideality of meditation-objects

> and then simply extends this fact to ordinary objects, without justifying this procedure by any rational argument. Thus, the result of our examination of the oldest materials of the Yogācāra school clearly speaks in favour of the theory that Yogācāra idealism primarily resulted from a generalization of a fact observed in the case of meditation-objects, i.e. in the context of spiritual practice.24

For supporting his observation he cited a Mahayana meditation scripture called Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṃmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra, in which the visualized Buddha in the samādhi state is reported to be nothing but mind.25

If Schmithausen's argument is correct, the universal validity of the doctrine of "noetic perception only" will collapse immediately due to lack of "rational agrument". Fortunately we do find rational argument elaborated in the doctrines of store-consciousness and the three natures, as discussed in the previous chapters. The intent in the passage of SNS VIII.7 is rather to stress the method by which the truth of "noetic perception only" can be disclosed to the practitioner. In addition to demonstrating the

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24 Lambert Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism", in German Scholars on India, Vol. II (1976), p. 241.

25 Ibid. p. 246. Cf. T.13. nos. 416. 417. 418. 419.

soteriological effect, the calming-discerning method also justifies the validity of the truth of noetic perception only. After a practitioner has attained liberation through calming-discerning praxis, then he comes to truly realize the truth of noetic perception only.[26]

7.5 Erasing the Marks

The truth of "noetic perception only" is realized when one arrives at the stage of the Path of Insight (darśana-mārga), i.e. the First Stage. For anyone who is going to enter the First Stage a thorough discipline in calming and discerning is absolutely required. He should be capable of meditating upon the "image with non-discrimination" as well as the "image with discrimination". Only being equipped with this kind of meditation technique can a practitioner comprehend "the limits of states of affairs" by operating calming and discerning synchronically.[27] At this stage a practitioner possesses all-inclusive knowledge and all-inclusive truths. The latter is subdivided into seven "truths" (tathatā), in which the truth of "noetic perception

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26 The systematization of the doctrines of consciousness, the three natures, and the noetic percpetion only was not completed until Asaṅga's composition of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

27 SNS, T.16.702.b.

only" is included.28

After the First Stage, the calming-discerning meditation is still required for all subsequent stages. If a practitioner stops at the stage of comprehension of the "limits of states of affairs", he will not attain liberation. For anyone who is satisfied by merely intellectualistic understanding will still be caught in mental-conceptual marks (nimitta) which the Yogācārins consider a major bondage.

In the subsequent stages, all sorts of psycho-linguistic marks are brought to the discernible level in the form of images in order to be erased. The deletion of marks is the most crucial moment in the whole process of meditation:

> Bodhisattva Maitreya asked the Buddha again: World Honored One, by what kind of intensive thinking (manasikāra) are the marks (nimitta) eliminated? How are the marks eliminated?
> The Buddha replied to Bodhisattva Maitreya: Son of Good Family, by the intensive thinking of things as they are (tathatā), the marks of dharma (doctrine/teaching) and meaning (artha) are eliminated. If one is not caught by name (nāma) and the self-nature (svabhāva) of name, nor discerning the mark of the base (āśraya) of [name], he then eliminates [the mark of name]. The same process applies to sentence (pada), syllable (vyañjana) and meaning (artha). By the same token, if one is not caught by spheres (dhātu) and the self-nature of sphere, nor discerning the mark of the base of sphere, he then eliminates [the mark of Realm]. (T.16.700.c)

What need to be eliminated are the marks of teaching and

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28 SNS, T.16.699.c. The other six truths include the evolution (pravṛtti) truth, the characteristics (lakṣaṇa) truth and the four noble truths.

meaning occurred at the initial stage of calming-discerning meditation. At that stage, one is instructed to study the scripture in order to comprehend the basic tenets and truths.29 The Buddhist texts are taken as a mirror-like instrument which reflects the totality of the samsaric life-world's structure. Being empty by nature, text is nothing but the reflection of the contextuality and conditionality of the samsaric life-world. In this sense, reading a Buddhist text is tantamount to reading the textuality of the samsaric life-world. Through reading Buddhist texts one is, therefore, able to bring the contextuality and conditionality of the samsaric life-world into the domain of reflection and transformation.

It is in the process of calming-discerning praxis that the pragmatic significance of the doctrine of the three natures can be fully exposed: the psycho-linguistic fabrication will be destroyed if the marks in the concentrated state are eliminated; the defiled other-dependent dimension will cease if the psycho-linguistic fabrication is destroyed.30

How many marks are there to be eliminated? Theoretically, there are marks as numerous as the states of affairs. They can be categorized by all sorts of

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29 Five or ten kinds of artha (meaning, referent) are listed in the SNS, among them "all-inclusive knowledge" and "all-inclusive truths" are most important to note.

30 SNS, T.16.701.b.

taxonomies.31 Including the marks of pure and impure dharmas, they are divided into two basic categories, the "coarse marks" and the "subtle marks". The coarse marks refer to those which appear in the everyday mental state or the Realm of Desire, or those which are impure.32

In the course of meditation, the bodhisattva eliminates the coarse marks by replacing them with the subtle marks, i.e., the images, in a way analogous to expelling a thick wedge by using a thin wedge.33 As listed in the SNS, there are 21 kinds of subtle marks appropriated by mind in the form of an image: the mark of experience (anubhava), the mark of noetic perception (vijñapti), the mark of defilement and purity, the mark of altruism, the mark of wisdom, the mark of suchness, the mark of the four noble truths, and so forth.34 When the coarse traces have been erased, the subtle marks are in turn ready to be eliminated by the same principle of wedge-evicted-by-wedge. This process is summarized in the following passage:

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31 For a list of 64 kinds of nimittas, see Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī of Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.697.a.

32 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 26.3.a.

33 Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.669.a. There are two kinds of mark, the original mark and the mark of an image. The former refers to those which are produced by the discrimination of the past and those which are produced by marks themselves. The latter refers to the images which are produced in the calming-discerning praxis. The mark of image is employed as an antidote to cure the original mark. See T.30.697.b.

34 SNS, T.16.702.a; Lamotte, p. 114-115.

> At that moment, since they have attained the Path of Insight, now they realize the meditation object of the limits of the states of affairs. Furthermore, in the subsequent stages they practice assiduously and meditate upon three kinds of meditational objects. It is as if a thick wedge is expelled by a thin wedge. By utilizing the method (upāya) of wedge-evicted-by-wedge the bodhisattvas erase the internal marks as well as all sorts of defilement associated [with those marks]. Since marks are erased, the gross wickednesses are also erased. When all marks and the gross wickednesses are cut off completely, in the subsequent stages the bodhisattvas refine their minds step by step in a way similar to the method of metallurgy. In so doing, they finally attain Supreme Perfect Enlightenment and the meditation object of Accomplishment of the Task. Son of Good Family, this is how the bodhisattvas attain Supreme Perfect Enlightenment through the correct practice of calming and discerning. (T.16.702.b)

In addition to the analogy of wedge-evicted-by-wedge, the analogy of metallurgy should not be overlooked. It is intended not only to emphasize the Yogācāra gradual path, but also to describe how the hidden, stubborn defilements are melted down by intensive thinking on the Suchness.35

7.6 Conclusion

When the psycho-linguistic marks and defilements have been deleted, what is left? What is Yogācāra's experience of liberation? Or, what is the liberated life-world? The perfected state seems difficult to verbally pin down, because no marks are supposed to remain there.

At the end of SNS. VIII, the Realm of Nirvana Without Remaining Support (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu) is described

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35 SNS, T.16.699.a.25: "During [tathatā]-thinking all bases of the gross wickednesses are melted down (Ch. jung-hsiao; Sk. vinaśana?) moment by moment."

as that in which all sorts of feelings (*vedanā*) are completely destroyed.36 But in the Realm of Nirvana with Remaining Support, an Arhat is said to have feelings as a result of contact with illumination (*vidyā-samsparśa*), which is in opposition to what results from contact with ignorance (*avidyā*).37 This suggests that in the Realm of Nirvana with Remaining Support there are perceptions and feelings which are purified and still active. In the *SNS* this enlightened experience refers to the "inexpressible *dharmatā*" (*anabhilāpya-dharmatā*). As lucidly explained by Walpola Rahula, the *dharmatā* in the enlightened experience are "natural, normal and regular", just as "water flows or wind blows".38

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36 Steven Collins renders the Pali term *an-upādhi-sena-nibbāna* into "nibbana without substrate". This stage occurs at the death of the enlightened Arhat, "in which the flames of life-in-samsara die out through lack of fuel". Here *upādhi* (=*upādāna*) as "fuel" refers to grasping and attachment. See *Selfless Persons*, p. 83.

37 *SNS*, T.16.703.a.5. Regarding the distinction between the contact with ignorance and the contact with illumination, see *Yogācārabhūmi*, T.30.805.b.22-29.

38 Walpola Rahula, "Wrong Notions of *Dhammatā* (*Dharmatā*)", in L. Cousins et al. (eds.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of J. B. Horner*, p. 183.

Part Three

A Selected Translation of *The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*

I

1. On one occasion, in the presence of the Buddha, Bodhisattva Inquiry-in-Reason1 raised a question to Bodhisattva Hermeneutic-of-Concealment2: "Son of the Victor! It is said that all dharmas are non-dual. What are all dharmas? Why are they non-dual?

Bodhisattva Hermeneutic-of-Concealment replied to Bodhisattva Inquiry-in-Reason: "Son of Good Family! Briefly, all dharmas are divided into two categories: (1) the conditioned (saṃskṛta) and (2) the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). As to these, the conditioned is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The unconditioned is, also, neither unconditioned nor conditioned." (688.c.25)

2. Bodhisattva Inquiry-in-Reason further asked Bodhisattva Hermeneutic-of-Concealment: "Son of the Victor! Why is the conditioned neither conditioned nor unconditioned? Why is the unconditioned neither unconditioned nor conditioned?"

Bodhisattva Hermeneutic-of-Concealment replied to Bodhisattva Inquiry-in-Reason: "Son of Good Family! Those

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1 This Bodhisattva's Sanskrit name is restored by Lamotte as Vidhivat-paripṛcchaka (?), but by Jitsudo Nagasawa as Yoniśas paripṛcchā. See Lamotte, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, p. 35; Jitsudo Nagasawa, Yugagyō Shisō to Mikkyō no Kenkyū (1978), p. 364. In my translation, some Bodhisattavas' long names are rendered into English in order to avoid making sentences too clumsy, while some short names remain untranslated.

2 Skt. Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana.

which are called 'conditioned' are provisionally designated as such by the Master. Since they are the Master's provisional designations, they are attached to by fabrication (parikalpa) and expressed by the words (vyavahārabhilāpa). Since they are attached to by fabrication and expressed by the words, they are truly constructed by all kinds of fabricating words. Because they do not accomplish any thing real, they are not called "conditioned".

Son of Good Family! To use the term "unconditioned" is also to be trapped in words. Even if some terms other than "conditioned" or "unconditioned" were to be used, they would be still characterized in the same way.

Nevertheless, these expressions are not used by our Master without [the basis of] the state of affairs (vastu). What is the state of affairs? Since the sages are detached from language by means of sagely wisdom and sagely vision, they realize Perfect Awakening (samyaksambodhi). In order to make others also realize Perfect Awakening, they provisionally adopt the term "conditioned" as a conceptual device on the basis of the inexpressible (anabhilāpya) dharmatā. (689.a.8)

3. Son of Good Family! Those which are called 'unconditioned' are provisionally designated as such by the Master. Since they are the Master's provisional designations, they are attached to by fabrication and

expressed by words. If they are attached to by fabrication and expressed by words, they are nothing else than expressions by fabricating words. Because they do not establish any thing real, they are not 'unconditioned'.

Son of Good Family! To use the term 'conditioned' is also to be trapped in words. Even if someone takes expressions other than 'conditioned' and 'unconditioned', they would be characterized in the same way. However, these expressions are not without [the basis of] the state of affairs. What is the state of affairs? Because the sages are detached from language by means of sagely wisdom and sagely vision, they realize Perfect Awakening. In order to make others also realize Perfect Awakening, they provisionally adopt conceptual devices, such as 'unconditioned', on the basis of their realization of the inexpressible dharmatā." (689.a.17)

4. Meanwhile, Bodhisattva Inquiry-in-Reason further asked Bodhisattva Hermeneutic-of-Concealment: "Son of the Victor! [As you said,] the sages realize Perfect Awakening because they are detached from language through sagely wisdom and sagely vision, and provisionally adopt conceptual devices, such as 'conditioned' and 'unconditioned', in order to make others realize Perfect Awakening on the basis of their realization of the inexpressible dharmatā. What is exactly meant by that?"

Bodhisattva Hermeneutic-of-Concealment answered

Bodhisattva Inquiry-in-Reason: "Son of Good Family! It is like skillful magicians, or their disciples, who accumulate straw, leaves, lumber, tiles and rubble at a crossroad's corner, and there put one a show of various illusory things, e.g., elephants, horses, carts, infantry, maṇi-jewel, pearl, crystal, shells, jades, corals, and other precious stuffs, crops and treasures. For those who are ignorant, dumb, of mean intelligence, knowing nothing, after they have watched the magical transformations made from straw, leaves, lumber, tiles, rubble, etc., they regard as real those elephants, horses, carts, infantry, mani-jewel, pearl, crystal, shells, jades, corals and other kinds of precious stuffs, crops and treasures. Thus they become deeply attached to the things they have watched. They then put this into words: 'Only that which I have seen and heard is real, while the rest are not real.' They need to re-examine [their experience].

For those who are wise, neither ignorant nor stupid, they know what really happened in the magic show. After they have witnessed all kinds of magic made with the tiles, the rubble, leaves and lumber, they realize that what they perceive are not real elephants, real horses...etc. However they nevertheless have illusions which deceive the eyes and give rise to the perception of the elephants and the differentiated perception of the elephants.3 Likewise, the

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3 That is, the different sizes and colors of the elephant. See Yüan-t'se, Shu, 6.24.b-25.a.

perception and the differentiated perception of all kinds of collections and treasures are also stirred up. But they never become attached to what they have seen and heard, therefore they do not say: "Only that which I have seen and heard is real, the rest are not real." However, in order to communicate their understanding, they also use language. They do not need to re-examine [their experience]. (689.b.14)

5. In the same way, for those sentient beings who are ignorant and unlearned, neither having the sagely supramundane wisdoms (āryalokottaraprajñā), nor comprehending the inexpressible dharmatā, when they have seen and heard all kinds of conditioned and unconditioned [things], they think what they have perceived is absolutely, really conditioned or unconditioned. They then become deeply attached to what they have perceived, and put into words: 'Only that which I have seen and heard is real, the rest are unreal.' They need to re-exaime [their experience].

For the sentient beings who are not ignorant, who have realized the Noble Truths, who have attained the sagely supramundane wisdoms and have truly comprehended the inexpressible dharmatā, when they have seen and heard all kinds of conditioned and unconditioned [things], they think that in what they perceive there is absolutely nothing really conditioned or unconditioned. However, there are the marks of conditioned existence (saṃskāra-nimitta) caused by

discrimination (vikalpa). They are like illusions which enchant the clear intellect. Hence the ideas of "conditioned" and "unconditioned" and their varieties arise. These [sages] are thus never attached to what they have seen and heard. Nor do they say: 'Only that which I have seen and heard is real, the rest are unreal.' Although they use language in order to communicate their understanding, they need not re-examine [their experience].

Therefore, Son of Good Family, since the sages have realized Perfect Awakening in the state of affairs by means of sagely widom and sagely vision detached from language, and in order to make others also realize Perfect Awakening, they provisionally adopt the terms 'conditioned' and 'unconditioned'". (689.c.3)

6. At that moment, Bodhisattva Hermeneutic-of-Concealment composed the following verses to explicate the above teaching:

The meaning of inexpressability (anabhilāpya) and
nonduality (advaya) presented by the Buddha
Is so profound that ignorant people can not reach it.
Enchanted by ignorance, ignorant people
Are obsessed by the two bases of discursive
construction.4
They are either in the indeterminate concentrated state

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4 "Two bases" refers to the categories of "conditioned" and "unconditioned". This distinction is the basis of discursive construction (prapañca).

(*aniyata*) or in the false concentrated state (*mithyā-niyata*).

Therefore they are floating in the endless cycle of birth-and-death.

Because they are also opposed to the teaching of Right Wisdom,

They will be re-born in the destinies of cattle, etc. (689.c.8)

II

1. At that time, Bodhisattva Inexhaustible-Spring (Dharmodgata) spoke to the Buddha: "There is a world called 'Grand Name' in the East, which crosses innumerable worlds as many as seventy-two Ganges Rivers. There dwells a Tathāgata called 'Enormous Name'. I came here from that Buddha Land, but while I was in that Buddha Land I saw 77,000 non-Buddhists sitting around their Master. In order to understand the characteristics of the ultimate truths of all dharmas, they speculated, reasoned, investigated through all methods, yet they were not able to attain the characteristics of the ultimate truths of all dharmas. They fought for all sorts of conjectural interpretations that were mutually contradicting and indeterminate. They disputed, attacked and injured each other, got angry and finally split apart. World-Honored One! At that moment I thought how marvelous the Buddha's supramundane experience is. Due to the Buddha's supramundane experience, the characteristics of the ultimated truths, which are beyond any speculative realm (tarkagocara), can be penetrated and attained." (689.c.20)

2. Thus spoke Bodhisattva Inexhaustible-Spring. At that moment, the Buddha addressed him: "Son of Good Family, well, well, as you said, I have realized Perfect Awakening as to the characteristics of the ultimate truths which are beyond

speculation. Having realized Perfect Awakening, I present it, make it known, disclose it, teach it, and shed light on it to the public. Why is that so?

I declare that the ultimate truth refers to that which is directly realized by the sages themselves, while the realm of speculation is indirectly realized by ordinary people through reasoning. Thus, Inexhaustible-Spring, for this reason, you should know that the ultimate truth transcends all the characteristics of the speculative realm.

Next, Inexhaustible-Spring, I declare that the ultimate truth is the realm of no-marks (animittagocara), while speculation stays within the realm of mark (nimittagocara) only. Thus Inexhaustible-Spring, for this reason, you should know that the ultimate truth transcends all the characteristics of the speculative realm.

Next, Inexhaustible-Spring, I declare that the ultimate truth can not be expressed, while speculation stays within the realm of discourse only. Thus Inexhaustible-Spring, for this reason, you should know that the ultimate truth transcends all the characteristics of the speculative realm.

Next, Inexhaustible-Spring, I declare that the ultimate truth can not be known, while speculation stays within the realm of knowledge.5 Thus Inexhaustible-Spring, for this

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5 According to Paramārtha's version, in this context the ultimate truth is said to go beyond "seeing, hearing, sensation and cognition" (chien-wen-chüeh-chih) (712.c.9). The same phrase ("seeing, hearing, etc.") replaced by piao-shih (expression, appearance) in Hsüan-tsang's translation,

reason, you should know that the ultimate truth transcends all the characteristics of the speculative realm.

Next, Inexhaustible-Spring, I declare that the ultimate truth is free from dispute, while speculation stays within the realm of the disputable. Thus Inexhaustible-Spring, for this reason, you should know that the ultimate truth transcends all the characteristics of the speculative realm. (690.a.8)

3. Inexhaustible-Spring, you should know that, for instance, those who all their lives are only familiar with bitter and spicy flavors, are unable to imagine or analogically know and truly realize the sweetness of honey and sugar.

Those who burn with the fire of desire during the long night [of life-and-death] because of resolve (abhimukti) and desire-greed (kāmarāga)6, are unable to imagine or

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by tha sñad (vyavahāra) in the Tibetan text (Lamotte, p. 40). Yüan-t'se commented in Shu 7.25.a: "This means that because the ultimate is detached from words, it cannot be expressed in terms of the four kinds of object-realms, that is, those which are seen, heard, sensed and known. Why? Because those four kinds of object-realms belong to the defiled discursive construction (prapañca), while the principle of the ultimate truth is not the object of seeing, hearing, [sensation and cognition]. Hence the ultimate truth cannot be expressed by what is seen, heard, etc."

6 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 8.3.a: "The term "long night" means the long night of life and death. The term "desire and greed" refers to those of the ten defilements which have desire and greed as their nature. The term "resolve" refers to those in the special concentrated states (viniyata) which by essence is resolve."

analogically know and truly realize the profound happiness of being free from all marks of form, sound, smell, taste and touch.

Those who are addicted to secular flowery language during the long night [of life-and-death] because of linguistic pomposity, are unable to imagine or analogically know and truly realize the holy happiness of internal quiescence and sagely silence.

Those who are addicted to secular knowledge during the long night [of life-and-death] because they are pompous as to all sorts of knowledge, are unable to imagine or analogically know and truly realize the absolute nirvāṇa in which all sorts of knowledge are destroyed and body-being (satkāya) ceases.

Those who are addicted to secular disputes during the long night [of life-and-death] because they are committed to disputing for property, are unable to imagine or analogically know and truly realize that in Uttarakuru there are no disputes for property.

Thus, Inexhaustible-Spring, those who speculate are unable to imagine or analogically know and truly realize the characteristics of the ultimate truths which transcend any speculation. (690.a.24)

4. At that moment, the Buddha composed the following verses to explicate the above teaching:

Internally realizing the realm of no-marks

Which is neither expressible nor knowable;

Ceasing all disputes, the ultimate truths

Go beyond all the characteristics of speculation.

(690.a.27)

III

1. At that time, Bodhisattva Pure Thought (Suviśuddhamati) spoke to the Buddha: "How wonderful is the World-Honored One! How eloquent is the World-Honored One! As the World-Honored One mentioned before, it is difficult to penetrate the characteristics of the ultimate truths which are so subtle and profound that they can not be characterized as identical to or different from all dharmas.

World-Honored One! As I have seen somewhere, the bodhisattvas, who were practicing at the preparatory stage,[7] met together to figure out whether the characteristics of the ultimate truth are identical to or different from the marks of conditioned existence. At the meeting, a group of bodhisattvas claimed that the characteristics of the ultimate truths are completely non-different from the marks of conditioned existence. Another group of bodhisattvas disagreed, saying that the characteristics of the ultimate truths are different from the marks of conditioned existence. The other bodhisattvas were puzzled and said: 'Who is right? Who is wrong? Whose practice is correct? Whose practice is incorrect?' Some of them contended that the characteristics of the ultimate truths are not different from the marks of conditioned existence. Some of them argued

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7 Skt. Adhimukticaryābhūmi. This is a pre-bhūmi stage in which a bodhisattva gains more understanding from faith than from true realization.

the other way.8

World-Honored One! Having seen their discussion, I thought that those Sons of Good Families are dumb and ignorant. They do not properly understand [the Buddha's teachings]. They do not practice in the right track either. Therefore, they do not understand that the ultimate truths are so subtle and deep that they can not be considered identical with or different from conditioned existence." (690.b.14)

2. Thus spoke Bodhisattva Pure Thought. At that moment, the Buddha said: "Well, well, as you said, those Sons of Good Families are dumb and ignorant. They do not have proper understanding. They also do not practice in the right track. Therefore they do not understand that the ultimate truths are so subtle and deep that they can not be considered

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8 In the Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya Vasubandhu explains the notions of "distraction by identity" (ekatvavikṣepa) and "distraction by difference" (nānātvavikṣepa): "Concerning the distraction caused by the notion of identity, the [Prajñāpāramitā-] Sūtra claims that the emptiness of form is not form. Why? If the other-dependent is identical to the perfected, it must be a pure realm as is the perfected. Concerning the distraction caused by the notion of difference, the Sūtra claims that form is not separate from emptiness. Why? If they are different, then dharma and dharmatā must be different, too. It is not reasonable to claim that dharmatā is separate from dharma. For instance, the impermanent dharma and the permanent-ness [are not separate]. If one appropriates the self-nature of the fabricated, then [the antitdote must be the teaching that] form is emptiness and emptiness is form. Why? Because the imagined form does not exist---that is called emptiness. The emptiness is exactly identical to the 'not existing' imagined form. This is unlike that the other-dependent and the perfected can not be said to be identical." (T.31.342.c) See also, E. Lamotte, La Somme II, p. 115.

identical to or different from conditioned existence. Why? (690.b.18)

3. Pure Thought, those who do not view conditioned existence in this way are entitled to penetrate the characteristics of the ultimate truths or to attain the ultimate truths.9 Why? Pure Thought, if the characteristics of the ultimate truths are not different from the marks of conditioned existence, all ordinary people will have already attained the truth. By the same token, all ordinary people will have already attained the Peaceful Nirvana of the Supreme Way (anuttara-yogakṣema-nirvāṇa) or have attained Supreme Awakening.10 If the characteristics of the ultimate truths are completely different from the marks of conditioned existence, the one who has comprehended the truths will not eliminate the marks of conditioned existence. If one does not eliminate the marks of conditioned existence, one will not be liberated from the bondage of marks (nimittabandhana). Because the one who has comprehended the truths would not be liberated from the bondage of marks, one will not be liberated from the bondage of gross wickedness (dauṣṭhulya). Because one will not be

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9 Paramārtha's translation: "For those who have such a wrong idea and practice the contemplation of truth through conditioned existences, it is impossible for them to attain the truth of Suchness." (T.31.713.a.15-17)

10 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 8.16.b: "Supreme Way" (Ch. wu-shang-fan-pien) refers to the Truth of Path.

liberated from the two bondages, the one who has comprehended the truths will not have obtained the Peaceful Nirvana of the Supreme Way nor attained the Supreme Awakening.

Pure Thought, since ordinary people have neither comprehended the truths nor obtained the Peaceful Nirvana of the Supreme Way, nor have they attained the Supreme Awakening either, it is not correct to claim that the characteristics of the ultimate truths are not different from the marks of conditioned existence. Accordingly, those who claim the non-difference between the characteristics of the ultimate truths and the marks of conditioned existence do not practise correctly.

Pure Thought, those who have not yet comprehended the truths, although they do not cut off the marks of conditioned existence at the present moment, are nevertheless capable of cutting them off. Those who have not yet comprehended the truths, although they are not liberated from the bondage of marks at the present moment, are nevertheless capable of being liberating from them. Those who have not yet comprehended the truths, although they are not liberated from the bondage of gross wickedness at the present moment, are nevertheless capable of being liberating from of it. Since they are capable of being liberating from the two bondages, they are capable of obtaining the Peaceful Nirvana of the Supreme Way as well as attaining the Supreme

Awakening. Therefore it is not reasonable to claim that the characteristics of the ultimate truths are completely different from the marks of conditioned existence. Accordingly, those who claim the non-difference between the characteristics of the ultimate truths and the marks of conditioned existence do not practise correctly. (690.c.15)

4. Furthermore, Pure Thought, if the characteristics of the ultimate truths are not different from the marks of conditioned existence at all, then the characteristics of the ultimate truths must be defiled because the marks of conditioned existence are defiled. Pure Thought, if the characteristics of the ultimate truths are totally different from the marks of conditioned existence, then the universal characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of all the marks of conditioned existence would not be called the characteristics of the ultimate truths.

Pure Thought, now since the characteristics of the ultimate truths are not identical with the characteristics of defilement, and the universal characteristics of all marks of conditioned existence are named the characteristics of the ultimate truths, it is incorrect to claim that there is no difference between the characteristics of the ultimate truths and the marks of conditioned existence; it is also incorrect to claim that the characteristics of the ultimate truths are completely different from the marks of conditioned existence. Accordingly, those who claim either

the non-difference or the difference between the characteristics of the ultimate truths and the marks of conditioned existence do not practice correctly. (690.c.26)

5. Furthermore, Pure Thought, if there is no difference at all between the characteristics of the ultimate truths and the marks of conditioned existence, all marks of conditioned existence would not be different from the characteristics of the ultimate truths, and vice versa. Also it would follow that the Yogācārins would not need to search for the ultimate (paramārtha) in addition to what they have seen, heard, sensed and known in conditioned existences.

If there is no difference between the characteristics of the ultimate truths and the marks of conditioned existence, the characteristics of the ultimate would not be identical to that which is manifested (Ch. hsien-hsien) by the non-self-ness-only (nairātmyamātra) and the non-self-nature-ness-only (niḥsvabhāvatāmātra) of conditioned existence. Also, the particular characteristics, i.e., the characteristics of defilement (saṃkleśalakṣaṇa) and the characteristics of purity (vyavadānalakṣaṇa), would exist at the same time.

Pure Thought, because all the marks of conditioned existence are distinguished [between the pure and the defiled], the Yogacarins should search for the ultimate in addition to what they have seen, heard, sensed and known in the marks of conditioned existence.

Furthermore, because the characteristics of the ultimate truths are identical to that which is manifested by the non-self-ness-only and the non-self-nature-ness-only, and because the different characteristics of purity and defilement exist at the same time, it is incorrect to claim that the characteristics of the ultimate truths are either identical to or completely different from the marks of conditioned existence. Accordingly, those who claim identity or difference between the characteristics of the ultimate truths and the marks of conditioned existence do not practice correctly. (691.a.14)

6. Pure Thought, for instance, it is difficult to claim that the whiteness of a shell is identical to or different from the shell itself. The same is true of gold and golden color. Another example: it is difficult to claim that a melody is identical to or different from the sound of a guitar. Another example: it is difficult to claim that the spiciness of pepper is identical from or different from the pepper itself. The same is true of haritakī medicine-fruit and its light taste. Another example: it is difficult to claim that the softness of silk is identical to or different from silk itself. Another example: it is also difficult to claim that ghee (ghṛta) is identical to or different from cream (maṇḍa). Another example: it is difficult to claim that the impermanence of all conditioned existences (saṃskāra), the suffering (duḥkhatā) of the contaminated

beings (sāsrava), the non-self-ness of all beings, are identical to or different from all conditioned existences, etc. Another example: it is difficult to claim that the restless characteristic (aśāntilakṣaṇa) and the defiled characteristic of greed (rāga) are identical to or different from greed itself. The same is true of hate and delusion. Thus, Pure Thought, the characteristics of the ultimate truths can not be characterized as being either identical to or different from the marks of conditioned existence.

Pure Thought, I have realized Perfect Awakening as to the characteristics of the ultimate truths, which are so subtle, very subtle, deep, very deep, impenetrable, very impenetrable, which can not be considered identical to or different from the characteristics of dharmas. After having realized Perfect Awakening, I present it, make it known, disclose it, teach it, and shed light upon it to the public. (691.b.4)

7. At that moment, the Buddha composed the following verses to explicate the above teaching:

The realm of conditioned existence [and] the
characteristics of the ultimate [are]
Beyond identity and difference.
If identity and difference are discriminated,
One does not practice correctly.
Sentient beings are bound up by the marks
And gross wickedness.

Practice calming (*śamatha*) and discerning (*vipaśyanā*)
assiduously,
Then you can be liberated. (691.b.9)

IV

1. At that moment, the World-Honored One asked Elder Subhūti: "Subhuti, do you know how many sentient beings there are in the sentient realm who declare their realization on account of being ensnared by conceit (abhimāna)? Do you know how many sentient beings, detached from conceit, state their realization?"

Elder Subhūti replied to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! As I know, in the sentient realm only a few sentient beings state their realization without conceit. World-Honored One! As I know, in the sentient realm there are numerous sentient beings who declare their realization while ensnared by conceit.

World-Honored One! Once I lived in a retreat grove (araṇya).11 Many monks also lived in the grove not far from my place. As I saw, during the early evening those monks gathered together to report the various teachings and their personal realization on the basis of the intuitive knowledge of teaching (vividhadharmālambakābhisamaya).12

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11 Paramārtha's Commentary: "The term araṇya means: (1) a quiet place free of urban clamor, (2) a place where nobody comes to cut firewood, (3) a place where no dispute exists. 'Dispute' refers to all kinds of defilements which always disturb good dharma. Araṇya is thus named because any one who lives here can overcome the defilements." See Yüan-ts'e, Shu, 9.17.

12 Hsüan-tsang's translation is different from both Bodhiruci's and Paramārtha's. According to Yüan-ts'e's Shu, Hsüan-tsang seems to stress the contrast between two kinds

2. Among them a group of monks reported what they had attained the aggregates (skandha), the characteristics of the aggregates, the arising of the aggregates, the ending of the aggregates, the cessation of the aggregates, the realization of the cessation of the aggregates. This is the group who attained the aggregates. Likewise, another group reported what their attained about the sense-fields (āyatana). Some reported what they attained about "dependent origination" (pratītyasamutpāda). Also some reported what they attained about "food" (āhāra), the characteristics of "food", the arising of "food", the ending of "food", the cessation of "food" and the realization of the cessation of "food". (691.b.27)

3. A group reported what they attained about the Truths (satya), the characteristics of the Truths, the complete knowledge (parijñā) of the Truth [of suffering], the elimination (prahāṇa) of the Truth [of the cause of suffering], the realization (sākṣātkāra) of the Truth [of cessation] and the cultivation (bhāvanā) of the Truth [of path]. (691.b.29)

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of intuitive knowledge (abhisamaya): (1) the intuitive knowledge of something, and (2) the intuitive knowledge of nothing. E. Lamotte reconstructed a Sanskrit term vividhadharmālambakābhisamaya from the Tibetan version, which means "intuitions sur les diverses choses" (intuition on diverse things). (pp. 48, 178)

The term yu-so-te-hsien-kuan (the intuitive knowledge of "something") refers to verbal understanding of the Truths stated in the scriptures, which is in contrast to wu-so-te-hsien-kuan (the intuitive knowledge of "nothing") as particularly stressed by the Prajñāpāramitā thinkers.

4. A group reported what they attained about the Realms (*dhātu*), the characteristics of the Realms, the variety (*nānātva*) of the Realms, the plurality (*anekatva*) of the Realms, the cessation of the Realms, and the realization of the cessation of the Realms. (691.c.3)

5. A group reported what they attained about the Fields of Mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*),13 the characteristics of the Fields of Mindfulness, the antidote and the disease of the Fields of Mindfulness, the cultivation of the Fields of Mindfulness, that which gives rise to the Fields of Mindfulness which have not yet been produced, and that which remains in the Fields of Mindfulness and reinforces the Fields of Mindfulness.

Like the group who attained the Fields of Mindfulness, another group reported what they attained about the Right Eliminations (*samyakprahāṇa*),14 the Bases of Wonder-Working Powers (*ṛddhi-pāda*),15 Controlling Principles (*indriya*), Powers (*bala*),16 and the Factors of Enlightenment (*bodhyaṅga*)17.

There was another group who reported what they attained

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13 Cf. Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 82-91.

14 Cf. *ibid*, pp. 101-103.

15 Cf. *ibid*, pp.104-106.

16 Cf. *ibid*, pp. 141-149.

17 Cf. *ibid*, pp. 149-155.

about the Eightfold Path, the characteristics of the Eightfold Path, the antidote and the disease in the Eightfold Path, the cultivation of the Eightfold Path, that which gives rise to the Eightfold Path which has not yet been called up, and that which remains on the Eightfold Path and reinforces it.18 (691.c.12)

6. World-Honored One! Then I thought, those Elders reported all sorts of teachings with their personal realizations based on intuitive knowledge of the teachings, because they were ensnared by conceit, and they did not understand that the ultimate truths are characterized by one flavor in everything (sarvatra-ekarasalakṣaṇa). Hence, the most profound is the World-Honored One! The most eloquent is the World-Honored One! As the World-Honored One said, the ultimate truths characterized by one flavor in everything are the subtlest of the subtlest, the deepest of the deepest, the most difficult of the most difficult. World-Honored One, in the Noble Teaching even the well-trained monk is not able to penetrate the ultimate truths characterized by one flavor in everything, not to mention the non-Buddhists." (691.c.21)

7. At that moment, the World-Honored One answered Elder Subhūti: "You are right, Subhūti! I have realized Perfect Awakening to the ultimate truth, the subtlest of the subtlest, the deepest of the deepest, the most difficult of

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18 Cf. ibid, pp.160-164.

the most difficult, which is one flavor in everything. After I have realized Perfect Awakening, I present it, make it known, disclose it, teach it, and shed light on it to the public. Why?" (691.c.25)

8. "Subhūti, I have demonstrated that the ultimate truths are the pure objects (viśuddhālambana) of all the Aggregates.19 I have also demonstrated that the ultimate truths are the pure objects of all the Sense Fields, Dependent Origination, "Foods", Truths, the Realms, the Fields of Mindfulness, the Right Eliminations, the Wonder-Working Power, the Controlling Principles, the Powers, the Factors of Enlightenment and the Eightfold Path. The pure objects of all the Aggregates are characterized by one flavor without differentiation. Likewise, the pure objects of all the Sense Fields...and the Eightfold Path are characterized by one flavor without differentiation. Thus, Subhuti, for this reason you should know that the ultimate truths are characterized by one flavor permeating everything." (692.a.3)

9. "Furthermore, if a Yogācārin has truly understood the Suchness, the ultimate and the self-less-ness of the dharmas (dharma-nairātmya) of one Aggregate, he does not need to

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19 There are two interpretations. First, "pure object" refers to the ultimate truths realized in the five aggregates. Mind is purified by the ultimate truth as the object-realm (ālambana). In Buddhism, Truths (satya) are taken as the objects of meditation. Second, the ultimate is pure, because it is detached from bondages. See Yüan-t'se, Shu 10.11.b.

search for the Suchness, the ultimate and the self-less-ness of the dharmas of the other Aggregates, Sense-Fields, Dependent Origination, "Food", Truths, Realms, Fields of Mindfulness, Right Eliminations, Bases of Wonder-Working Powers, Controlling Principles, Powers, and Factors of Awakening and Path. Based on the wisdom of Suchness, the ultimate and non-duality, he then goes on to examine and experience the ultimate truths characterised as one flavor permeating everything.20 Hence, Subhuti, for this reason you should know that the ultimate truths are characterized by one flavor permeating everything. (692.a.9)

10. Furthermore, Subhūti, if the characteristics of Suchness, the ultimate and the self-less-ness of all dharmas are differentiated into those of the Aggregates, the Sense-Fields, the "Foods", the Truths, the Realms, the Fields of Mindfulness, the Right Eliminations, the Bases of Wonder-working Powers, the Controlling Principles, the Powers, the Factors of Awakening and the Paths, then the Suchness, the ultimate and the self-less-ness of all dharmas must have a cause [of origination] and originate from the cause. If they originate from the cause, they are conditioned. If they are conditioned, they are not ultimate. If they are not ultimate, then one should search for other ultimate truths.

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20 According to Yüan-t'se, "wisdom" refers to "non-discriminative wisdom" (nirvikalpa-jñāna). It might also refer to the "wisdom of non-self in person and the wisdom of non-self in dharma". See Shu 10.15.a.

Subhūti, since the Suchness, the ultimate and the self-less-ness of dharmas are not called a cause, or something originated from a cause, and they are not conditioned. Hence they are called 'ultimate truth'. If one attains the ultimate, he does not need to search for other ultimate truths. Whether the Tathāgata had ever appeared in the world or not, the dharmatā of dharmas would always already have been well established, and the dharmadhātu of dharmas would always already have been well resided.21 Therefore, Subhuti, for this reason, you should know that the ultimate truths are characterized by one flavor permeating everything.

11. Subhūti, for example, among the varieties of form with different characteristics, empty space is characterized as non-differentiated, invariable and one flavor permeating everything. Likewise, among the dharmas which have different natures and characteristics, the ultimate truth is characterized as one flavor permeating everything.

(692.a.24)

12. At that moment, the World Honored One composed the

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21 Yogācārabhūmi (T.30.327.c): "Question: The World Honored One once said: 'the [characteristics of] dependent origination is neither produced by me nor by other. Why? Regardless of whether the Buddha had appeared in the world or not, one should firmly abide in dharmatā, dharmasthiti, dharmadhātu.' What is dharmatā? What is dharmasthiti? What is dharmadhātu? Answer: Since the beginningless, the [characteristics of] dependent origination are based on principle (Ch. li).--That is called dharmatā. If the characteristics of dependent origination based on principle are correctly articulated by words, that is called 'the dwelling of dharma' (dharmasthiti). Since dharmatā is the cause of dharmasthiti, it is called dharmadhātu."

following verses to explicate the above teaching:

> The ultimate, which is characterized by one flavor
> permeating everything,
> Is not differentiated, as declared by Buddhas.
> Whoever attempts to differentiate it
> Must be an ignorant person ensnared by conceit.
> (692.a.26)

V

1. At that moment, Bodhisattva Viśālamati spoke to the Buddha: "World-Honored One! You have mentioned some bodhisattvas who are perfectly learned the secret of mind (citta), mentation (manas), and consciousness (vijñāna). Why are they qualified as the 'bodhisattvas perfectly knowing the secret of mind, mentation and consciousness'? For what reason does the Tathāgata call them bodhisattvas who perfectly comprehend the secret of mind, mentation, and consciousness?" Thus spoke Bodhisattva Viśālamati.

At that moment, the World-Honored One answered Bodhisattva Viśālamati: "Well, well, Viśālamati, now you are able to ask the Tathāgata such a profound question. You raise such a question in order to benefit numerous sentient beings, showing compassion to the human worlds and heavenly beings, human beings, asura, and so forth in order to benefit them. Listen carefully, I am going to explain to you the meaning of the secret of mind, mentation, and consciousness. (692.b.8)

2. Listen, Viśālamati, in the six destinies of life-and-death, sentient beings fall into one of the [four typies of] sentient beings. Some are born to be the oviparious life-form. Some the viviparious life-form. Some the life-form born from moisture. Some the metamorphic life-form. During the first moment of birth, the consciousness-containing-all-

seeds (sarvabījakacittavijñāna) matures, evolves, merges, grows and increases. It is based on the twofold activities of appropriation: (1) appropriating the sense faculties (rūpīndraya) and their bases (sādhiṣṭhāna), and (2) appropriating the sediments (vāsanā) of discursive constructions (prapañca) and everyday language (vyavahāra) which result from the discrimination (vikalpa) of marks (nimitta) and names (nāma). Those twofold activities of appropriation exist in the realm of form (rūpadhātu), but do not exist in the formless realm (ārūpyadhātu). (692.b.14)

3. Viśālamati, this consciousness [i.e., consciousness-containing-all-seeds] is also called "appropriating-consciousness" (ādāna-vijñāna). Why? Because this consciousness chases and grasps the body (kāya). [This consciousness] is also called "store-consciousness" (ālaya-vijñāna). Why? Because this consciousness takes the body and hides itself in the body so that both of them share the same destiny. This consciousness is also called "mind" (citta), because this consciousness accumulates (ācita) and grows (upacita) color, sound, smell, taste, touch, etc..(692.b.18)

4. Viśālamati, on the basis of construction (saṃniśritya pratiṣṭhāya), i.e., appropriating-consciousness, the six consciousnesses evolve. The six consciousnesses are seeing-, hearing-, smelling-, tasting-, tactile-consciousness and apperceptive consciousness (manovijñāna). When the eyes and the visible are given as the conditions, seeing-

consciousness arises. Co-arising with the seeing-consciousness, the discriminative apperceptive consciousness (vikalpaka manovijñāna) evolves at the same time and with the same object. When the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, and a sound, smell, taste, and touch are given as the conditions, the hearing-, the smell-, the tasting- and the tactile-consciousness arise. Co-arising with these consciousnesses, the discriminative apperceptive consciousness evolves at the same time and with the same objects.

Viśālamati, if the seeing-consciousness is evolving at a particular moment, it is co-evolving with the discriminative apperceptive consciousness simultaneously. If there are two, or three, or four, or five, consciousnesses evolving, only the discriminative apperceptive consciousness co-arises simultaneously with them. (692.b.28)

5. Viśālamati, it is like a torrent. If there emerges an condition to produce a wave, only then does a wave arise. If there emerge many conditions to produce two or more waves, there arise multiple waves. Yet the torrent itself runs forward continually. It is also like a perfectly pure mirror. If there emerges a condition to produce an image, only then does an image arise. If there emerge many conditions to produce two or more images, then there arise many images. The mirror does not transform itself into the images, nor is it worn out either.

Similarly, Viśālamati, on the basis of construction, i.e., appropriating-consciousness which is similar to the torrential flow, if at the very moment that the conditions for a visual consciousness arise, precisely at that moment a visual consciousness occur. If the conditions for the body of five consciousnesses arise, precisely at that moment do the five consciousnesses occur. (692.c.8)

6. Viśālamati, although those bodhisattvas have perfectly learned the secret of mind-mentation-consciousness on the basis of Dharma-Abiding Wisdom (dharmasthitijñāna)22, the Tathāgata does not call them bodhisattvas who have perfectly learned all the secrets of mind-mentation-consciousness. Vaśālamati, the Tathāgata claims that the ultimately skillful bodhisattvas are those who internally, separately and truly do not perceive appropriation (ādāna), nor appropriating-consciousness, who do not perceive "store" (ālaya), nor store-consciousness, who do not perceive

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22 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 12.14-15: The notion of Dharma-Abiding Wisdom has three interpretations:
(1) According to Sarvāstivādin definition, it refers to the wisdom of knowing the cause in which the fruit abides.
(2) According to Sautrāntika definition: by this wisdom one knows that the dharma (truth or principle) of dependent origination exists unchangingly.
(3) According to Yogācāra: it refers to the wisdom which establishes the dharma-gate on the basis of sutras.

Yüan t'se concludes: "Although a pre-bhūmi bodhisattva understands the conventional analysis of mind-mentation-consciousness through Dharma-Abiding Wisdom, he has not attained the ultimate meaning of the secret of mind-mentation-consciousness. Therefore, he has not been claimed by the World Honored One as the bodhisattva who has perfectly learned [the secret of mind-mentation-conscousness]." (12.15.a)

accumulation (*ācita*), nor mind, who do not perceive the eye, visibles, nor the seeing-consciousness, who do not perceive the ear, sounds, nor the hearing-consciousness, who do not perceive the nose, smells, nor the smell-consciousness, who do not perceive the tongue, tastes, nor the tasting-consciousness, who do not perceive the body, tactiles, nor the tactile-consciousness, who do not perceive the apperception (*manas*), dharmas (objects of apperception), nor the apperceptive consciousness. Viśālamati, they are then called bodhisattva who have skillfully learned all the secrets of mind-mentation-consciousness. The Tathāgata thus ordains them as bodhisattvas who have skillfully learned all the secrets of mind-mentation-consciousness. (692.c.20)

7. At that moment, the World-Honored One composed verses to reiterate the above teaching:

> The appropriating-consciousness is so profound and
> subtle;
> I have never presented it to the spiritually immature.
> All seeds are like a torrent
> Lest they would imagine it to be a self. (692.c.23)

VI

1. At that moment, Bodhisattva Guṇākara spoke to the Buddha: "World-Honored One! The World-Honored One has declared that some bodhisattvas have skillfully learned the characteristics of all dharmas. By what qualifications are they called bodhisattvas who have skillfully learned the characteristics of all dharmas? For what reason does the Tathāgata claim they are bodhisattvas who have skillfully learned the characteristics of all dharmas?" Thus spoke Bodhisattva Guṇākara.(693.a.10)

2. At that moment, the World-Honored One replied to Bodhisattva Guṇākara: "Very good, Guṇākara! Now you are able to ask the Tathāgata such a profound question. You raise this question in order to benefit numerous sentient beings, showing compassion for the human worlds and heavenly beings, human beings, asura and so forth in order to benefit them. Listen carefully, I am going to explain to you the characteristics of all dharmas. (693.a.15)

3. Briefly, there are three characteristics of dharmas. What are these three? The first is the [psycho-linguistically] fabricated characteristic (parikalpitalakṣaṇa). The second is the other-dependent characteristic (paratantralakṣaṇa). The third is the perfected characteristic (pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa). (693.a.17)

4. What is the [psycho-linguistically] fabricated

characteristic of dharmas? This refers to all the dharmas which are conventional designations by which the differentiation of self-nature is established. Consequent on this, discourse then arises. (693.a.19)

5. What is the other-dependent characteristic of dharmas? Because the self-nature of all dharmas are produced by conditions, therefore, this exists if that exists, this arises if that arises. That is, ignorance gives rise to karmic volition and so on. In this way a great mass of suffering arises. (693.a.21)

6. What is the perfected characteristic of dharmas? It refers to the universal Suchness of all dharmas. Due to courage, vigor, fundamental thinking (yoniśomansikāra)23 and correct thinking, the bodhisattvas are thus able to truly understand this Suchness. Based on this true understanding, they then progressively cultivate it until they perfectly attain the Supreme Perfect Awakening. (693.a.25)

7. "Son of Good Family! The [psycho-linguistically] fabricated characteristic is like a cataract disease in the eyes of persons who are suffering from that disease. The other-dependent characteristic is like those things which are seen by a person with cataracted eyes. Those objects appear differentiatedly as hair, wheel, bee, fly, sesame, in

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23 Yoniśas means "fundamentally, thoroughly, from the ground up"; yoniśo-manasikāra means "fundamental mental comprehension". See Franklin Edgerton, Diçtionary, p. 448. Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation of yoniśo-manasikāra is ju-li tso-i, meaning "rational or logical thinking".

colors of blue, yellow, red, white, etc. The perfected characteristic is like the undistorted object seen by the healthy eyes of persons who have recovered from the cataract diease." (693.b.2)

8. "Son of Good Family! It is also like a pure, transparent crystal. If a transparent crystal comes into contact with blue dyestuff, it will give the illusory appearance of a blue indranīla maṇi-jewel or a mahanīla maṇi-jewel, etc. Since sentient beings may mistakenly attach to the illusory appearance as if it were a real blue indranīla maṇi-jewel or a mahanīla maṇi-jewel, they therefore become confused and agitated.

If a transparent crystal contacts red dyestuff, it will give the illusory appearance of an amber maṇi-jewel. Since sentient beings may mistakenly attach to the illusory appearance of an amber maṇi-jewel as if it were a real amber maṇi-jewel, they therefore become confused and agitated. If a transparent crystal contacts green dystuff, it will give the illusory appearance of a marakata maṇi-jewel. Since sentient beings may mistakenly attach to the illusory appearance of a marakata maṇi-jewel as if it were a real marakata maṇi-jewel, they therefore become confused and agitated. If a transparent crystal contacts yellow dyestuff, it will give the illusory appearance of gold. Since sentient beings may mistakenly attach to the illusory appearance of gold as if it were real gold, they therefore become confused

and agitated. (693.b.10)

9. Guṇākara, just as a transparent crystal may reflect any kind of dyestuff, the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristic is constructed upon the other-dependent characteristic through the psycho-linguistic sediments (vyavahāra-vāsanā). Just as one wrongly attaches to [the crystal as it were] indranīla, mahānīla, amber, marakata and gold, the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics are attached to the other-dependent characteristics. The other-dependent characteristics are like the transparent crystal. The appearances of indranīla, mahānīla, amber, marakata or gold reflected in the transparent crystal are always already neither real nor with self-nature; likewise, the perfected characteristic means that the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics constructed upon the other-dependent characteristics are always already neither real nor with self-nature. (693.b.20)

10. Furthermore, Guṇākara, due to the association of marks and names, the fabricated characteristics can be known. Due to the attachment (abhiniveśa) of the fabricated characteristics onto the other-dependent characteristics, the other-dependent characteristics can be known. Due to the non-attachment (abhiniveśābhāva) of the fabricated characteristics onto the dependent characteristics, the perfected characteristics can be known. (693.b.25)

11. Son of Good Family! The bodhisattvas are able to truly

comprehend all the dharmas which are without characteristics (alakṣaṇadharma) if they can truly comprehend the fabricated characteristics in the other-dependent characteristics of dharmas. The bodhisattvas are able to truly comprehend all the dharmas which are characterized by defilement (saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharma) if they can truly comprehend the other-dependent characteristics. The bodhisattvas are able to truly comprehend all the dharmas which are characterized by purity (vyavadānalakṣaṇadharma) if they can truly comprehend the perfected characteristics.

Son of Good Family! The bodhisattvas are able to eliminate the dharmas which are characterized by defilement if they can truly comprehend the dharmas which are without characteristics in the other-dependent characteristics. They are able to attain the dharmas which are characterized by purity if they can eliminate the dharmas which are characterized by defilements. Thus, Gunakara, because the Bodhisattvas truly comprehend the fabricated characteristics, the other-dependent characteristics and the perfected characteristics, they truly comprehend the dharmas which are without characteristics, the dharmas which are characterized by defilement and the dharmas which are characterized by purity. Because they truly comprehend the non-characteristic dharmas, they eliminate all the dharmas which are characterized by defilement. Because they eliminate all the dharmas which are characterized by

defilement, they attain all the dharmas which are characterized by purity. They are thus called bodhisattvas who are skillfully learned the characteristics of dharmas. Hence, the Tathagata ordained them as bodhisattvas who are skillfully learned the characteristics of dharmas.

(693.c.10)

12. At that moment, the World-Honored One composed the following verses in order to reiterate the teaching:

If anyone has not comprehended the dharmas which are
without characteristics,
He is not able to eliminate the dharmas which are
characterized by defilements.
Because he is not able to eliminate the dharmas
characterized by defilement,
He will fail to attain the profound dharmas which are
characterized by purity.
If anyone does not reflect on the wrongdoings of
conditioned existence,
He will commit careless wrongdoings which harm sentient
beings,
Due to sloth (kausīdya). [If one] abides in the dharma
within the moving dharma,24
One will not have any faults to be pitied.

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24 "Moving dharma" (Ch. tung-fa) means "saṃsāra".

VII

1. On one occasion, Bodhisattva Attaining-the-Ultimate (*Paramārthasamudgata*) asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One! Once, in a tranquil place, a thought came to my mind: The World-Honored One has taught through numerous methods (*aneka-paryāyena*)25 about the self-characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) of the Aggregates,26 their characteristics of arising and cessation, their elimination and complete knowledge. As with the Aggregates, so did he teach the Sense-Fields, Dependent Origination and the "Foods". The World-Honored One also taught through numerous methods all the self-characteristics of the [Four Noble] Truths, complete knowledge [of them], their elimination, attainment

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25 *Anekaparyāyena*, in this context, means a great number of methods and doctrines used by the Buddha. In its Chinese equivalent, *wu-liang-men*, the word *men*, which corresponds with the Sanskrit *paryāya*, means "gate" or "entrance". For the Buddhist student, the Buddha's teachings are taken as the Gate opening onto the Buddha Realm.

26 Yüan-t'se, *Shu*, 14.3.a: "'All the self-characteristics' refers to the 'particular characteristic'. For example, [the self-characteristic of] 'form' (*rūpa*) is resistibility and that of 'consciousness' is cognizance (*vijñapti*). 'The characteristic of arising' and 'the characteristic of cessation' are the 'universal characteristic', because all 'forms', etc., are characterized by arising and cessation." Yüan-t'se's interpretation is based on the distinction between "self-characteristic" (*svalakṣaṇa*) and "universal characteristic" (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). On Dignaga's interpretation of this distinction, see Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*, p.24. In *Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence*, Tsong Khapa criticized Yüan-t'se's interpretation. See R. Thurman, pp. 191-192, 292.

and meditation [on them]. The World-Honored One also taught through numerous methods all the self-characteristics, variety (nānātva), multiplity (anekatva), elimination and complete knowledge of the [Eighteen] Sense-Realms. The World-Honored One also taught through numerous methods about the Fields of Mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), all their self-characteristics, the antidote, the disease, that which gives rise to the Fields of Mindfulness which have not yet been produced, that which can remain on the Fields of Mindfulness and that which can continue to reinforce the Fields of Mindfulness. As with the Fields of Mindfulness, so did the World-Honored One teach about the Right Eliminations, the Bases of Wonder-Working Powers, the Controlling Principles, the Powers, and the Factors of Enlightenment. The World-Honored One also taught through numerous methods about the Eightfold Path, all their self-characteristics, the antidote, the disease, the cultivation, that which gives rise to the Factors of Enlightenment which have not yet been produced, that which can remain on the Factors of Enlightenment, and that which can continue to reinforce the Factors of Enlightenment.

However, the World-Honored One also taught that all dharmas are self-nature-less (niḥsvabhava), neither arisen (anutpanna), nor ceased (aniruddha), originally quiescent (ādiśānta) and nirvanic by nature (prakṛtiparinirvṛta). With what intention (Ch. mi-i; Sk. saṃdhāya, abhipretya) did the

World-Honored One proclaim this statement: 'All dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen, nor ceased, originally quiescent and nirvanic by nature'? Now I request that the Tathāgata completely disclose the intention behind the above statement.27 (694.a.4)

2. At that moment, the World-Honored One replied to Bodhisattva Attaining-the-Ultimate: "Well, well, Attaining-the-Ultimate, you have made a good point. Well, well, Son of Good Family, now you are able to ask the Tathāgata such a profound question in order to benefit the numerous sentient beings, showing compassion for the human worlds and heavenly beings, human beings, asura, and so forth. Listen carefully, I am going to disclose for you the total intention behind the above statement, i.e.,'All dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent and nirvanic by nature'. (694.a.12)

3. Listen, Attaining-the-Ultimate, through the threefold non-self-nature-ness (niḥsvabhāvatā) I declare with hidden intention that all dharmas are without self-nature. The threefold non-self-nature-ness are (1) the non-self-nature-ness of characteristics (lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā), (2) the non-self-nature-ness of arising (utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā) and (3) the ultimate non-self-nature-ness

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27 Tsong Khapa quoted the above paragraph in his Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence. See Robert A. F. Thurman's English translation (1984), p. 191.

(paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā).28 (694.a.15)

4. Son of Good Family, what is the non-self-nature-ness of the characteristics of all dharmas? It refers to the [psycho-linguistically] fabricated characteristics of dharmas. Why? The non-self-nature-ness of characteristics is so named because fabricated characteristics are constructed on the basis of the conventional designations, but not constructed on the basis of self-characteristics themselves.29 (694.a.18)

5. What is the non-self-nature-ness of the arising of all dharmas? This refers to the other-dependent characteristics of all dharmas. Why? "Non-self-nature-ness" is so named because [other-dependent characteristics] do not exist by themselves, but due to the force of conditions.30 (694.a.20)

6. What is the ultimate non-self-nature-ness of all dharmas? All dharmas are without self-nature-ness, because their arising is without self-nature-ness. That is, all dharmas are produced by conditions. Why is this also named the ultimate non-self-nature-ness. I have demonstrated that among dharmas those in the pure object-realm

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28 Cf. Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence. p. 192.

29 Ibid, p. 194.

30 Ibid, p.195.

(*viśuddhālambana*) are ultimate.31 However, because the characteristics of the other-dependent are not the pure object-realm, they are also characterized as ultimately without self-nature-ness.

The perfected characteristics of dharmas are also called 'ultimate non-self-nature-ness'. Why? The non-self-ness of dharma (*dharmanairātmya*) of all dharmas is called both 'ultimate' and 'non-self-nature-ness', because it is the ultimate truth and because it is revealed by non-self-nature-ness. Thus it is called ultimate non-self-nature-ness.32 (694.b.1)

7. Son of Good Family, the non-self-nature-ness of characteristics is just like a sky-flower. The non-self-nature-ness of arising is like a phantom, and one aspect of the ultimate non-self-nature-ness is also [like a phantom]. Just as space is everywhere, but only manifests through the absence of form, the other aspect of the ultimate non-self-nature-ness is in everything, but only manifests through the non-self-ness of dharmas.33 (694.b.6)

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31 Here I follow the Tibetan version. See, Lamotte, pp.68-69. In Hsüan-tsang's text, it reads as "Among the dharmas I declare that those in the pure object-realm are the ultimate non-self-nature-ness". This textual discrepancy was pointed out by Yin-shun, who noted that the term *wu-tzu-hsing* (non-self-nature-ness) in this context is misplaced. See, Yen-p'ei, *Chieh shen-mi ching yü-t'i shih* (1953/1982). p. 202.

32 Cf. Robert A. F. Thurman, *ibid*, pp.195-196.

33 Cf. Robert A. F. Thurman, *ibid*, pp. 197-198.

8. Son of Good Family, through the threefold non-self-nature-ness I declare with hidden intention that all dharmas are without self-nature. Listen, Attaining-the-Ultimate, with the hidden intention of the non-self-nature-ness of characteristics I declare that all dharmas are neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent and nirvanic by nature. Why? If dharmas do not have self-characteristics, they are not arisen; if they are not arisen, they are not ceased; if they are neither arisen nor ceased, they are originally quiescent; if they are originally quiescent, they are nirvanic by nature, because there is nothing left to pass into nirvana. Therefore, with the hidden intention of the non-self-nature-ness of characteristics I declare that all dharmas are neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent, and already nirvanic by nature. (694.b.14)

9. Son of Good Family, also with the hidden intention of ultimate non-self-nature-ness manifested by non-self-ness of dharmas I declare that all dharmas are neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent and already nirvanic by nature. Why? Because ultimate non-self-nature-ness, which is manifested by the non-self-ness of dharmas, refers to the dharmas which permanently and eternally reside in <u>dharmatā</u>, unconditioned and completely disassociated from defilements. If dharmas are permanently and eternally abiding in <u>dharmatā</u>, they are unconditioned; if they are unconditioned, they are neither arisen nor ceased; if they are completely

disassociated from defilements, they are originally quiescent and nirvanic by nature. Therefore, with this hidden intention of ultimate non-self-nature-ness manifested by the non-self-ness of dharmas I declare that all dharmas are neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent and already in nirvanic by nature.34 (694.b.24)

10. Furthermore, Attaining-the-Ultimate, I establish the threefold non-self-nature-ness not because sentient beings in the sentient realm take the fabricated self-nature to be "self-nature", nor because they take the other-dependent self-nature and the perfected self-nature as "self-nature", but because they superimpose (āropya) the fabricated self-nature onto the other-dependent self-nature and the perfected self-nature. Based on the characteristics of the [psycho-linguistically] fabricated self-nature, sentient beings bring forth language (vyavahāra) within the other-dependent self-nature and the perfected self-nature. Language then proliferates. Due to the mind perfumed by language (vyavahāraprajñaptyāparivāsitacitta), comprehension accompanied by language (vyavahāraprajñaptyanubodha) and the dormant proclivity accompanied by language (vyavahāra-prajñaptyanuśaya), one attaches the characteristics of [psycho-linguistically] fabricated self-nature to the other-dependent self-nature and the perfected self-nature. Since attachment proliferates, one attaches the fabricated self-

34 Cf. Thurman, ibid. pp.199-200.

nature to the other-dependent self-nature and the perfected self-nature prolifically. For this reason, the other-dependent self-nature arises in the next life. Also for this reason, [sentient beings] are either defiled by the impurity of defilement, the impurity of karma, or the impurity of birth. They are thus restlessly evolving in the cycle of life-and-death for a long time. They are suffering either in the worlds of hell, animals, ghosts, heavenly beings, asura, or human beings. (694.c.13)

11. Furthermore, Attaining-the-Ultimate, I expound the teaching of the non-self-nature-ness of arising for those who have never grown the root of goodness, those who have never purified the coverings, those who have never matured "continuity" (saṃtāna)35, those who have never cultivated zealous learning (adhimukti)36 and those who have never accumulated the two kinds of equipment, i.e., merit and wisdom. When they have heard my teaching, they will be able to understand, each according to his dispositions, that all conditioned existents which originate dependently are impermanent and changeable; therefore those existents are unstable and subject to destruction. They may be afraid and

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35 Saṃtāna in this context means "to sustain", or "to keep something going continuously". That is, the efforts of growing the root of goodness should be sustained. For other meanings of saṃtāna, cf. Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 555.

36 Edgerton, pp. 13-14: adhimukta, "zealous about, actively interested in or devoted to"; adhimukti, "strong inclination, attachment; earnest, zealous application".

disgusted with all conditioned existents. If they therefore become afraid and disgusted with all conditioned existents, they may be prevented from wrongdoing. Since they do not commit wrongdoing, assiduously cultivate good dharmas, and practice good dharmas, those who have not grown the root of goodness now can grow it; those who have not purified the coverings now can purify them; those who have not matured "continuity" now can mature it. They then assiduously cultivate zealous learning and accumulate the two kinds of equipment, i.e., merit and wisdom. (694.c.24)

12. Even though they have grown the root of goodness, and have accumulated the two kinds of equiment, i.e., merit and wisdom, and so on, if they have not truly understood the non-self-nature-ness of characteristics and two kinds of ultimate non-self-nature-ness within the non-self-nature-ness of arising, they will not be able to correctly dislike, correctly detach themselves from, and correctly liberate themselves from all conditioned existents, and completely liberate themselves from the impurity of defilement, the impurity of karma and the impurity of birth. For this reason, the Tathāgata also teaches them another essentials of the Dharma, i.e., the non-self-nature-ness of characteristics and the ultimate non-self-nature-ness, in order to make them correctly dislike, correctly detach from, correctly liberate themselves from all conditioned existents, and transcend all impurity of defilement,

impurity of karma and impurity of birth. (695.a.5)

13. After they have heard those teachings, they are able to correctly understand the non-self-nature-ness of characteristics and ultimate non-self-nature-ness within the non-self-nature-ness of arising. Having investigated, meditated upon and truly penetrated [the meaning of non-self-nature-ness], they are then able to not attach (abhiniveśa) to the characteristics of the psycho-linguistically fabricated self-nature within the other-dependent self-nature. Due to wisdom which is not perfumed by language, the wisdom in which comprehension is not accompanied by language, and the wisdom in which the dormant proclivity is not accompanied by language, they are able to cease other-dependent characteristics. Being supported by the power of wisdom in their present existence[37], they are also able to permanently destroy the cause of rebirth. For the same reason, they are able to correctly dislike, correctly detach from, correctly liberate themselves from all conditioned existents, and to completely liberate themselves from impurity of defilement, impurity of karma and impurity of birth.

(695.a.13)

14. Furthermore, Attaining-the-Ultimate, those sentient beings who belong to the lineage of the Vehicle of Disciples

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37 Yüan-t'se interprets hsien-fa (the present existence) as hsien-shen (the present body), i.e., the very existence of the practitioner. (15.6.b)

also attain the Peaceful Nirvana of the Supreme Way through this path. Those sentient beings who belong to the lineage of the Vehicle of Solitary Buddhas and those sentient beings who belong to the lineage of the Vehicle of the Tathāgata also attain the Peaceful Nirvana of the Supreme Way through this path. All Disciples, Solitary Buddhas and Bodhisattvas share the same profound path of purification, the final path of purification.38 There is no other [path]. Accordingly, I declare with the hidden intention that there is one Vehicle only. This does not mean that within the worlds of sentient beings there are no differences among the various lineages of sentient beings, such as the ungifted, the average, and the gifted. (695.a.22)

15. Son of Good Family, those who belong to the lineage of Disciples and are interested in quiescence only, are not able to attain the Supreme Perfect Awakening right at the sitting place, even though they have received skillful instructions from Buddhas. Why? Because they are born into an inferior lineage, always lacking compassion and frightened by suffering. Because they always lack compassion, they avoid benefiting sentient beings; because they are frightened by sufferings, they always flee from

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38 According to Yüan-t'se (15.8.b), there are two interpretations. (1) Because the same path is shared by the three Vehicles, it is thus characterized as "absolutely pure", meaning that there is only path only, no other path at all. In this sense, One Vehicle is understood in terms of One Path. (2) "The profound path of purification" refers to the path, while "absolutely pure" refers to the fruit.

involement in worldly affairs.39 I have never claimed that those who always flee from benefiting sentient beings and those who always flee from involvement in worldly affairs are able to attain the Supreme Perfect Awakening right at the sitting place. Therefore I call them "Disciples interested in quiescence only". (695.b.3)

16. For those who belong to the lineage of Disciples but are converted to Wisdom (bodhi), I also provisionally call them Bodhisattvas. Why? Because they are not only liberated from the coverings of defilement (kleśāvaraṇa), they are also capable of liberating from the covering of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa) when they are enlightened through [the instructions of] Buddhas. They are designated as belonging to the lineage of Disciples simply because in the beginning they only made efforts to liberate themselves from the coverings of defilements for their own benefit. (695.b.8)

17. Therefore, Attaining-the-Ultimate, among sentient beings there are various interpretations of the [Buddha's] eloquent teachings which were presented in the purest mental state (suviśuddhāśaya)40; there are various interpretations

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39 Literally, the phrase fa-ch'i-chu-hsing-so-tso means "that which is brought forth by the conditioned activities". Bodhiruci's rendering is chu-yu-wei-chih-hsing, meaning "the conditioned actions". (T.16.671.c.25-26) Lamotte simply translated it by "l'action". (p. 198)

40 Yüan-t'se, Shu: According to Nāgārjuna, there are two kinds of mental state with regard to teaching dharmas: (1) When the worldings teach dharmas, they are based on inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicāra). (2) When bodhisattvas of the dharmakāya teach dharmas, they are not

of the teachings and disciplines which were eloquently spoken and well established. Son of Good Family, on the basis of the doctrine of the threefold non-self-nature-ness, the Tathāgata implicitly (Ch. yin-min-hsiang) taught with the deep and hidden intention the essentials of the Dharma in the non-definitive (neyārtha) scriptures: "All dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent, and already in nirvanic by nature". (695.b.14)

18. Those sentient beings who have grown the root of high-grade goodness, who have purified the coverings, who have matured "continuity", have cultivated zealous learning and have accumulated the two kinds of equipment, i.e., merit and wisdom, if they learn the teaching in those [non-definitive] scriptures, they will be able to truly understand my discourse which is embedded in the deepest, hidden intention (saṃdhāyavacana); they will be able to have deep faith in and understanding of those [non-definitive] scriptures; they will have correct wisdom to truly understand the meanings [of my teachings]; they will be able to attain the final point very soon because they will practice meditation in accordance with true understanding. Moreover, they will have pure faith in me, recognizing that I am a Tathāgata, an Arhat, and a Samyaksaṃbuddha who is enlightened with regard to all dharmas. (695.b.22)

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based on inquiry and investigation. (16.2.a)

19. For those sentient beings who have grown the root of high-grade goodness, have purified the coverings, have matured "continuity", have cultivated zealous learning, but have not accumulated the two kinds of equipment, i.e., merit and wisdom, and do not cling to self-centered ways of seeing (svadṛṣṭi-parāmarśa) because they are simple-minded and incapable of reasoning and judging, if they learn my teachings, even though they are not able to truly understand my discourse, which contains the deepest, hidden intention, they may instead have pure faith and wish to understand. They will believe that these profound scriptures were spoken by the Buddha, that they are associated with the emptiness, and are difficult to understand, are not susceptible to speculation, nor are they the object-realm of speculation, and are only to be realized by the wise who are critical and meticulous. When they try to understand the meaning of the Scripture, they humble themselves and say: 'The wisdom of Buddhas is the deepest. The dharmatā of dharmas is the deepest. It can be penetrated by Buddhas only, but not by people like us. The Buddhas have set the Right Teaching into motion for zealous sentient beings. Compared to the Buddhas' limitless wisdom-insight (jñāna-darśana), our wisdom-insight is just like a cow's footprint.' Although they pay homage to those scriptures, recite them for other people, make copies, protect them, preserve them, study them, circulate them, worship them sincerely, receive them, chant and review

them41, they are still unable to begin preparatory practice (prayoga) in accordance with [the scripture's] instruction. Therefore, they are unable to understand my discourse which contains the deepest, hidden intention. The efforts of those sentient beings will nevertheless enable them to increase the two kinds of equipment, merit and wisdom. They will also be able to mature the not-yet-matured "continuity". (695.c.12)

20. For those sentient beings who, like those mentioned above, are unable to accumulate the two kinds of equipment, i.e., merit and wisdom, but who are not simple-minded, who are capable of reasoning and judging, and yet firmly abide in a self-centered way of seeing, they do not truly understand my discourse which contains the deepest, hidden intention, even though they have heard such a teaching. Although they have faith in my teaching, they are attached to the literal meaning. They assert that all dharmas are definitely without self-nature, definitely neither arisen nor ceased, definitely originally quiescent, and definitely nirvanic by nature. Therefore, they dogmatically view all dharmas as non-existent (abhāva) and without characteristics (alakṣaṇa). Due to their dogmatic conception of non-existence and without-characteristics, they deny all

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41 These are listed in the "Ten Dharma Practices" (daśa dharma-caryāḥ). See, Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, G. Nagao, p.63; Hsüan-tsang tr., T.31.474.b.21-27; Stefan Anacker, pp.259-260. See also, Yüan-t'se, Shu, 16.9.a-11.a.

characteristics by claiming that they do not exist. They slanderously deny [the existence of] the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics, the other-dependent characteristics and the perfected characteristics of all dharmas. Why? The psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics can be designated due to the existence of other-dependent characteristics and perfected characteristics. If they regard both other-dependent characteristics and perfected characteristics as non-existent, they slanderously deny the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics. Thus they are accused of slander for denying the three characteristics.

Although they take my Teaching as the Teaching, they take the incorrect meaning (anartha) as the meaning (artha). Consequently, they hold the correct Teaching as the correct Teaching, but hold incorrect meaning as correct meaning. Though they increase in merit due to their faith in the Teaching, they lose wisdom due to their attachment to the incorrect meaning. Because they lose wisdom, they also lose innumerable good dharmas. (696.a.2)

21. Furthermore, if some sentient beings hear from those who take my Teaching as the Teaching, but an incorrect meaning as the [correct] meaning, and if they accept their ideas, i.e., take my Teaching as Teaching but an incorrect meaning as the [correct] meaning, and attach to my Teaching as the Teaching, but an incorrect meaning as the [correct]

meaning, you should know that for this reason they will lose innumerable good dharmas. (696.a.5)

22. If some sentient beings do not follow their views, but overhear the teaching that 'all dharmas are without self-nature, neither arised nor ceasen, originally quiescent, and nirvanic by nature,' they may become afraid. Because they are afraid, they declare that this is not the Buddha's word, but the devil's word. Due to such a misunderstanding, they slander and heap scorn on the scriptures. For that reason, they will fall into terribly fate and will generate great karmic coverings. Therefore I say, if anyone views all characteristics as non-existent and holds an incorrect meaning to be the [correct] meaning, he is openning a way for great karmic coverings, because he will lead innumerable sentient beings to have great karmic coverings. (696.a.13)

23. Son of Good Family, for those sentient beings who have not grown the root of goodness, who have not purified the coverings, who have not matured 'continuity', have not cultivated the zeal of learning, have not accumulated the two kinds of equipment, i.e., merit and wisdom, but are not simple-minded, are capable of reasoning and judging, but nevertheless firmly abide in self-centered ways of seeing, even if they have learned my teaching, they will still be unable to truly understand my discourse which contains the deepest, hidden intention; they will also lack any faith-understanding in my [non-definitve] teaching; they will

consider the correct teaching to be an incorrect teaching, and the correct meaning to be incorrect meaning; they will hold the correct teaching as an incorrect teaching, and the correct meaning as an incorrect meaning. They then will claim that 'this is not the Buddha's word, but the devil's word.' Whenever they have such misconceptions, they slander and heap scorn on this scripture, and condemn it as apocryphal. They then will do whatever they can do to ruin this scripture and consider as their enemy those who have faith in this scripture. Having been covered by karmic coverings from the past, they continue to cover themselves with such karmic coverings. Since they easily produce such karmic coverings, they will not be saved for millions of _kalpa_ time-periods.

Son of Good Family, now we know that sentient beings have various understandings and interpretations of my eloquent teachings that were presented through the purest mental state; they have various understandings and interpretations of my dharmas and disciplines which were eloquently spoken and established. (696.a.29)

24. At that moment, the World-Honored One composed the following verses to reiterate the above teaching:

All dharmas are without nature,
Neither arisen, nor ceased, originally quiescent.
All dharmas are always nirvanic by nature.
Who has wise discourse without the hidden intention?

The non-self-nature-ness of characteristics, arising,
and the ultimate
Those I have explained here.
If someone does not understand the Buddha's hidden
intention,
He will lose the Right Path and go nowhere.
Anyone who purifies himself through the Paths of
Purification
Should rely on this [teaching], but not others.
One Vehicle is thus established, but not because
sentient beings lack different dispositions.
The innumerable beings in the sentient realm
Deliver themselves only towards nirvana.
The Great Compassion attains nirvana resolutely,[42]
But no sentient being is abandoned. How remarkable!
How profound and unthinkable the Undefiled Realm
In which liberation is one and only one.
All tasks are accomplished, defilement and suffering
are cut off;
This can be described in a different way as permanence
and bliss. (696.b.11)

25. At that moment, Bodhisattva Attaining-the-Ultimate spoke to the Buddha again: "World-Honored One, the Buddha-Tathāgatas' discourses with their hidden intention are so unusual, exceptional, profound, remarkably profound, deep,

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42 "The Great Compassion" refers to the bodhisattva.

remarkably deep, inconceivable, remarkably inconceivable! According to what I have understood, the meaning of the World-Honored One's discourse is that the marks of conditioned existence, which are the basis of psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics, and the object-realm of discrimination (vikalpa-gocara), are designated [1] 'the form aggregate' (rūpaskandha) with its self-nature-characteristic (svabhāva-lakṣaṇa) and differentiation-characteristic (viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa); [2] 'the arising of the form aggregate'; [3] 'the cessation of the form aggregate'; and [4] 'the elimation and the complete knowledge of the form aggregate'; each with its respective self-nature-characteristics and differentiation-characteristics; those designations refer to the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics. According to this account, the World-Honored One then designates this as the non-self-nature-ness of characteristics of dharmas.

"Other-dependent characteristics" refers to the marks of conditioned existence which are the basis of psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics and the object-realm of discrimination. According to this account, the World-Honored One designates this as the non-self-nature-ness of the arising of dharmas plus one aspect of the ultimate non-self-nature-ness.

According to what I have understood, the meaning of the World-Honored One's discourse is that the psycho-

linguistically fabricated characteristics are not [truly] established in the marks of conditioned existence, which are the basis for psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics and the object-realm of discrimination. The non-self-nature-ness of the self-nature [of fabricated characteristics] itself [is the same as] the Suchness of the non-self-ness of dharmas and the purified object-realm, and therefore this is what is referred to as the perfected characteristic. For this reason, the World-Honored One designates this as the other aspect of ultimate non-self-nature-ness.

Just as to the form aggregate, the same exposition also applies to the rest of the aggregates; just as to the Aggregates, the same exposition applies to each of Twelve Sense-Fields, to each link in the chain of Twelve Links, to each of the Four Foods, to each of the Six Realms and Eighteen Realms. (696.c.2)

26. According to what I have understood, the meaning of the World-Honored One's discourse is that, as the basis of the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics and the object-realm of discrimination, the marks of conditioned existence are designated [1] 'the truth of suffering' and [2] 'the complete knowledge of the truth of suffering' and [its] self-nature-characteristics and differentiation-characteristics; those designations refer to the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics. According to this

account, the World-Honored One then designates this as the non-self-nature-ness of the characteristics of dharmas.

'Other-dependent characteristics' refers to the marks of conditioned existence which are the basis of the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics and the object-realm of discrimination. For this reason, the World-Honored One designates this as the non-self-nature-ness of the arising of dharmas and one aspect of ultimate non-self-nature-ness.

According to what I have understood, the meaning of the World-Honored One's discourse is that the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics are not established in the marks of conditioned existence, which are the basis for the fabricated characteristics and the object-realm of discrimination. The non-self-nature-ness of the self-nature [of fabricated characteristics itself] [is the same as] the Suchness of the non-self-ness of dharmas and the purified object-realm, and therefore this is what is referred to as the perfected characteristic. For this reason, the World-Honored One designates this as the other aspect of ultimate non-self-nature-ness.

Just as to the Truth of Suffering, the same exposition also applies to the rest of the Truths; just as to the Noble Truths, the same exposition also applies to each of the Fields of Mindfulness, the Right Eliminations, the Bases of Wonder-Working Powers, the Controlling Principles, the

Powers, the Factors of Enlightenment and the Eightfold Path. (696.c.16)

27. According to what I have understood, the meaning of the World-Honored One's discourse is that, as the basis of psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics and the object-realm of discrimination, the marks of conditioned existence are designated as 'perfect concentration', its 'illness' and 'antidote', 'that which gives rise to perfect cultivation which has not yet started', 'that which can maintain perfect concentration', 'that which can reinforce and refine perfect concentration', along with their respective self-nature-characteristics and differentiation-characteristics. Those designations refer to the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics. According to this account, the World-Honored One then designates those as the non-self-nature-ness of characteristics of dharmas.

"Other-dependent characteristics" refers to the marks of conditioned existence which are the basis of the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics and the object-realm of discrimination. For this reason, the World-Honored One designates those as the non-self-nature-ness of the arising of dharmas plus one aspect of ultimate non-self-nature-ness.

According to what I have understood, the meaning of the World-Honored One's discourse is that the psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics are not

established in the marks of conditioned existence, which are the basis for psycho-linguistically fabricated characteristics and the object-realm of discrimination. The non-self-nature-ness of the self-nature [of the fabricated characteristics itself] [is the same as] the Suchness of the non-self-ness of dharmas and the purified object-realm, and therefore this is referred to as the perfected characteristic. For this reason, the World-Honored One designates those as the other aspect of the ultimate non-self-nature-ness. (696.c.28)

28. World-Honored One, just like the viśva medicine which should be properly applied for any prescription of ordinary medicine or wonder medicine, World-Honored One, the definitive teaching of non-self-nature-ness, namely, 'all dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent and nirvanic by nature,' should be properly applied to all the non-definitive scriptures.

World-Honored One, just as color, whether blue, yellow, red, or white, having the same 'flavor' in all paintings, is used to highlight [the subject of] a painting, World-Honored One, the definitive teaching of non-self-nature-ness, namely, 'all dharmas are without self-nature...and nirvanic by nature,' which has the same flavor in all the non-definitive scriptures, is used to highlight the non-definitive meaning in those scriptures.

World-Honored One, just as cheese is used to enhance

the flavor of all kinds of cooked foods and cakes, World-Honored One, the definitive teaching of the non-self-natureness, namely, 'all dharmas are without self-nature...and nirvanic by nature,' is inserted into the non-definitive scriptures in order to create great joy.

World-Honored One, just as empty space pervades everywhere with the same flavor and does not obstruct anything, World-Honored One, the definitive teaching of non-self-nature-ness, namely, "all dharmas are without self-nature...and nirvanic by nature", pervades all non-definitive scriptures, and its one flavor does not obstruct the tasks of any in the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna or Mahāyāna." Thus he spoke. (697.a.17)

29. At that time, the World-Honored One applauded Bodhisattva Attaining-the-Ultimate: "Well, well, Son of Good Family, now you perfectly understand the Tathāgata's most profound discourse in which is embedded my hidden intention. You also have profoundly elucidated its meaning by analogies, such as <u>viśva</u> medicine, the background color of painting, cheese, and space. As such, Attaining-the-Ultimate, there is no other interpretation; as such, you should receive it." (697.a.22)

30. At that moment, Bodhisattva Attaining-the-Ultimate spoke to the Buddha again: "In the Deer Park at Ṛṣivadana in Vārāṇasī, the World-Honored One turned the dharma-wheel for the first time, teaching the Four Noble Truths for the

followers of the Śrāvaka Vehicle. This turning of the wheel was marvelous and wonderful, such as had never before been turned in the world by gods or men. Nevertheless, this first turning of the dharma-wheel was surpassable, non-definitive, and subject to criticism. Then the World-Honored One turned the dharma-wheel again for the Mahāyāna followers in an implicit way, teaching that all dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent, and nirvanic by nature. This second turning of the dharma-wheel was more marvelous and wonderful. Nevertheless, it was still surpassable, non-definitive, and subject to criticism. Now, the World-Honored One has turned the dharma-wheel for the third time in an explicit way for the sake of the followers of all vehicles, presenting the teaching of non-self-natureness, that all dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent, and nirvanic by nature. This third turning of the dharma-wheel is absolutely marvelous and wonderful. It is unsurpassable, truly definitive, not subject to criticism. (697.b.9)

31. World-Honored One, if Sons of Good Family or Daughters of Good Family hear the Tathāgata's most profound, definitive discourse, which is based on [the teaching that] 'all dharmas are without self-nature, neither arisen nor ceased, originally quiescent, nirvanic by nature', they, too, will have faith in it, make copies from it, protect it, worship it, circulate it, chant it, meditate on it and

correctly reflect on it, and then also practice on the basis of its instruction, how much bliss will they produce?" Thus he spoke. (697.b.14)

32. At that time, the World-Honored One replied to Bodhisattva Attaining-the-Ultimate: "Attaining-the-Ultimate, those Sons of Good Family or Daughters of Good Family will produce more bliss than words can express. Here I try to describe it for you. It is like the dust in one's fingernail in comparison with the whole earth, which is as little as one compared to a hundred, one compared to a thousand, one compared to ten thousand, as little as one compared to whatever one can calculate, divide, count, and suggest by analogy, and as little as one compared to infinite numbers. It is also like the water in a cow's footprint compared to the four oceans, which is as little as one compared to a hundred...one compared to infinite numbers. Similarly, compared to the merits that result from hearing, believing...and practicing this definitive scripture, the merits that result from hearing, believing...and practicing the non-definitive scriptures are as little as one compared to a hundred...one compared to infinite numbers." Thus he spoke. (697.b.36)

33. At that time, Bodhisattva Attaining-the-Ultimate asked the Buddha again: "What should we call this teaching in the Dharma-Gate that Discloses the Concealed Meaning (Saṃdhinirmocana-dharmaparyāya)? How should I receive and

practice it?" The Buddha replied to Bodhisattva Attaining-the-Ultimate: "Son of Good Family, this teaching is called the ultimately definitive teaching that you should receive and practice."

In the assembly where this ultimately definitive teaching was presented, there were 600,000 sentient beings who initiated the Mind of Supreme Perfect Enlightenment, 300,000 Disciples who were detached from dust and dirt and attained the Pure Dharma-Eye in all dharmas, 150,000 Disciples who cut off all defilements and were liberated from their minds, 75,000 Bodhisattvas who attained the Recognition of Unborn-ness (anutpattikadharma-kṣānti).

VIII

1. At that time, Bodhisattva Maitreya spoke to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, when a bodhisattva practices calming (śamatha) and discerning (vipaśyanā) in the Mahayanic way, what does he rely upon and in what does he reside?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family! You should know that when a bodhisattva practices calming and discerning in the Mahayanic way, he relies on the [Buddha's] provisional teaching (dharma-prajñapti-vyavasthāpana) and resides in the devotional will to attain the Supreme Wisdom of Enlightenment." (697.c.18)

2. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "The World-Honored One mentioned four kinds of [meditational] objects (ālambana-vastu): (1) the image with discrimination (savikalpa-pratibimba), (2) the image with non-discrimation (nirvikalpa-pratibimba), (3) the limits of states of affairs (vastuparyantatā), and (4) the accomplishment of the task (kārya-pariniṣpatti).43 Among the four kinds of objects, what is the object of calming? What is the object of discerning? And also what are the objects of the synchronical practice of calming and discerning?"

The Buddha replied to Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, the image with non-discrimination is the object

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43 For the Sanskrit origins of these four terms, see Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript, p. 86.

of calming. The image with discrimation is the object of discerning. The limits of states of affairs and the accomplishment of the task are the objects of the synchronical practice of calming and discerning." (697.c.27)

3. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, how does a bodhisattva achieve calming and master discerning in dependence on those four meditational objects of calming and discerning?"

The Buddha replied to Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, I have taught provisional teachings to the bodhisattvas, i.e., prose discourses (sūtra), verses (geya), the testimony of Buddha's disciples (vyākaraṇa), independent verses (gāthā), teaching unsolicited by disciples (udāna), historical narratives (nidāna), allegories (avadāna), the past lives of the Buddha's disciples (itivṛttaka), the past lives of the Buddha (jātaka), the expanded teachings (vaipulya), miraculous tales (adbhuta-dharma) and discussions of doctrine (upadeśa). Bodhisattvas should listen and understand these teachings correctly. [The Buddha's] words should be well understood. The meaning should be well pondered. The insight should be well penetrated.

After a bodhisattva has skillfully learned the Buddha's teachings, he should reside in solitude and meditate on them. He should maintain his meditative state of mind [without disturbance]. By practicing the preceding

correctly, his mind will become serenely fixed, and he will experience lightness and calmness of body (kāya-praśrabdhi) and lightness and calmness of mind (citta-praśrabdhi), which are called 'calming'. By following this procedure a bodhisattva can achieve calming. (698.a.8)

4. Once he has attained lightness and calmness of body-and-mind, a bodhisattva goes on to investigate and zealously study the 'images as the object-realm of inner concentration' (adhyātma-samādhi-gocara-pratibimba) in accordance to the teachings he has skillfully investigated. He then cut off and detach from the marks of mind (citta-ākāra).44 A bodhisattva is then able to critically, very critically investigate and comprehensively examine the cognized objects (jñeya-artha) which are the images in concentration. That is called "discerning", [which is also characterized] as recognition (kṣānti), delight (kāma), wisdom (nitīraṇa), insight (darśana), and contemplation (avabodha). By following this procedure a bodhisattva is thus able to properly practice discerning."45 (698.a.14)

5. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, if bodhisattvas take mind as the object [of reflection] and reflect on mind internally, and yet they do

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44 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 16.19.b: "The mark of mind (citta-ākāra) as the object of calming is cut off in order to practice discerning. As to 'the mark of mind', mind itself is the mark."

45 A similar passage is found in Śrāvakabhūmi, T.30.451.b.13-23; also cf. Alex Wayman, Manuscript, p. 110.

not attain lightness and calmness of body-and-mind, what sort of intensive thinking (manasikāra) is this?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, it is not the intensive thinking in calming, but rather the intensive thinking still associated with zealous learning in the course of calming."

"World-Honored One! If bodhisattvas can intensively think about images as objects of inner concentration which they derive by examining the teachings, and yet they still do not acquire lightness and calmness of body-and-mind, what sort of intensive thinking is this?"

"Son of Good Family! It is not the intensive thinking of discerning, but rather the intensive thinking still associated with zealous learning in the course of discerning." (698.a.22)

6. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, is the path of calming identical to or different from the path of discerning?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family! They are neither identical nor different. Why are they not different? As to the object-realm of discerning, mind is the object [of discerning]. Why are they not identical? Because the image with discrimination is not the object [of calming]." (698.a.27)

7. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, are images as objects of discerning in the

state of concentration identical to or different from the mind?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, there is no difference. Why? Because those images are only noetic perceptions (vijñapti). Son of Good Family, I say, the object (ālambana) of consciousness (vijñāna) is nothing but what is manifested by noetic perception (vijñapti)."46

"World-Honored One, if [the discerned] images are not different from mind, how can a mind be seen by the same mind?"

"Son of Good Family, in this case there is nothing which is able to see anything. However, while the mind is arising, there the images manifest. Son of Good Family, for instance, when a thing (rūpa) is taken as an object, the same thing is seen as a reflection in a clean mirror. Similarly [people] say that now 'I' am seen in the reflection. They also assume that the manifested images exist in separation from that thing. Hence, while mind is arising, there manifests something which is [assumed] to be separate from the images arised within the state of concentration." (698.b.9)

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46 Here I follow Hsüan-tsang's version. Another reading suggested by the Tibetan translation, which is slightly different from Hsüan-tsang's reading, can be rendered as such: "Vijñāna refers to the object which is manifested (prabhāsate) by vijñapti." Cf. Nozawa (1957), p. 204; Nagasawa (1978), p. 383; M. Takemura (1976), pp. 78-79; Alex Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians", p. 68.

8. "World-Honored One, for sentient beings who abide in self-nature and take mental images, such as form (*rūpa*), etc., as objects, are these [images] also not different from mind?"

"Son of Good Family, there is no difference. However, due to perverse understanding those ordinary people are unable to truly understand that those images are nothing but 'noetic perception only'. Hence their misconception."47 (698.b.13)

9. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One! When can it be said that a bodhisattva practices discerning only?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, a bodhisattva practices discerning only when he constantly maintains intensive thinking on the marks of mind (*citta-nimitta*)."

"World-Honored One, when can it be said that a bodhisattva practices calming only?"

"Son of Good Family, it can be said only when he constantly maintains intensive thinking on the uninterrupted mind (*ānantarya-citta*)."

"World-Honored One, what can it be said that a bodhisattva practices simultaneous operation of calming and discerning?"

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47 This passage is quoted in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* II.7. See T.31.138.b; Lamotte, *La Somme*, Tome II, pp. 93-95.

"Son of Good Family! It can be said so only when he is correctly thinking with the one-pointedness of mind (cittaikāgratā)."48

"World-Honored One, what are the marks of mind?"

"Son of Good Family, the marks of mind refer to the images with discrimination in the state of concentration, which are the objects of discerning."

"World-Honored One! What is the uninterrupted mind?"

"Son of Good Family! It is the mind which takes images as objects, and which is the object of calming."

"World-Honored One! What is one-pointedness of mind"?

"Son of Good Family, it refers to truly understanding the fact that images in the state of concentration are nothing but noetic perceptions (vijñaptimātra). Having truly understood this, one then contemplates Suchness (tathatā)." (698.b.24)

10. Bodhisattva Maitreya asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One! How many kinds of discerning are there?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, briefly, there are three kinds of discerning: (1) discerning of the mark (nimitta), (2) discerning through search (paryeṣaṇā), and (3) discerning through scrutinizing (pratyavekṣaṇā).

What is discerning of the mark? It is the discerning

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48 The "one-pointedness of mind" refers to the object-realm of the simultaneous operation of calming and discerning.

which purely reflects on images with discrimination in the state of concentration.

What is discerning through search? It refers to the discerning that through wisdom (prajñā) one intensively contemplates those dharmas which have not yet been perfectly understood.

What is discerning through scrutinizing? It refers to the discerning that through wisdom one intensively contemplates in order to perfectly attain final liberation [that occurs] when dharmas have been perfectly understood."49 (698.c.4)

11. Bodhisattva Maitreya asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One! How many kinds of calming are there?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, there are three kinds of calming associated with the uninterrupted mind.50

There are also eight kinds of calming which correspond to the first meditation (dhyāna), [the second meditation, the third meditation, the fourth meditation, the base of boundless space, the base of boundless consciousness, the base of nothingness], and the base of neither perception nor non-perception.

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49 Cf. Śrāvakabhūmi, T.30.451.b; Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript, pp. 110-111.

50 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 20.15.a: Since there are three kinds of discerning associated with the marks of mind, there are three kinds of calming-mind associated with the uninterrupted mind.

There are also four kinds of calming which correspond to the four infinite virtues, that is, benevolence, compassion, joy, and impartiality." (698.c.10)

12. Bodhisattva Maitreya asked the Buddha again: "World-Honored One, there are the teaching-based (dharmāśrita) calming-discerning and the non-teaching-based (dharmānāśrita) calming-discerning. What is the teaching-based calming-discerning? What is the non-teaching-based calming-discerning?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, a bodhisattva attains calming-discerning when he understands the meaning of the teaching that he himself has studied and contemplated. This is called 'teaching-based calming-discerning'. As for a bodhisattva who attains calming-discerning not because he understands the meaning of the teaching that he himself has learned and contemplated, but because he understands the meaning of teachings by way of instruction and advice he receives from others-- such as 'contemplating a blue corpse, a rotten corpse, etc.,' 'all conditioned existents are impermanent', 'all conditioned existents are suffering', 'all existents are non-self', or 'nirvana is ultimately quiescent', etc.-- this sort of calming-discerning is called 'non-teaching based discerning'.

I expediently designate as teaching-following bodhisattvas (dharmānusārin), those who are gifted, who have

attained calming-discerning by abiding in the teaching. I also expediently designate as faith-following bodhisattvas (śraddhānusārin), those who are nongifted, who have attained calming-discerning not by abiding in the teaching."

(698.c.25)

13. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One! You have mentioned calming-discerning that takes particular teachings as its object (amiśradharmālambaka). You also mentioned calming-discerning that takes mingled teachings as its object (miśradharmālambaka). What is called 'calming-discerning that takes particular teaching as its object'? What is called 'calming-discerning that takes mingled teaching as its object'"?

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family! If bodhisattvas meditate upon a particular teaching, e.g., a sūtra, and then practice calming-discerning in accordance with the [particular] teaching that they have studied and contemplated, this is called 'calming-discerning that takes a particular teaching as its object'. If bodhisattvas intensively contemplate all the teachings of the sūtra, etc., which they take as a bundle, a collection, a unit, and an accretion, [and they contemplate that] those teachings incline toward Suchness, are headed for Suchness, lead to Suchness, incline toward wisdom, nirvāṇa, transformation (āśrayaparāvṛtti), are headed for [wisdom,

nirvana, transformation], lead to [wisdom, nirvana, transformation]; and they also contemplate that those teachings expound numerous good dharmas, this sort of contemplation and practice of calming-discerning is called 'calming-discerning that takes mingled teachings as its object'." (699.a.8)

14. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, you have mentioned calming-discerning that takes petty mingled teaching as its object, calming-discerning that takes grand mingled teachings as its object, and calming-discerning that takes innumerable mingled teachings as its object. What is calming-discerning that takes petty mingled teachings as its object? What is calming-discerning that takes grand mingled teachings as its object? And what is calming-discerning that takes innumerable mingled teachings as its object?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, if individual sūtras and śāstras have been taken as a unit to be the object of intensive thinking, it is called 'calming-discerning that takes petty mingled teachings as its object'. If one intensively contemplates on all the sutras, etc., not individual ones, which have been learned and contemplated, this is called 'calming-discerning that takes grand mingled teachings as its object'. If the Tathāgata's innumerable teachings, innumerable words and sentences, and the innumerable [teachings] which are

illuminated by the various kinds of wisdom, -- and not just those that one has learned and contemplated, -- have been taken in toto as the object of intensive thinking, this is called 'calming-discerning that takes innumerable mingled teachings as its object'." (699.a.22)

15. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, how does a bodhisattva become qualified to attain the [ultimate] goal (adhigama) by taking mingled teachings as the object of calming-discerning?"

The Buddha answered the Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, the following five conditions qualify a bodhisattva to attain the goal: (1) during contemplation, the basis (āśraya) of all gross wickedness (dauṣṭhulya) has been dissolved moment by moment; (2) by detaching all sorts of idea and thereby attaining the joy of the dharma[-garden]; (3) comprehending the infinite brightness of dharmas, which is characterized by non-discrimination; (4) the pure non-discriminated characteristics associated with the accomplishment of the task have been constantly presented; (5) the profound cause leading to final victory has been attained in order to perfectly accomplish the dharma-body (dharmakāya). (699.a.29)

16. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, how do we know when a [bodhisattva] has 'completely penetrated' and 'attained' the calming-discerning that takes mingled teachings as its object?"

The Buddha answered Boddhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, 'complete penetration' is reached at the First Stage, i.e., the Truly Joyful (pramuditā) Stage. 'Attainment' is reached at the Third Stage, i.e., the Shining (prabhākarī) Stage. Son of Good Family, during the course of practice beginner bodhisattvas work on intensive thinking through learning (anuśikṣā). They should not be lazy or drop out of [the course] even though their efforts have not yet reached satisfaction." (699.b.6)

17. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, what kind of calming-discerning is called 'concentration attended by inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicāra)'? What kind of calming-discerning is called 'concentration not attended by inquiry but by investigation only'? What kind of calming-discerning is characterized as 'concentration not attended by inquiry or investigation'?

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, if during calming-discerning one perceives and examines the coarse marks of dharmas (dharma-nimitta) that were grasped as the objects of inquiry and investigation, this is called 'concentration attended by inquiry and investigation'. If during calming-discerning one perceives and examines the subtle, illuminating thought, rather than their coarse forms, of the marks of dharmas, this is called 'concentration not attended by inquiry but by investigation

only'.51 If during calming-discerning one does not intensively think, perceive or examine all marks of dharmas, this is called 'concentration not attended by inquiry or investigation".

Furthermore, Son of Good Family, concentration attended by inquiry and investigation also refers to the calming-discerning of seeking (paryeṣaṇā). Concentration attended by investigation but not by inquiry also refers to the calming-discerning of scrutiny (pratyavekṣaṇā). Concentration without inquiry or investigation also refers to the calming-discerning that takes mingled teachings as its object." (699.b.20)

18. Bodhisattva Maitreya asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, what is the mark of calming (śamatha-nimitta)? What is the mark of up-lifting (pragraha-nimitta)? What is the mark of indifference (upekṣā)?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, when mind is stirred up, or about to be stirred up, one intensively thinks about disgusting [and unpleasant] things with an uninterrupted mind (ānantaryacitta). This is called the mark of of calming. When mind is depressed, or about to be depressed, one intensively thinks about delightful (abhirāma) things with their mental-marks. This

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51 "Illuminating thought" (Ch. kuang-ming neng) is rendered in a Tibetan version as "kyi dran pa tsam" (smṛtimātra) which means "memory only". Cf. Lamotte, pp.96-97; Nozawa, p.251. Also, Edgerton, Dictionary, p.614: smṛti= mindfulness, (full) consciousness or awareness.

is called the mark of up-lifting. When mind is defiled by the two secondary defilments while practicing either calming only, discerning only, or simultaneous operation of calming and discerning, effortlessly intensive thinking (nirābhogamanasikāra) and all kinds of intensive thinking in spontaneous evolution (svarasena pravartate) are called the mark of indifference."52 (699.b.28)

19. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, bodhisattvas, who practice calming-discerning, know teachings (dharma) and [their] meanings (artha). What is 'knowing teachings' (dharma-pratisaṃvedin)? What is 'knowing meanings' (artha-pratisaṃvedin)?"53

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, the following five conditions qualify a bodhisattva to know teachings and [their] meanings: (1) knowing names (nāman), (2) knowing sentences (pada), (3) knowing syllables (vyañjana), (4) knowing 'parts' (pṛthak), and (5) knowing 'the whole' (saṃgrahatas).

What is 'name'? It is the mentally constructed designations (saṃjñāprajñapti) which are used to signify the self-natures established for all pure and defiled dharmas. What is 'sentence'? It is established as the basis

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52 For another translation of this passage, cf. Gadjin M. Nagao, "Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of Upekṣā" (1980), p. 249.

53 Pratisaṃvedin does not merely mean "knowing or recognition", but also "experiencing, perceiving". Cf. Edgerton, Dictionary, p. 371.

for communicating the meanings of purity and defilement through the aggregate of names. What is 'syllable'? It is the phoneme (akṣara) on which those words and sentences rely.54 What is knowing 'parts'?55 It is derived from intensively thinking about each [part]. What is knowing the 'whole'? It is derived from intensively thinking about the total elements. It is called 'knowing dharmas' when all the five conditions are fulfilled. Accordingly bodhisattvas of this sort are declared as 'knowing dharmas'. (699.c.10)

20. Son of Good Family, the following ten conditions qualify a boddisattva to become 'knowing meanings': (1) knowing the totality of existents (yāvadbhāvikatā), (2) knowing the totality of existents as they are (yathāvadbhāvikatā),56 (3) knowing the meaning of "[the

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54 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 22.3.b.-5.a: "Sanskrit nāman is rendered by Chinese ming (name), meaning "going toward", because [the name] always goes toward the signified.... Sanskrit pada is rendered by Chinese chi (trace; footprint). It is like a bird's footprints which represent the bird itself... Sanskrit vyañjana is rendered by Chinese wen. Sanskirt akṣara is rendered by Chinese tzu. The former is standard Sanskrit, while the latter is vernacular Sanskrit...Here according to the Mahayana tradition, [all of word, sentence and phoneme] belong to the aggregate of saṃskāra disassociated from mind (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra). They are provisional, but not real."

55 That is, name, sentence, syllable.

56 The English renderings of yāvadbhāvikatā and yathāvadbhāvikatā vary among Buddhist scholars. Alex Wayman and Janice D. Willis render them as "phenomenon" and "noumenon" respectively. See Analysis, p.86. Calming and Discerning, p. 83. On Knowing Reality, p. 69. In his "A Study of the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa" (pp. 121-122) and his translation of Nagao Gadjin's The Fundamental Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy (p.33), J. Keenan presents another

subject as] the grasper" (grāhakārtha), (4) knowing the meaning of "[the object as] the grasped" (grāhyārtha), (5) knowing the meaning of construction (sthānārtha), (6) knowing the meaning of enjoyment (paribhogārtha).57 (7) knowing the meaning of perversion (viparyāsārtha), (8) knowing the meaning of non-perversion (aviparyāsārtha), (9) knowing the meaning of impurity (saṃkleśārtha), and (10) knowing the meaning of purity (vyavadānārtha).

Son of Good Family, (1) the 'totality of existents' refers to the limits of categories of defiled and pure dharmas, such as the five aggregates, the six internal faculties, the six external faculties, and so on.

(2) 'The totality of existents as they are' refers to all the Suchnesses of both defiled and pure dharmas. There are seven kinds of Suchness:

(a) The Suchness of Evolution (pravṛtti-tathatā), meaning that all conditioned existents (saṃskāra)58 are without [linear] sequentiality.

(b) The Suchness of Characteristics (lakṣaṇa-tathatā), meaning that all dharmas are [characterized by] the non-

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rendering: "the limits of existence" and "the existence just as it is", and "being-to-its-limit" and "being-as-such".

57 See Edergton, Dictionary, p. 328: paribhoga, enjoyment, use, also article of enjoyment.

58 Wolpola Rahula translates saṃskāra by "mental formation". He also points out that "saṃkhāra in other contexts may mean anything conditioned, anything in the world, in which sense all the Five Aggregates are saṃkhāra". See, What the Buddha Taught, p.22. note 2.

self-ness of personality (pudgala-nairātmya) and the non-self-ness of dharmas (dharmanairātmya).

(c) The Suchness of Noetic Perception (vijñapti-tathatā), meaning that all conditioned existents are noetic perceptions only.

(d) The Suchness of Establishment (saṃniveśa-tathatā), which refers to the truth of suffering.

(e) The Suchness of Wrongdoing (mithyāpratipatti-tathatā), which refers to the truth of the cause [of suffering].

(f) The Suchness of Purity (viśuddhi-tathatā), which refers to the truth of cessation [of suffering].

(g) The Suchness of Right Conduct (samyakpratipatti-tathatā), which refers to the truth of the path [of deliverance].

Due to the Suchness of Evolution, the Suchness of Establishment, and the Suchness of Wrongdoing, all sentient beings are equal. Due to the Suchness of Characteristics and the Suchness of Noetic Perception Only, all dharmas are equal. Due to the Suchness of Purity, all the Sravakas' enlightenments (śrāvakabodhi), the Solitary Buddhas' enlightenments (pratyekabuddha-bodhi), and Supreme Enlightenments (anuttarā-samyaksaṃbodhi) are equal. Due to the Suchness of Right Conduct, the wisdoms that result from the excellent calming-discerning involved in learning the Right Teaching and taking it (Right Teaching) as the mingled object [of calming-discerning] are equal.

(3) '[The subject as] the grasper' refers to the five inner material faculties (rūpyayatana), such as mind (citta), mentation (manas), consciousness (vijñāna), and mental associates (caitasikadharma).

(4) '[The object as] the grasped' refers to the six external faculties. Furthermore, 'grasper' has same meaning as 'the grasped'.

(5) 'Construction' refers to world systems (lokadhātu) in which all realms of sentient beings are settled:

(a) Villages, numbering 1, 100, 1,000, 100,000.

(b) Large plains by the seashore, numbering 1, 100, 1,000, 100,000.

(c) Jambudvīpa, numbering 1, 100, 1,000, 100,000.

(d) The four continents, numbering 1, 100, 1,000, 100,000.

(e) The Small Thousand World-Systems (sāhasracūdiko lokadhātu, consisting of 1,000 worlds), numbering 1, 100, 1,000, 100,000.

(f) The Medium Thousand World-Systems (dvisāhasro madhyamo lokadhātu, consisting of 1,000 sāhasracūdiko world-systems), numbering 1, 100, 1,000, 100,000.

(g) The Triple Great Thousand World-Systems (trisāhasramahāsāhasro lokadhātu, consisting of 1,000 dvisāhasro madhyamo lokadhātu), numbering 1, 100, 1,000, 100,000.

(h) The Limit (koṭi, consisting of 100 million

trisāhasramahāsāhasro lokadhātus), numbering 1, 100, 1,000, 100,000.

(i) The Infinity (asaṃkhya), numbering 1, 100, 1,000, 100,000.

(j) The innumerable and unmeasurable worlds in the ten directions are equal, like dust in space, to the innumerable trisāhasramahāsāhasro worlds. (700.a.15)

(6) 'Enjoyment' means that all sentient beings acquire furnishings necessary for the purpose of enjoyment.

(7) 'Perversion' refers to [the fact] that due to conceptual perversion (saṃjñāviparyāsa), mental perversion (cittaviparyāsa) and theoretical/perspective perversion (dṛṣṭiviparyāsa), one takes what is impermanent, such as the grasper, etc., to be permanent. [It also refers to the fact that] due to the those perversions one takes suffering to be pleasure, the impure to be the pure, non-self to be self.

(8) 'Non-perversion' refers to the antidote to the above perversions. One should know the characteristics of non-perversion.

(9) 'Impurity' refers to three kinds of impurity in the Three Realms: (1) the impurity of defilement (kleśasaṃkleśa), (2) the impurity of karma (karmasaṃkleśa), and (3) the impurity of birth (utpādasaṃkleśa).

(10) 'Purity' refers to all the practices toward Enlightenment which can liberate one from the three kinds of impurity.

Son of Good Family, the above ten categories exhaustively cover all meanings. (700.a.24)

21. Further, Son of Good Family, those bodhisattvas are [also] recognized as [those who] 'know meanings' if they are capable of knowing the five meanings. What are the five meanings? (1) the known things in totality (parijñeyavastu), (2) the meaning of the known [things] in totality (parijñeyārtha), (3) the cause of all that is known, (4) the fruition of the known in totality (parijñānaphalalābha), and (5) illumination of [the fruit] (tatprajñāpana).

Son of Good Family, (1) 'the known things in totality' refers to all the objects of knowledge, i.e., all aggregates, internal faculties, and external faculties.

(2) The 'meaning of the known [things] in totality' refers to all the object-realms which should be known, such as, the conventional (saṃvṛti) and the ultimate (paramārtha); merit (guṇa) and fault (doṣa); the condition (pratyaya), the time-period (kāla), the characteristics of birth, duration and destruction, the analogies of illness, etc., suffering and the cause [of suffering]; Suchness, the limit of reality (bhūtakoṭi), and the dharma-realm (dharmadhātu); the comprehensive (saṃgraha) and the brief (vigraha); the direct answer, the distinguishing answer, the returning of the question and the silent answer; the implicit (guhya) and the explicit (vivṛta)59, etc. All those

59 Cf. Unrai Wogihara, Bodhisattvabhūmi, p. 82.

[categories] are called the 'meaning of known [things] in totality'. (700.b.6)

(3) The 'cause of the known in totality' refers to the practices of Enlightenment, i.e., the Fields of Mindfulness, the Right Eliminations, etc., which are able to deal with the above two [i.e., the totality of known things and their meanings]. (700.b.8)

(4) The 'fruition of the known in totality' refers to the disciplines (vinaya) by which greed, hatred and delusion are completely eliminated. It also refers to the Śrāmaṇa Fruits by which all [the seeds] of greed, hatred and delusion are completely eliminated. It also refers to all mundane and supramundane merits that are, as testimony [to spiritual realization], either shared by the Tathāgata and the Sravaka or owned by the Tathagata only.

(5) The 'illumination of fruits' refers to the wisdoms of liberation (vimuktijñāna) [which are attained] in spiritual realization. Based on those wisdoms of liberation one discloses to others [their realization and merits].

Son of Good Family, the above five meanings exhaustively include every kind of meaning. (700.b.13)

22. Furthermore, Son of Good Family. bodhisattvas are recognized as those who know meanings if they are able to know the following four meanings. What are the four? (1) the meaning of 'appropriation of mind' (cittādānārtha), (2) the meaning of 'experiencing' (anubhavārtha), (3) the meaning of

'noetic perception' (vijñaptyārtha), and (4) the meaning of 'purity and impurity'.60 Son of Good Family, the above four meanings exhaustively cover all meanings. (700.b.17)

23. Again, Son of Good Family, bodhisattvas are recognized as those who know meanings if they are able to know three meanings. What are the three? (1) the meaning of 'syllable' (vyañjanārtha), (2) the meaning of 'meaning' (arthārtha), and (3) the meaning of 'realm' (dhātvartha).

Son of Good Family, the meaning of 'syllable' refers to groups of name, etc. The meaning of 'meaning' refers to the following ten kinds: (1) the characteristics of reality (tattvalakṣaṇa), (2) the characteristics of complete knowledge (parijñānalakṣaṇa)61, (3) the characteristics of elimination (prahāṇalakṣaṇa)62, (4) the characteristics of realization (sākṣātkāralakṣaṇa)63, (5) the characteristics of meditation (bhāvanālakṣaṇa)64, (6) the characteristics of the different sub-categories of the above five

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60 Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun: "When the mind begins to investigate meditation objects, there are four things (vastu): (1) the thing which is appropriated by mind, (2) the thing which is experienced by mind, (3) the thing which is made known by mind, and (4) the thing which is purified and defiled by mind." (T.31.488.b) Vastu (thing) in this passage is replaced by artha in the SNS.

61 I.e., the truth of suffering.

62 I.e., the truth of the cause of suffering.

63 I.e., the truth of cessation of the cause of suffering.

64 I.e., the truth of path.

characteristics, (7) the characteristics of the mutual belongingness between the supported (āśrita) and the support (āśraya), (8) the characteristics of coverings (antarāyikadharmalakṣaṇa) of complete knowledge, etc., (9) the characteristics of that which can deal with [the coverings], (10) the characteristics of both faults and merits; faults which result from lacking complete knowledge, etc., and merits which result from complete knowledge, etc.

The meaning of 'realm' refers to five realms: (1) the inanimate realm, (2) the sentient realm, (3) the dharma realm, (4) the realm of those who need to be disciplined, (5) the realm of expedient methods (upāya) of discipline.

Son of Good Family, those five meanings cover all meanings." (700.b.28)

24. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, what is the difference between the [three] ways of knowing meanings through the wisdom established by hearing (śrutamayī prajñā), the wisdom established by reflection (cintāmayī prajñā), and the wisdom established by practicing calming-discerning?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, the wisdom established by hearing is based on words. This wisdom merely accepts the teaching literally, but it does not properly understand the intended meaning (abhisaṃdhi) [of the teaching]. [The meditational image] has not intuitively manifested. But [one who has this wisdom] is

on the right track toward liberation, even though one has not yet been able to experience the accomplishment of liberation.

The wisdom established by reflection is also based on words. This wisdom does not merely follow the teaching literally, but properly understands the intended meaning [of the teaching]. [The meditational image] has not yet manifested. Yet [one who has this wisdom] is getting closer to liberation, even though one has not been able to experience the accomplishment of liberation.

The wisdom established by practice could either be or not be based on words. It could either follow or not follow the teaching literally. However, it touches the intended meaning [of the teaching]. The image as the concordance of the known object which arises in the mental state of concentration (jñeyavastusabhāga-samādhigocarapratibimba) manifests. [This wisdom] is the best approach to liberation. [By it one] is able to experience the accomplishment of liberation.

Son of Good Family, this is the difference between the above three ways of knowing meanings." (700.c.11)

25. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, those bodhisattvas who practice calming-discerning know teachings and meanings. What is knowledge (jñāna)? What is seeing (darśana)?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good

Family, I have declared the distinction between knowledge and seeing in numerous ways. Now I will briefly explain to you the characteristics of knowledge and seeing. Knowledge refers to all kinds of profound wisdom obtained through calming-discerning which takes mingled teachings as the object of meditation. Seeing refers to all kinds of wisdom obtained through calming-discerning which takes particular teacnings as the object of meditation." (700.c.17)

26. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, for those bodhisattvas who practice calming-discerning, how does one eliminate marks (nimitta)? And by what kind of intensive thinking?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "By intensive thinking on Suchness (tathatāmanasikāreṇa) [the bodhisattvas] eliminate marks of teaching and meaning. How can the marks be eliminated? [The marks] are eliminated when the bodhisattvas detach from names and their self-natures, and when they do not contemplate the marks of the basis (āśraya) [of name and its self-nature].65 The same intensive thinking is applied to sentences, syllables, and meanings. By the same token, [the marks] are eliminated when they detach from Realm (dhātu) and the Realm's self-nature (dhātusvabhāva), and when they also do not contemplate the marks of the basis of Realm and its self-nature." (700.c.25)

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65 "The basis of name" refers to consciousness or the other-dependent. See Yüan-t'se, Shu, 24.2.

27. "World-Honored One, can the mark of the known meaning of Suchness (tathatārthapratisaṃvid) be eliminated?"

"Son of Good Family, there is no mark in the known meaning of Suchness, nor is anything obtained. What can be eliminated? Son of Good Family, as I have said, when one understands the meaning of Suchness, one can overcome all marks of teachings and meanings; but this understanding cannot be overcome by anything." (700.29)

28. "World-Honored One, this is explained by the World-Honored One's analogies: one is unable to view one's own image in a pot of dirty water, or in a dirty mirror, or in a whirling spring; it is the opposite of those that reflects. Similarly, if one has not perfectly cultivated one's mind, one unable to truly see all kinds of Suchness; if one has perfectly cultivated one's mind, one can truly see [all kinds of Suchness]. What is the mind which is able to truly see? In accordance with what sort of Suchness is the above statement made?"

"Son of Good Family, three kinds of mind are truly able to see: (1) the mind established by hearing, (2) the mind established by reflection, and (3) the mind established by practice. The above statement is based on the Suchness of noetic perception (vijñaptitathatā)." (701.a.7)

29. "World-Honored One, bodhisattvas, who have knowledge of teaching and meaning, assiduously practice preparatory training in order to eliminate marks. How many kinds of mark

are there which are difficult to be eliminated? How can they be eliminated?"

"Son of Good Family, ten kinds of marks can be eliminated by emptiness. What are these ten kinds of marks? (1) The mark of language, which is caused by knowing teachings and meanings, can be correctly eliminated by the emptiness of all dharmas.

(2) The mark of the sequential evolution of arising, cessation, endurance and change, which is caused by knowing the meaning of the Suchness of Establishment, can be correctly eliminated by the emptiness of characteristics (lakṣaṇaśūnyatā) and the emptiness of non-sequentiality (anavarāgraśūnyata).

(3) The mark of narcissism (satkāyadṛṣṭi) and the mark of self-conceit (asmimāna), which are caused by knowing the meaning of 'grasper', can be correctly eliminated by the emptiness of internality (adhyātmaśūnyatā) and the emptiness of non-attainability (anupalaṃbhaśūnyatā).

(4) The mark of obsession with property (bhogadṛṣṭi), which is caused by knowing the meaning of 'the grasped', can be correctly eliminated by the emptiness of externality (bahirdhāśūnyatā).

(5) The mark of internal pleasure (adhyātmasukha) and the mark of external glamour (bāhyapriyam), which are caused by knowing the meaning of the enjoyment associated with sex and possesions (pariṣkāra), can be correctly eliminated by

the emptiness of internality and externality and the emptiness of essence (prakṛtiśūnyatā).

(6) The mark of infinity, which is caused by knowing the meaning of construction, can be correctly eliminated by the great emptiness (mahāśūnyatā).

(7) The mark of inner quiescence and liberation, which is caused by knowing the meaning of the 'formless' (ārūpa), can be correctly eliminated by the emptiness of conditioned things (saṃskṛtaśūnyatā).

(8) The mark of the non-self-ness of persons, the mark of the non-self-ness of dharmas, the mark of noetic perception only, and marks of the ultimate, which are caused by knowing the meaning of the Suchness of characteristics, can be eliminated by absolute emptiness (atyantaśūnyatā), the emptiness of non-existence (abhāvaśūnyatā), the emptiness of non-existence and self-nature (abhāvasvabhāva-śūnyatā), and ultimate emptiness (paramārtha-śūnyatā).

(9) The mark of the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) and the mark of changelessness (anavakāra), which are caused by knowing the meaning of the Suchness of purity, can be eliminated by the emptiness of the unconditioned (asaṃskṛtaśūnyatā) and the emptiness of changelessness.

(10) The mark of emptiness, which is caused by intensively thinking on [the preceding] emptinesses that one used to eliminate the [preceding] marks, can be eliminated

by the emptiness of emptiness (śūnyatāśūnyatā)."66 (701.a.28)

30. "World-Honored One, what is eliminated, and from what mark is one liberated, when these ten kinds of marks have been eliminated?"

"Son of Good Family, one is liberated from the marks of the bondage of defilement when one has eliminated the marks of the image in the state of concentration; at the same time [the liberating mind, or the contemplating mind] is also eliminated.

Son of Good Family, although a particular kind of emptiness is claimed to deal specifically with a particular mark, this does not mean that a particular emptiness can not deal with all kinds of marks. This is just like the case of ignorance which is not incapable of causing all sorts of defiled dharmas, all the way to old age and death. Ignorance is claimed to be the specific cause of karmic formations, only because it is the most proximate cause of karmic formations." (701.b.6)

31. At that time, Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, what is the characteristic of the most fundamental among [those kinds of] emptiness, such that if bodhisattvas have understood this [fundamental emptiness], they will not damage the characteristics of

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66 For the eighteen kinds of emptiness, or the twenty kinds of emptiness, cf. Edward Conze, tr., The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom, pp.143-148.

emptiness and will detach them from conceit?"

At that moment, the Buddha praised Bodhisattva Maitreya and said: "Very good, Son of Good Family, you are now able to raise a very profound question to the Tathāgata so that bodhisattvas will not damage the characteristics of emptiness. Why? Son of Good Family, if bodhisattvas damage the characteristics of emptiness, they completely damage the Great Vehicle. Therefore, listen carefully, I am going to explain to you the characteristic of fundamental emptiness. Son of Good Family, fundamental emptiness in the Great Vehicle is characterized as completely detaching from all sorts of [psycho-linguistically] fabricated characteristics, both defiled and pure, from other-dependent characteristics and perfected characteristics, and not possessing anything in that."67 (701.b.17)

32. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, how many kinds of supreme concentration can be attained through this calming-discerning?"

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67 Yüan-t'se presents two interpretations: (1) Bhāvaviveka contended that all three natures are empty. The last phrase "and not possessing anything in that" indicates that both the other-dependent and the perfected are empty. The complete non-attainability of the three natures is thus named "the characteristic of fundamental emptiness". (2) Dharmapāla contended that in the three natures only the pyscho-linguistically fabricated characteristic should be eliminated, but not the other two natures, the other-dependent and the perfected. The last phrase, as mentioned, means that the characteristic of fundamental emptiness does not possess any of the previous 10 marks. In his _Shu_ Yüan-t'se recorded a lenthy debate between Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla. See Yüan-t'se, _Shu_, 24.25b-39a.

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, as I said before, there are innumerable kinds of supreme concentration practiced by the innumerable Śrāvakas, Bodhisattvas and Buddhas. All sorts of concentration are obtained through this calming-discerning."

"World-Honored One, what is the cause of this calming-discerning?"

"Son of Good Family, the cause is right understanding accomplished through pure ethical conduct, pure hearing and pure reflection."

"World-Honored One, what are the fruits of this calming-discerning?"

"Son of Good Family, the fruits are perfectly pure conduct, perfectly pure mind and perfectly pure wisdom. Again, Son of Good Family, all mundane and supramundane good dharmas of all Śrāvakas, Buddhas, et el., are the fruits which are obtained through calming-discerning."

"World-Honored One, what kind of karma can be accomplished by calming-discerning?"

"Son of Good Family, calming-discerning liberates two bondages, i.e., the bondage of marks and the bondage of gross wickedness. This is what can be accomplished by calming-discerning."68 (701.c.1)

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68 The notion of "bondage of marks" has two interpretations: (1) It refers to the noematic pole (hsiang-fen) of duality which, because it is dominated by the outflows (āsrava), dominates the noetic pole (chien-fen). (2) Due to the manas, which is the essence of the bondage of

33. "World-Honored One, among the five kinds of fixation, which are the obstacles to calming? Which are the obstacles to discerning? And which are the obstacles to both? "

"Son of Good Family, (1) narcissism and (2) obsession with body and property (kāya-bhoga-dṛṣṭi) are the obstacles to calming. (3) The incapability to penetrate the sacred teachings is an obstacle to discerning. The obstacles to both are (4) the enjoyment of living together with many people and (5) the complacency. Because of (4), one is not able to practice meditation. Because of (5), one is not able to accomplish one's preparatory training."

"World-Honored One, among the five kinds of covering, which are the obstacles to calming? Which are the obstacles to discerning? Which are obstacles to both?"

"Son of Good Family, restlessness (auddhatya) and regret (kaukṛtya) are the obstacles to calming. Drunkenness (styāna), torpor (middha) and doubt (vicikitsā) are the obstacles to discerning. Greed-desire (kāmacchanda) and malice (vyāpāda) are the obstacles to both."

"World-Honored One, when is one considered to have achieved the perfectly pure path of calming?"

"Son of Good Family, one is considered to have achieved the perfectly pure path of calming when all coverings,

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marks, the other six consciousnesses are enslaved by their perceived objects. The notion of "bondage of gross wickedness" also has two interpretations: (1) a synonym for the "outflow dharmas"; (2) the seeds of the two coverings. See Yüan-t'se, Shu, 25.3.a-b.

including drunkenness and torpor, are correctly eliminated."

"World-Honored One, when is one considered to have achieved the perfectly pure path of discerning?"

"Son of Good Family, one is considered to have achieved the perfectly pure path of discerning when all coverings, including restlessness and regret, are eliminated."

(701.c.14)

34. "World-Honored One, how many kinds of mental distraction (vikṣiptacitta) should bodhisattvas be aware of during the course of practicing calming-discerning?"

"Son of Good Family, they should be aware of five kinds [of mental distraction]: (1) the mental distraction of intensive thinking (manasikāravikṣepa), (2) outward mental distraction (bāhyacittavikṣepa), (3) inward mental distraction (adhyātmacittavikṣepa), (4) the mental distraction of mark (nimittavikṣepa), and (5) the mental distraction of gross wickedness (dauṣṭhulyavikṣepa).

Son of Good Family, if bodhisattvas turn away from Mahāyāna intensive thinking and fall into the Śrāvaka and Pratyakabuddha intensive thinking, it is called 'the mental distraction of intensive thinking'.

If [bodhisattvas] allow their minds to float among all the ideas and secondary defilements which result from the bustling marks of the five kinds of outward appetitive desires and their external object-realms, this is called "outward mental distraction".

If one is defiled by secondary defilements, such as drunkenness, torpor, sinking, addiction to samāpatti, or the secondary defilements associated with any particular samāpatti, it is called 'inward mental distraction'.

'Mental distraction of marks' refers to intensive thinking on the [internal] marks of meditation which are based on external marks.

Due to internal intensive thinking, all kinds of feelings arise; also due to the body of gross wickedness one takes these feelings as 'self' and thus produces self-conceit. This is called 'mental distraction of gross wickedness'." (701.c.28)

35. "World-Honored One, from the first bodhisattva stage to the Tathāgata stage, what obstacles can be overcome by calming and discerning?"

"Son of Good Family, (1) in the first stage, calming-discerning is employed to deal with the following obstacles: the impurity of defilement, the impurity of karma, and the impurity of birth in an evil destiny.

(2) In the second stage, it deals with the obstacle of subtle wrongdoings that committed unintentionally.

(3) In the third stage, it deals with the obstacle of greed.

(4) In the fourth stage, it deals with the obstacle of being addicted to concentration and teachings.

(5) In the fifth stage, it deals with the obstacle of

refuting *saṃsāra* and being devoted to *nirvāṇa* in an one-sided fashion.

(6) In the sixth stage, it deals with the obstacle of the arising of many marks (*nimittabahusamudaya*).

(7) In the seventh stage, it deals with the obstacle of the arising of subtle marks (*sūkṣma-nimitta*).

(8) In the eighth stage, it deals with the obstacles of striving for no-mark (*ānimitta-paryeṣṭi*) and being dominated by marks (*nimitta-nirvaśitva*).

(9) In the nineth stage, it deals with the obstacle of lacking mastery over all kinds of skillful communication.

(10) In the tenth stage, it deals with the obstacle of being incapable of attaining a perfect darma-body.

(11) Son of Good Family, in the Tathagata stage, calming-discerning is employed to deal with the subtlest obstacles of defilement and knowledge (*kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*). By being able to eliminate these two obstacles forever, a bodhisattva attains non-attached, unrestrained comprehensive insight (*jñānadarśana*).69 He thus establishes the purest dharma-body on the basis of the object-realm of the accomplishment of the task."70 (702.a.13)

36. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "How can

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69 "Non-attached", according to Yüan-t'se, refers to the contemplative wisdom of knowing the emptiness of dharma; "un-restrained" refers to the contemplative wisdom of knowing the emptiness of personal identity. (*Shu*, 25.29.a)

70 Cf. *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun*, English translation by Wei Tat, pp.726-747.

a bodhisattva attain Supreme Perfect Enlightenment by unfailingly practicing calming-discerning?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, when a bodhisattva has achieved calming-discerning by following the seven kinds of Suchness, he correctly reflects, with the most concentrated mind, on the nature of Suchness which has been well examined, meditated on and established in the teachings which have been heard and thought about. Because they have correctly reflected on Suchness, [their] mind is able to eliminate the arising of all subtle marks, not to mention coarse marks (sthūlanimitta)71.

Son of Good Family, 'subtle marks' refer to the following:

(1) marks which are appropriated by mind (cittādāna), (2) marks of experience (anubhava), (3) marks of noetic perception (vijñapti), (4) marks of defilement and purity (saṃkleśa-vyavadāna), (5) internal (ādhyātmika) marks, (6) external (bāhya) marks, (7) internal and external marks, (8) marks of the thought that I should practice whatever is beneficial to sentient beings, (9) marks of wisdom, (10) marks of Suchness, (11) marks of suffering, the cause [of suffering], the cessation [of suffering] and the path, (12) marks of the conditioned, (13) marks of the un-conditioned,

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71 "Subtle mark" refers to the mark in the concentrated mental state, while "coarse mark" refers to the mark in the everyday mental state.

(15) marks of permanence, (16) marks of impermanence, (17) marks of suffering which is subject to change, (18) marks of suffering which is not subject to change, (19) marks of the different characteristics in conditioned [things], (20) marks of the identical characteristics in conditioned [things], (21) marks of omniscient knowledge after everything is known, (22) marks of the non-self-ness of the pudgala,72 (23) marks of the non-self-ness of dharmas. The mind is able to abolish the presence of those [marks].

Since they constantly remain in the practice of [correctly contemplating the various Suchnesses], they cultivate their minds by means of overcoming all the fixations, coverings and mental distractions. Subsequently, they inwardly attain the seven kinds of Penetrating Wisdoms (pratyavekṣaṇājñāna) in accordance with seven kinds of Suchness. This is called the 'Path of Insight' (darśanamārga).73

Because of this attainment, they are characterized as bodhisattvas who have attained 'liberation from defilements

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72 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 26.5.b-6.a: Pudgala (Ch. shu-ch'u-ch'u) means "that which goes back and forth repeatedly heading for the various destinies". It is inappropriate simply to render it as "person". In Sanskrit "person" is called puruṣa.

73 Cf. Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun, trans. Wei Tat, pp. 688-691.

through the Sagely Path'74, who are born in the Family of Tathagata, who attain the First Stage, and who are able to enjoy the Supreme Powers of the First Stage.

Because they have obtained calming-discerning, they obtain two kinds of [meditation] objects, i.e., images with discrimination and images with non-discrimination. At that moment, after they have attained the Path of Insight, they also attain the meditational object of the limits of states of affairs. Furthermore, in subsequent stages they practice the Path of Cultivation (bhāvanāmārga) and intensively contemplate three kinds of meditational objects in a way just as a thick wedge is expelled by a thin wedge.75 By

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74 Skt. samyaktva-niyama: Ch. cheng-hsing li-sheng. Yüan-t'se, Shu, 26.8.a-9.a: Cheng-hsing (Skt. samyaktva) means (1) uncontaminated Sagely Path or (2) nirvana. Li means "to detach from, to get rid of". Sheng, literally meaning "originate, give rise to, birth", is interpreted in this context as follows: (1) the defilements give rise to saṃsāra just as raw food gives rise to illness. (2) the not-yet-matured Sagely Path. Li-sheng (Skt. niyama) means that the Path of Insight is able to destroy defilements. Niyama was also rendered in Chinese as chüeh-ting, meaning "definite". Samyaktvaniyama thus means "being detached from the defilements that cause samsara, through the Sagely Path".

75 The analogies of "thin wedge" and "thick wedge" have three interpretations:

(1) thin wedge: the image in samādhi,
thick wedge: self-nature;
(2) thin wedge: the lightness-and-calmess of body-and-mind,
thick wedge: the gross wickedness of body-and-mind.
(3) thin wedge: Sagely Path,
thick wedge: defiled seeds.

For (1) and (2), see Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.669.a.8-11. For (3), see Mahāyānasamgraha, T.31.146.c.18; Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya, T.31.361.c.27-362.a.3; Asvabhāva's Bhāṣya, T.31.427.b.10-15; Lamotte, pp.219-220. Paramārtha's version

ultilizing the method (*upāya*) of wedge-evicted-by-wedge, bodhisattvas erase internal marks and all sorts of defilements associated with those marks. Since the marks are eliminated, gross wickednesses are also eliminated. Since all marks and gross wickedness are cut off completely, in subsequent stages they refine their minds, step by step, in a way similar to the process of metallurgy. In so doing, they finally attain Supreme Perfect Enlightenment, the meditation object of the 'accomplishment of the task'. Son of Good Family, this is the way that bodhisattvas attain Supreme Perfect Wisdom through the correct practice of calming and discerning." (702.b.18)

37. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, what does a bodhisattva practice to initiate great power (*abhinirhāra*)?"76

"Son of Good Family, if a bodhisattva perfectly understands [the following] six points, he is able to initiate all great powers: (1) to perfectly understand the arising of mind (*cittotpāda*), (2) to perfectly understand the abiding of mind (*citta-sthāna*), (3) to perfectly

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of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* explains: "Treatise: It is similar to the *upāya* of expelling a [thick] wedge by a [thin] wedge. Commentary: When people chop firewood, they use the thin wedge first, then the thick wedge. By the same reason, when the Yogācārins are eliminating defilements, they practice the Elementary Path first, then the Intermediary Path, and finally the Advanced Path." T.31.235.b.6-8.

76 *Abhinirhāra* means "production, accomplishment, effectuation, undertaking, realization". See, Edgerton, *Dictionary*, p.52.

understand the emancipation of mind (citta-vyutthāna), (4) to perfectly understand the increase of mind (citta-upacaya), (5) to perfectly understand the decrease of mind (citta-apacaya), (6) to perfectly understand expedient means (upāya).

What is perfect understanding of the arising of mind? It means truly understanding (yathābhūtam) the sixteen different ways that mind arises. The following are the sixteen different ways that mind arises:

(1) The arising of the imperceptible consciousness (vijñapti) of both the durational (dṛḍha) [consciousness] and its dwelling (bhājana), which refers to the appropriating-consciousness (ādāna-vijñāna).77

(2) The arising of the consciousness which takes the various marks of conditioned existence (saṃskāra-nimitta) as

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77 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 26.15.a: "'imperceptible' means that it is imperceptible regarding whether or not the eighth consciousness is able to apprehend the object. 'Durational' means that [the eighth consciousness] exists in the chain of continuity. 'Consciousness of the dwelling' means that [the eighth consciousness] grasps and holds the world of residence. "Appropriating-consciousness" indicates the essential nature of [this consciousness]. The Sanskrit term ādāna, meaning 'grasping' or 'holding', has three meanings: (1) grasping the bases (āśraya) of sense organs, (2) grasping the seeds (bīja), and (3) grasping the chain of persisting sequence." According to Jñānagarbha, "durational" refers to the store-consciousness which contains "all seeds". The store-consciousness is the locus which is perfumed by the habitual residues (vāsanā) of all defiled and pure dharmas. "Bhajana" means "sthāna". See, Nozawa, Daijō Bukkyō Yugagyō no Kenkyū, p.379.

In Bodhiruci's version, ch'i-shih (bhājana-vijñāna) was replaced by ch'i-shih-chien (bhājana-loka). T.16.679.a.28. It is quite obvious that Yüan- t'se's commentary follows Budhiruci's translation.

objects.[78] This refers to (i) the discriminative apperceptive-consciousness (vikalpaka manovijñāna) which directly grasps all object-realms (viṣaya), such as color (rūpa), etc., and which directly grasps internal and external object-realms and [their associated] impressions-and-feelings (Ch. chüeh-shou), and (ii) the discriminative apperceptive-consciousness which enters into various states of concentration, and sees the various Buddha Lands and the various Tathāgatas all in an instant.

(3) The arising of the consciousness which takes small marks (parittanimitta) as objects. This refers to 'the consciousness fixed on the world of desire'.

(4) The arising of the consciousness which takes large marks (mahānimitta) as objects. This refers to 'the consciousness fixed on the world of form'.

(5) The arising of the consciousness which takes immeasurable marks as objects. This refers to 'the consciousness fixed on the base of boundless space (ākāśānantya) and the base of boundless consciousness (vijñānānantyāyatana)'.

(6) The arising of the consciousness which takes subtle marks (sūkṣmanimitta) as objects. This refers to 'the consciousness fixed on the base of nothingness (ākiṃcanyāyatana)'.

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78 For a textual discrepancy between Hsüan-tsang's version and Tibetan version, see Lamotte, p. 116.

(7) The arising of the consciousness which takes marks of marginality as object. This refers to 'the consciousness fixed on the base of neither perception nor non-perception (*naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana*)'.79

(8) The arising of the consciousness of no-mark (*animitta-vijñapti*). This refers to supramundane consciousness (*lokottara*) and the consciousness for which the object has been extinguished (*nirodhālambaka*).

(9) The arising of the consciousness which is accompanied by suffering. This refers to hell-consciousness.

(10) The arising of the consciousness which is accompanied by all sorts of feelings (*misravedana*).80 This refers to the consciousness which is dominated by desire.

(11) The arising of the consciousness which is accompanied by joy (*prīti*). This refers to consciousness in the first and the second stages of meditation.

(12) The arising of the consciousness which is accompanied by pleasure (*sukha*). This refers to consciousness in the third stage of meditation.

(13) The arising of the consciousness which is accompanied by neither pain nor pleasure. This refers to

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79 (5) to (7) deal with mental states during the course of the four formless meditations. Cf. H. Gunaratana, *The Path of Serenity and Insight*, pp.107-122.
Yüan-t'se, *Shu*, 26.16.b-17.a: The "consciousness" in (3) to (7) refers to the store-consciousness. Cf. *Yogācārabhūmi*, T.30.580.a.

80 I.e., pleasure, pain, and neutral.

consciousness from the fourth stage of meditation to the base of neither perception nor non-perception.

(14) The arising of the consciousness which is accompanied by impurity. This refers to the consciousness which is associated with the [primary] defilements and the secondary defilements.

(15) The arising of the consciousness which is accompanied by goodness. This refers to the consciousness which is associated with faith, etc.

(16) The arising of the consciousness which is accompanied by the [karmically] indeterminate (avyākṛta). This refers to the consciousness which is not associated with those [good and impure dharmas] at all. (702.c.12)

What is the perfect understanding of the abiding of mind? It means that one truly understands the Suchness of noetic perception.

What is the perfect understanding of the emancipation of mind? It means that one truly understands the emancipation [of mind] from the two bondages, i.e., the bondage of marks and the bondage of gross wickedness. This perfect understanding liberates the mind from those [forms of bondage].

What is the perfect understanding of the increase of mind? It means that one truly understands the mind which is able to deal with the bondages of marks and gross wickedness. When that [i.e., bondage] grows and accumulates,

this (i.e., mind) also grows and accumulates.81 That is called 'perfectly understanding the increase of mind'.

What is the perfect understanding of the decrease of mind? It means that one truly understands the mind which is defiled by marks and the gross wickedness which needs to be cured. When 'that' declines and decreases, 'this' also declines and decreases.82 That is called 'perfect understanding of the decrease of the mind'.

What is the perfect understanding of expedient means? It means that one truly understands liberation, the spheres of sovereignty (abhibhvāyatana) and the spheres of permeation (kṛtsnāyatana),83 and the occasions for cultivating or discarding those methods.84

Son of Good Family, thus is a bodhisattva able to

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81 According to Yüan-t'se, "that" refers to the mind which is capable of dealing with the two bondages, and "this" refers to the "wisdom" which corresponds to that mind. See Shu 26.20.b. According to Han Ch'ing-ching, "this" refers to the "seeds" in the Store-consciousness. See, Chieh shen-mi ching fen-pieh yu-ch'ieh pin lueh-shih, III.48.a.

82 Yüan-t'se: "That" refers to the mind which is defiled by gross wickedness; "this" refers to the knowledge (dṛṣṭi) which is associated with that mind. See Shu, 26.21.a. According to Han Ch'ing-ching, "that" refers to the bondages of mark and gross wickedness; "this" refers to the defiled mind. See ibid.

83 These are models of meditation. Usually they are called the "eight liberations", the "eight spheres of sovereignty", and the "ten spheres of permeation". For details, see Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.336.b.ff. and Mahāvibhāṣā, T.27.434-442.

84 That is, those methods should be dismissed when they have been accomplished.

initiate enormous bodhisattva powers at any time. (702.c.23)

38. Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "World-Honored One, you have said that all sorts of feelings (vedanā) are completely destroyed in the Realm of Nirvana Without Remaining Support (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇadhātu). What feelings are completely destroyed in that Realm?"

"Son of Good Family, briefly there are two kinds of feeling completely destroyed without remainder. What are those two? They are (1) the feelings from sensory bases and gross wickedness (āśrayadauṣṭhulyavedita), and (2) the feelings from the object-realms which are caused by those [sensory bases] (tatphalaviṣayavedita).

The feelings from the sensory bases and gross wickedness are divided into four kinds: (1) the feelings of material (rūpa) sensory bases, (2) the feelings of non-material (ārūpa) sensory bases,85 (3) the feelings of gross wickedness as the matured fruit (phalāsiddha-dauṣṭhulyavedita), and (4) feelings of gross wickedness as the not-yet-matured fruit.86 The feeling as the matured

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85 The Tibetan version reads as (1) "the feeling of material gross wickedness" and (2) "the feeling of non-material gross wickedness". See Lamotte, p.119.

86 Yüan-t'se, Shu, 26.25.a: (1) the feeling of material sensory bases refers to the feeling which is associated with the five kinds of sensory consciousness; (2) the feeling of non-material sensory bases refers to the feeling which is associated with the sixth consciousness; (3) the feeling of gross wickedness as the matured fruit refers to the present feeling which originates from past ignorance and karmic volitions, and so on; (4) the feeling of gross wickedness as the not-yet-matured fruit refers to

fruit refers to that which is presently experienced. The feelings as the not-yet-matured fruits refer to that which will be experienced in the future.

Feelings of object-realms resulting from those [sensory bases] are divided into four kinds: (1) the feeling of 'sustencance',87 (2) the feeling of 'living necessity' (pariskāra), (3) the feeling of 'enjoyment', and (4) the feeling of 'obsession'.

In the Realm of Nirvana With Remaining Support, [a bodhisattva] has completely destroyed the feeling as the not-yet-matured fruit. He possesses the feeling which originates from its antidote, 'illuminating contact' (vidyāsaṃsparśa).88 He experiences what is intersubjective (Ch. kung-yu). He still has feelings as the matured fruit.89 Furthermore, two kinds of feelings are completely destroyed. What remains is only the feeling originating from the

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future feelings which will originate because of karma and the defilements.

87 Ch. i-ch'ih; Skt. ādhāraṇa. Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.288.b.20-28. There are six kinds of "sustenance": (1) sustenance of construction, e.g., earth; (2) the sustenance of shelter, e.g., house; (3) the sustenance of food; (4) the substenance of security; (5) the substenance of sunlight and moonlight; and (6) the substenance of the "four foods".

88 There are two kinds of "contact" (sparśa): ignorant contact and illuminating contact. Therefore, feelings are also of two kinds: feelings which originate from ignorant contact and feelings which originate from illuminating contact. Cf., Yogācārabhūmi, T.30.805.b.22-29.

89 That is, a bodhisattva in the Realm of Nirvāṇa With Remaining Support is still subject to physical suffering.

illuminating contact experienced at the present. In the Realm of Nirvāṇa Without Remaining Support, this, too, is completely destroyed.90 Hence I declare that in the Realm of Nirvāṇa Without Remaining Support all sorts of feelings are completely destroyed without remainder." (703.a.9)

39. At that moment, when the World Honored had finished the [above] teaching, he further told Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Well, well, now you have raised questions to the Tathāgata in accordance with the ultimately pure and profound path of yoga that you have practiced well. [This shows that] you have attained yoga in the most skillful, definitive way. I have taught you the purest, the most profound path of yoga which is the same as that which has been, and will be, declared by all the Perfect Enlightened Ones in the past and the future. Sons and Daughters of Good Family should practice assiduously the above teaching." (703.a.16)

40. At that moment, the World-Honored One composed the following verses to restate the above teaching:

> If one carelessly practices the yoga provisionally
> designated by the teaching,
> One will lose the great benefits.
> If one abides in this teaching and yoga,
> And practice it correctly, one will attain Perfect
> Awakening.

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90 "This" refers to the feeling which is originated by illuminating contact.

It is impossible for anyone who claims that he has
attained such insight to attain liberation.
If his "insight" is taken as identical with the
attainment of Dharma,
Maitreya, he is far from yoga,
Just as the earth is far from the sky.
Benefiting sentient beings resolutely, yet not claiming
credit.
After having attained enlightenment, one should
deligently cultivates oneself to benefit sentient
beings.
A wise man practices through infinite time,
He can attain supreme joy by eliminating defilements.
If someone preaches the Dharma out of desire,
He grasps desire in the name of abolishing desire.
It is just like an ignorant man who has found an
invaluable jewel of dharma,
And yet still wanders and begs.
Addiction to debate, quarrel, and discursive
construction:
Abandon! Initiate high spirit and vigor,
Practice calming and discerning with effort in order to
save heavenly beings and the human world.
(703.a.26)

41. At that moment, Bodhisattva Maitreya further asked the Buddha: "What is the name of the preceding teaching in the

dharma-gate that discloses the concealed? What [teaching] do I obey and practice?"

The Buddha answered Bodhisattva Maitreya: "Son of Good Family, it is named the definitive teaching of yoga. You should obey and practice this definitive teaching of yoga."

In the assembly where this definitive teaching of yoga had been presented, 600,000 sentient beings initiated the Mind of Supreme Perfect Enlightenment; 300,000 Disciples were detached from dust and dirt[91], and obtained the Pure Dharma-Eye (*dharmacakṣus*); 150,000 *Śrāvakas* eliminated all the "outflows" (*āsrava*)[92] and liberated their mind; 75,000 Bodhisattvas attained the Great Yoga of Intensive Thinking (*mahāyogamanasikāra*)[93]. (703.b.6)

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91 "Dust" and "dirt" are metaphors either for defilement (*kleśa*) and dormant proclivity (*anuśaya*) or for the duality of grasper and grasped, and defilement and dormant proclivity. See *Yogācārabhūmi*, T.30.778.c.7-13.

92 H. Gunaratana briefly explains the term *āsrava* (Pāli: *āsava*): "The term signifies certain fundamental defilements which 'flow out' from the mind, sustaining the process of *saṃsāra*. In the earliest texts the *āsavas* are usually given as three in number: the canker of sensual desire (*kāmāsava*), the canker of (craving for) existence (*bhavāsava*), and the canker of ignorance (*avijjāsava*). Other texts, particularly those of the Abhidhammapiṭaka, add a fourth, the canker of wrong views (*diṭṭhāsava*)." See *The path of Serenity and Insight*, p.135.

93 Yüan-t'se, *Shu* 26.32.b: "'Great' means the emptiness of personal identity and existents (*pudgaladharma-nairātmya*); 'yoga' means calming and discerning. The term means the intensive thinking about calming-discerning on the emptiness of personal identity and existents".

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